Journal in Entirety by unknown

SPRING 1989
VOL. 44 • NO. 1
 
 
!"#$%&
!"##$%&'%()*+
!"#$%&#'()*%'&"
,"--"./%0'%&1223-4
!"#$%&&#"'#$ '()&*#")+,-'./%#-#01',23'4%&-%1'5*63)%&
0'%5."6"-%78(922"$
!"#$%&&#"'#$ '7%*/#3)&*'(#-)2%&&'()&*#"1
!"#$%&#'()'"+#,%&-).'/!(
:32239;%<=#9/9;>%!%"8)2&'5+/##-'#$ './%#-#01
?963@%A)-@$>%96--%"'./%#-#0)+,-'5%:)2,"1
!"@%&9;B="22>%!%"8)2&'5+/##-'#$ './%#-#01
C$)-D+")-%&/13>%5%#6-'./%#-#0)+,-';2)<%"&)*1
E3*/9#@%C"3.F"-#9."#>%=68%';2)<%"&)*1'=)<)2)*1'5+/##-
5*1..%,34+"#>%4%&-%1'./%#-#0)+,-'5%:)2,"1
59#9/%G9-*94."#>%7%*/#3)&*'./%#-#0)+,-'5+/##-'#$ '>/)#
H9#"./%G21$@>%;2)<%"&)*1'#$ '7,2+/%&*%"
E9-@$%(9@@1I>%=68%';2)<%"&)*1'=)<)2)*1'5+/##-
J9-.9*/93%("@K)/1->%76,20'./,)'?/6"+/@'A,208#8@'./,)-,23
5.9-2"$%JL1K3>%!,&*#"@'B,0#&@'C)0%"),
M9)2%J);#3*/>%./%#-#0)+,-'?#2&#"*)6:'#$ 'D"%,*%"'?#-6:E6&
?9-9%E1="#.>%A#&*#2';2)<%"&)*1
C1L9#@%5-$@"#>%.123,-%'5%:)2,"1@'.#"#2*#
G'%:"42"$%@"%51)F9>%?,23-%"'5+/##-'#$ './%#-#01
G"1-9#@%5L"".>%="%F';2)<%"&)*1'5+/##-'#$ './%#-#01
<;14%N1-D>%G%0%2*';2)<%"&)*1
CL9%N)-D>%;2)*%3'7%*/#3)&*'?/6"+/@'H6,-,'B,:I6"@'7,-,1&),
<22%3-O)3#3"4%#"D9#@3-D%4)=4*#3B.31-4>%=9*+%344)"4>%B"#;34431-4%.1%#"B#3-.>
;9-)4*#3B.4%P1#%4)=;34431->%9-@%=11+4%P1#%#"63"L%4/1)2@%="%9@@#"44"@%.1Q
$01)'23456)78459:;
<4=)#$%!/"121D3*92%5";3-9#$
RST%J'%G"I3-D.1-%<6"-)">%:32;1#">%,N%TSUVS
W<XQ%%YZV[YZY[RU\Z
LLL'94=)#$4";3-9#$'"@)]-"L4]B)=23*9.31-4]94=)#$./"1K1)#-92
^%&1B$#3D/.%RS_R%=$%<4=)#$%!/"121D3*92%5";3-9#$
 1 ! !
 2 ! !
SPRING 1989 
Volume 44, Number 1 
Artificial Intelligence and Spiritual Life ...................... 5 
Paul C. Vitz 
From Pluralism towards Catholicity? 
The United Methodist Church after the 
General Conference of 1988 ..................... ............. ...... 17 
Geoffrey Wainwright 
The World Will End in 1919 
Daniel Among the Victorians ............... ....................... 29 
Stanley D. Walters 
Pannenberg's Quest for the Proleptic Jesus .............. 51 
R. David Rightmire 
Calvin's Contribution to Universal Education .... ...... 77 
Ivan L. Zabilka 
Book Reviews .................................................................. 97 
Published in April and October by 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Postmaster: Send address changes to 
The Asbury Theological Journal 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
204 North Lexington 
Wilmore, KY 40390-1199 
USPS 547-440 
Continuing 
The Asbury Seminarian 
 3 !
iliiiJRNAL 
SPRING 1989 
Volume 44, Number 1 
David L. McKenna 
Publisher 
Jerry L. Walls 
Associate Editor 
Carolyn B. Smith 
Assistant Editor 
Sylvia A. Duttweiler 
Editorial A ssistant 
Robert T. Bridges 
Editor in Chief 
Laurence W. Wood 
Editor 
J. Steven O'Malley 
Book Review Editor 
Eric H. Johnson 
Managing Editor 
EDITORIAL BOARD 
David L. McKenna 
Preside11t a11d Publisher 
Robert T. Bridges 
Vice Preside11t for Seminary 
Advancement, Editor in Chief 
Laurence W. Wood 
Frank Paul Morris Professor of 
Systematic Theology, Editor 
Jerry L. Walls 
Assistant Professor of Philosophy 
and Religion, Associate Editor 
Eric H. Johnson 
Director of Communications, 
Managing Editor 
J. Steven O'Malley 
Professor of Church History 
and Historical Theology, 
Book Review Editor 
David D. Bundy 
Assistant Professor of 
Christian Origins 
Allan Coppedge 
Associate Professor of Theology 
Donald Demaray 
Granger E. and Anna A. Fisher 
Professor of Preaching 
Teresa Wren and Mark Mealey 
Student Representatives 
BOARD OF REFERENCE 
George W. Coats 
Professor of Old Testament, 
Lexington Theological Seminary 
Stanley Hauerwas 
Professor of Theological Ethics, 
Duke University 
Helmut Nausner 
Superintendent, 
Methodist Church i11 Austria 
W. Richard Stegner 
Professor of New Testame11t, 
Garrett-Evangelical 
Theological Seminary 
Printed in U.S.A. 
 4 !
THE ASBURY THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL provides a scholarly forum for 
thorough discussion of issues relevant to Christian thought and faith, and to the 
nature and mission of the church. The Journal addresses those concerns and 
ideas across the curriculum which interface with Christian thought, life and 
ministry. 
The primary resource for contributions to The Journal is the Asbury 
Seminary faculty who engage in dialogue with both the roots of our religious 
heritage and contemporary thought. Scholars from other academic disciplines 
and various backgrounds are invited to submit articles for publication. 
The positions espoused in articles in 171e Journal do not necessarily 
represent the views of the editors or of Asbury Theological Seminary. 
Books for review and articles for consideration should be mailed to: Eric H. 
Johnson, Asbury Theological Seminary, Wilmore, KY 40390-1199. Telephone 
(606) 858-3581. Manuscripts should be in English and typed double-spaced on 
white bond paper, 8Yi x 11 inches, with an accompanying computer disk copy 
when that is possible. Sermons, poetry and devotional materials are not used. 
Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless a self-addressed envelope 
with sufficient postage is provided. Queries are welcome, and a style sheet is 
available upon request. Modest honorarium payments to authors follow 
acceptance. 
Articles in The Journal are indexed in The Christian Periodical Index and 
Religion Index One: Periodicals (RIO); book reviews are indexed in Index to 
Book Reviews in Religion (/BRR). Both RIO and IBRR are published by the 
American Theological Library Association, 5600 South Woodlawn Avenue, 
Chicago, IL 60637, and are available online through BRS Information 
Technologies and DIALOG Information Services. Articles, starting with vol. 43, 
are abstracted in Religious and Theological Abstracts. 
Volumes in microfiJm of The Asbury Theological Journal (Vol. 41-) and The 
Asbury Seminarian (Vol. 1-40) are available from University Microfilms 
International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106. 
Articles and reviews may be copied for personal or internal use, and permission 
to reprint aJI or portions of any of the contents may be granted upon request to 
the managing editor. 
Subscriptions: 
One year (2 issues), $5.00 
(outside the U.S. $8.00); 
Two years, $8.()() ($14.00); 
Three years, $11.00 ($20.00). 
 5 !
Artificial Intelligence and 
Spiritual Life1 
PAULC. VITZ 
Angels, whether one believes in them or not, are defined as rational beings 
without bodies. By contrast, we humans are known to be rational beings with 
bodies. In a standard Judea-Christian framework, humans are not only ra-
tional beings that happen to have bodies, they are embodied rational beings. 
That is, human mental life and human bodily life are theologically conceptual-
ized as inextricably interwoven. The Greeks and their modern idealistic heirs, 
on the other hand, see the human mind as only accidentally connected to the 
body. For those taking this approach, we humans are rational beings who just 
happen lo have bodies--but our bodies are only a necessary accident of having 
a physical existence and are not intrinsic to who and what we are. For these 
theorists, there is no necessary link between the nature of our body and the 
nature of our mind. 
I still remember, about 1960, as a graduate student in psychology, when I 
was first introduced to the concept of a computer program. My professors 
emphasized that the beauty and power of a program lay in its independence of 
the particular physical material in which it might exist. A program, like a 
statement in formal logic, could be written in chalk on a blackboard, it could 
exist as a sequence of ones and zeros as written in machine language, it could 
be punched as holes in a deck of IBM cards, it could be a magnetic pattern on 
tape, or it could be a sequence of electronic states in the computer itself where 
the program could be stored and then retrieved and run. These examples 
should make it clear that a computer program, in its very nature, is remarka-
bly free from any particular physical stuff. A program can be embodied in 
almost any material so long as the material in question allows one to fix the 
symbols expressing the program. And a program can be run in a computer 
that uses widely different basic electronic elements. The elements must allow 
for a rapid and reliable binary representation--e.g., on or off. However, vac-
uum tubes or silicon chips or who knows what in the future can serve this 
function. In short, the program with its structure exists independent of any 
particular physical medium. Strange as it may sound, a computer program is 
Paul C. Vitz, Ph.D., is professor of psychology at New York University. 
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somewhat closer to an angel, that is to a rational intelligence without a body, 
than it is to the mind of a human being--at least that is the claim being made 
here. 
In fact, this fundamental difference between a computer program and the 
human mind has long been established empirically in the biological sciences. 
And in the past few decades research in neurophysiology has very thoroughly 
elaborated and deepened the evidence that the human mind is dependent on 
the different particular materials of the brain. The research is well known, 
though apparently the implication--that computer programs are quite different 
from the human mind--is not commonly appreciated. Over 150 years ago, the 
great German physiologist Johannes Muller first clearly articulated what is 
known as the "law of specific nerve energies." Put simply, what this means is 
that a given nerve gives rise to a sense quality that depends on the specific 
character of the nerve. Stimulation of a visual nerve gives rise to visual 
experience; stimulation of an auditory nerve gives rise to the experience of 
sound, and so on. For example, in hearing there are specific nerve fibers in 
the cochlea for almost every specific sound frequency. Thus, the hair cells on 
the organ of Corti at the bottom of the cochlea respond to high frequencies, 
while those at the top respond to low frequency sound. Now this principle is 
far more general than the qualitative experience of the five senses for it 
characterizes the central nervous system--e.g., the cortex--as well as the 
peripheral senses. For example, recent research shows that this kind of 
qualitative specificity is present in the auditory cortex where it is known as a 
tonotopic map.2 That is, the frequencies to which the hair cells in the cochlea 
are sensitive are mapped into columns of cortical cells--with each column of 
cells responding only to a particular and very narrow band of tone frequencies. 
The columns of cells are laid out in a spatial pattern that reproduces the 
spatial structure in the cochlea. In short, the particular neurons in the 
auditory cortex are not interchangeable, general-purpose neurons like silicon 
chips; rather they are highly specific and qualitatively different. 
This same principle characterizes the visual system--indeed here the degree 
of specificity is, if anything, even greater than in the case of audition.3 In the 
retina it has long been known that there are three different kinds of color-
sensitive receptors (cones) plus light-sensitive receptors (rods). However, 
research starting three decades ago has demonstrated that retinal ganglion 
cells are also specialized for certain elementary kinds of light stimulation as 
well as for retinal Jocation--the best identified types of ganglion cells are 
known as X,Y and W cells; in the lateral geniculate nucleus (part of the brain) 
visual neurons are specialized for one of four colors, for location on the retina, 
and so on. In the visual cortex the specialized complexity expands even 
further. Here we find groups of visual neurons specialized for straight lines of 
different orientations ranging from vertical to horizontal (or spatial frequency 
analyzers); cortical visual neurons appear to exist that respond only to 
binocular disparity, while other groups of cortical neurons deal only with color 
processing, still separate systems appear to specialize in form and movement 
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perception. In short, throughout the structure of visual cortex there are 
qualitatively distinct channels analyzing or responding to elementary visual 
properties. Typically these channels process the various qualitatively different 
kinds of visual information in parallel, that is, at the same time. 
Since the mid-nineteenth century it has been known that elsewhere in the 
cortex there are special systems both for understanding speech (Wernicke's 
area) and for producing speech (Broca's area). The motor cortex is another 
major area of specialized neurons. Indeed the cortex is now known to consist 
of a very large number of interconnected sub-systems of neurons, each with 
specialized qualitatively different sensitivities. One major consequence of this 
now-established understanding of the cortex is that to simulate the human 
mind it will be necessary to simulate the human body. 
This extension of the law of specific nerve energies from the peripheral 
sensory system to the cortex clearly shows that the human brain operates on a 
principle that is the opposite of a digital computer. That is, digital computers 
are made of identical and interchangeable electronic elements. The possibility 
that certain chips, for example, could only process one kind of information 
(e.g., a payroll but not a mathematical equation or a business letter), would 
destroy the utility, the very raison d'etre of the modern digital computer. 
This is not to imply that all cortical neurons are qualitatively different from 
each other. Certainly within a cortical neural system there is some 
redundancy. Thus, a whole column of cells in the visual cortex may be 
sensitive to the same line orientation (or spatial frequency orientation); but 
this local redundancy should not be allowed to keep us from understanding 
that many different cortical areas are involved in qualitatively different kinds 
of processing and experience. 
In other words, the understanding of the cortex today is that it consists of a 
complex, interconnected group of sub-systems. Each of the many sub-systems 
represents a specialized and qualitatively different kind of processing; often 
these sub-systems are also associated with qualitatively different conscious 
experience. All th is means that the basic neural elements--or the "chips"--in 
each sub-system would have to be highly specific and different from those in 
each other sub-system; the same is also probably true for the large number of 
interconnecting neural structures. 
A different but closely related fundamental biological fact is that the 
nervous system and the human body are intimately linked with properties of 
the external physical world. As just one example, consider the range of light 
waves that the human eye is sensitive to. This range, known as the visible 
spectrum, is from about 380 nm (violet) to 760 nm (red). Now the potential 
spectrum of light (electro-magnetic energy) is enormously greater and ranges 
from extremely short waves (gamma rays) to very long radio waves and AC 
circuits. The visible spectrum is thus a very small slice of this potential 
spectrum. However, it is reasonable to assume that the human eye is only 
concerned with the light available on the surface of the earth. To be able to 
see waves that onJv exist elsewhere in the cosmos would he a wa!\te of 
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biological energy and tissue. The human eye is, however, responsive to almost 
all of the spectrum that actually reaches the surface of the earth with any 
significant amount of energy. Only the relatively small ultra-violet and infra-
red parts of the spectrum are not part of our sensitivity. That is, the hum an 
visible spectrum is close to the available spectrum on the surface of the earth. 
Over and over again scient ists find evidence of this type showing how the body 
is adaptcd--cven fine-tuned--to its environment. 
There arc two well-known major theoretical understandings of the complex 
and intimate connection between the human body and the external physical 
world.4 Among scientists today the most common is the atheistic or agnostic 
theory of evolution. This familiar intellectual framework assumes that life 
originated by chance and then evolved or developed over many millions of 
years. For those who hold this view, life forms are understood to be a 
marvelously complex, long-term, natural response or adaptation to the 
surrounding physical and biological reality. 
My own vicw--which can be called theistic evolution--accepts much of the 
previous position; but, like many others, I assume that the physical and 
biological world was created by God. In this framework the origin and 
evolution of life over time is a God-governed phenomenon. However, the 
nature of how the changes took place is a scientific question that can be 
investigated without reference lo the Divinity. In spite of theoretical conOicl 
about origins, both the atheistic and theistic versions of evolution accept 
almost all of the same scientific findings. That is, they both assum e that life in 
all its forms is closely connected to the outside environment in which life has 
developed and to which it is adapted. Thus, both kinds of scientists assume an 
animal 's nervous system can't be understood when separated from its body 
and neither the nervous system nor the body can be understood when 
separated from the animal's environment, since the three constitute a mutually 
interacting system. 
The major point that mi nd is embodied is, of course, not a new one. For 
example, recently it has been emphasized in the writings of the information 
theorist Donald MacKay5 and in the discussions of Artificial Intelligence (AT) 
by the philosopher Dreyfus, who sums his position by a quote from the poet 
Yeats: "Man can embody the truth, but he cannot know it."6 
I am aware that some of the difficulties that arise from ignoring the body 
arc beginning lo receive serious attention in Al and related areas. Neural 
nets, now fairly common, are a small step toward a more neurological or 
"body-like" model of the mind. Nevertheless, very serious difficulties remain 
before even a modest simulation of the biological basis of mind appears 
possible. One expression of the difficulties involved in the simulation of the 
human brain is represented by the terms "hardware" and "software." 
Hardware refers to the fixed physical and electronic components in a 
computer or robot. However, there is no real hardware analogy to the human 
body where even muscle and bone tissue arc, at best, a kind of "software." A 
computer program is called software, but there is no evidence that the 
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program level actually exists for humans. The body exists and conscious 
experience exisls, bul lhere is no evidence lhal a level analogous to a 
computer program exists as a functioning part of lhe brain/ mind. The 
difficulties involved derive from the fact that computers and robots are based 
on silicon while animal life is primarily carbon based. Computers are not, in 
principle, restricted to silicon systems, but they are all based on silicon 
(including neural nets) for what appear to be practical rcasons--namely silicon 
is cheap and allows very reliable binary representation. As such, silicon 
systems are devoted to dryness, so Lo speak, while carbon systems are devoted 
to wetness. Water quickly destroys or " kills" a computer, while too much 
dryness quickly kills humans and other animals. The brain is very much a wel 
system and simulating il will have lo involve simulating th is very fundamental 
property which is so different from computers. In brief, the human brain 
consists of d ifferent kinds of what might be called "wetware" and hardware 
and software are irrelevant o r misleading terms. In any case my fundamental 
point here is that a true simulation of the human mind would require a 
simulation of the human brain and body. Whether lhis is possible remains to 
be seen. 
In fact the intellectual world of the digital computer and of research on Al 
is often far removed from lhc body and the world within which the body lives. 
As previously no ted, the advocates of digital compuler programs as models of 
mind reject, or al least commonly ignore, the connections between the mind 
and body. They lend to present a very abstracted or idealized view of reason 
and of mental activity in general. With this as background and context, it is 
now time to focus on our central topic--nameiy, artificial intelligence and the 
spiritual life. 
First, I wish to emphasize that the prior point on the interrelationship of 
the mind and body is proposed as an analogy to a similar interrelationship 
between mind and spirit. Just as our mind is inextricably bound up with the 
body and physical reality, so it is likewise bound up with God and spiritual 
reality. Thus, I starl wilh the assumption that there is a lransccndent spiritual 
realm, and that the human mind is conslanlly interacting with this realm. 
Now, I am fully aware of the fact lhal it is precisely this assumption that is 
rejected by many scientists, especially those in the world of art ificial 
intelligence. I wi ll examine the basis of this rejection and present a case for 
the existence of spiritual reality. Obviously, this realm must first be accepted 
as existing before one can accept its relevance for an understanding of mind. 
Therefore, the subsequent remarks are primarily addressed to the skeptical or 
atheistic scientist. 
Throughoul human history and its varied cultures, three great external 
realms of reality commonly have been assumed to exist. These are lhe 
external physical world, lhe world of other minds and the transcendent 
spiritual world (for example, of God or the gods). An interesting feature that 
these lhrce presumed realities share is that we cannot prove the existence of 
any of them. Indeed, some years ago the prominent philosopher Alvin 
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Plantinga published a very important proof on the subjcct.7 Bric ny, what 
Plantinga was able to prove was that the degree of rational and empirical 
uncertainty about the existence of other minds and about the existence of God 
is exactly the same. That is, the ra tional grounds for accepting the existence of 
both of these realms has the same structure, and involves the same 
assumptions--assumptions Plantinga shows are often question-begging in both 
cases. For example, we never directly experience other minds and our 
assumption that they exist is based on an analogy with our own mental life. 
Plantinga's proof itself is sophisticated and cannot be summarized easily, but 
its general structure is not hard to outline. Plantinga first systematically shows 
that neither natural theology nor natural "atheology'' off crs a satisfying 
solution to the problem of a rational justification of belief in God 's existence 
or o f God's non-existence. He then tries another approach to the justification 
of belief in God by exploring its analogies and connections with a similar 
question--the "problem of other minds"; that is, how do you justify the 
existence of other people's minds. Plantinga goes on to "defend the analogical 
argument for other minds against current criticism and argue that it is as good 
an answer as we have to the question of other minds. But it turns out that the 
analogical argument finally succumbs to a malady exact ly resembling the one 
afnict ing the teleological argument [for God's existence]." He concludes that 
"belief in o ther minds and belief in God arc in the same epistemological boat; 
hence if either is rational, so is the other. But obviously the form er is rational; 
so, therefore, is the lattcr."8 His formal proof for this conclusion has stood 
without a successful challenge for over 20 years. 
Elsewhere Plantinga shows that just as we can't prove the existence of 
other minds, it is also impossible to prove the existence of external physica l 
reality, or even to prove the existence of the past.9 Again, he shows that the 
failure in each proof is identical to the failure in the teleological argum ent for 
God's existence. One obvious implication of Plantinga's work is that if 
scientists, for example, tend to assume the existence of physical reality and of 
other minds but to reject that of God, then this is done on non-rational 
grounds. Before turning to some of the non-rational reasons behind the 
rejection of the spiritual realm, it will be useful to discuss how it is that the 
existence of the external world is commonly accepted. First, the problem of 
proving the existence of external reality arises once one accepts the fact that 
our knowledge of external reality is always mediated by the nervous system. 
All we arc directly aware of is our own states of mind. We must--we can 
only--infcr an external reality existing behind and act ing as a cause of our 
sensations and perception. The validity of this inf crencc is what cannot be 
proved. We may accept Plant inga's reasoning in this matter o r we may be 
convinced on other grounds that proving the existence of the physical world is 
not possible. There is, of course, a long line of skeptics on this issue in 
Weste rn philosophy (including David Hume, Bishop Berkcly and Thomas 
Reid), whose writings certainly support Plan tinga's conclusion. 
Nevert heless, almost no one has ever doubted physical reality to the point 
Anijicia/ Inteffigence and Spi1itual Ufe 11 
of trying seriously to live by such a position. If a person lived on the basis of 
such doubl il is nol clear why one would eat food, avoid walking into walls, or 
even bother to get dressed. A few idealist philosophers in the last two 
hundred years or so seem to be the intellectual representatives of a position 
that denies or comes close to denying the physical world. 
The overwhelming majority of scientists, and of average citizens of the 
world, have always accepted the existence of an external physical reality. 
Scientific theories are, after all, about something outside of us. The ground 
for this acceptance seems to be that we are so made that sensory and 
perceptual experience carries with it the overwhelmingly convincing notion 
that it is external reality that is experienced. Put somewhat diff crently, our 
normal interaction with what appears to be physical reality naturally creates a 
firm conviction of its existence. 
Of course, in some rare instance one's perception of external reality may 
be faulty. There are such things as illusions and hallucinations. But to believe 
that the whole realm of physical reality doesn't exist, or that most, or even 
much, of our perceptual experience is without an exte rnal source, would be 
considered--wo uld be--bizarre indeed. Except for certain kinds of 
philosophers, such as the just-mentioned idealists (who arc given a kind of 
philosophers' license to suspend common sense), anyone who fai led to believe 
in the external world would be judged as suffering from a mental pathology. 
Likewise, our belief in the existence of other minds comes from interaction 
with other people. Sensory contact with a person plus interaction involving 
language and symbols appears adequate for us to reliably assume the existence 
of othe r minds. The tendency to interpret other minds as existing is so strong 
that often it reaches the point of projecting mind onto something which is not 
mind at all. Children project human minds onto many animals; even trees or 
inanimate objects, especially at night, are often understood by children as 
having minds. Anthropologists commonly note that in so-called primitive 
cultures certain special objects, such as a mask or talisman, sometimes are 
supers titio usly und ers tood as possessing mind and spi rit. This 
anthropomorphism is one tendency scientists have traditionally guarded 
against. However, some of those in Al seem especially susceptible to this 
error of projecting mind onto objects. For example, one prominent Al 
scientist attributes beliefs to thermostats.10 Apparently thermostats have three 
beliefs: it is too hot, it is too cold, it is just right. That a thermostat has beliefs 
seems to me to be a rather crude, if updated, example of anthropomorphic 
thinking. 
Although even Al scientists may sometimes see in, or project mind onto 
things or places where it doesn't exist, few seriously propose that other minds 
don't exist. Even if mind is assumed to be an expression of matter, few doubt 
that other people's integrated consciousness--that is, thoughts, feelings and 
purposes--actually exists. For all practical purposes everyone assumes both 
the existence of other minds and also of physical reality. 
It is important to note that a crucial issue with respect to initiating and 
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maintaining contact with external physical or mental reality is whether the 
person has the wi ll or desire to initiate the interaction with the presumed 
reality. For example, suppose you find a man who is on an artificial respirator 
in a darkened room and who claims there is no external reality. After some 
investigation you discover that he has not walked, or used his eyes or cars for 
some time. His last tape-recorded utterance is a comment to the effect that 
there is no external physical world. You desire to cure him of this intellectual 
ailmcnt--one obviously supported by his markedly reduced physical and 
perceptual activity. A reasonable strategy would be to strengthen his muscles, 
get him to open his eyes, unstop his cars and lo talk with him often. Jn time, 
you, his guide, would ask him lo walk and later to come out of his room and, 
enter the outside world. Therapy for his pathological intellectual position is 
thus to immerse him in the direct intcractional experience of the reality that 
he denies. In this case there is every reason to believe that such a program 
would convince him of the realist position. But such a procedure depends 
upon his willingness to cooperate with you and, as for proof, that would 
remain, as always, impossible. 
Suppose you find someone who not only denies that other mi nds exist--but 
lives as though other minds don't exist. (Such a position, of course, seems to 
be quite rare.) Let us also suppose, as would be likely, that our subject's 
condition is strongly supported by his social isolation. He lives alone and has 
for years. He never speaks lo anyone. As a result , his lack of belief in other 
minds is hardly surprising. He remembers interacting with people when he 
was young, but these experiences he attributes to a childish and immature 
understanding of things al the time. Again, this man's condition is 
fundamentally a mental pathology and correction would involve the slow 
introduction of interpersonal communication into his life. In time he would 
discover fri ends, and enemies; perhaps even love. Years later, if he were to be 
reminded by an old friend of his form er belief that other minds didn't exist, 
the only answer, and a likely one, would be Lo look at his fri end and laugh. In 
short, interaction with other minds is necessary in order to accept their 
existence, indeed in most cases it is sufficient. 
Let me suggest that the situation with respect to belief in the transcendent 
spiritual realm is similar. First note that most of the people who deny not only 
the existence of God but also the entire spiritual realm constitute a relatively 
small group that seems to have come into existence in Western Europe about 
250 years ago. They live in rather peculiar environments, and most of them 
have been tra ined in science or other rationalistic and int ellectual disciplines. 
They tend to work in laboratories and universities which arc highly specialized 
and pecul iar places. They tend to socialize mostly with those having similar 
skeptical outlooks. What they mean by " real thi nking" is the mental 
manipulation of abstract written symbols, often numbers, or other very digital 
clements. To such people a proper belief system or world view is something 
constructed by correct sequencing of these symbols with occasional checks on 
whether some kind of observa tion backs it up. Thal is, their world view is 
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something that exists in a digital code and they seem to assume that digital 
codes are adequate for representing any kind of question, problem or 
knowledge. The very notion of a belief system based on an oral tradition of 
knowledge, or on analog information coded in the body and often unavailable 
to conscious verbal expression, or on a world view based primarily on direct 
personal experience, doesn't occur to them. 
Also "strange" is the fact that these people never, or almost never, go to 
church or to a synagogue or read religious writings. But, most peculiar of all 
is that they appear never to pray, to meditate or to engage in other spiritual 
exercises. That is, they rarely, if ever, use the well-known procedures for 
getting and staying in contact with the spiritual realm. 
Again, the answer to this pathology is not some vain attempt to prove the 
existence of God or of spiritual reality. As in the other cases this is impossible 
anyway. The answer is to try to convince such a person to pray, that is to talk 
with God, or listen for God's voice, or to engage in other spiritual activities. If 
such a person refuses to interact with the transcendent and is determined to 
remain in his spiritual isolation, there is little else one can do. 
This requirement that one engage in prayer and meditation is a serious 
one. For example, if someone doubted some astronomical claim (such as the 
existence of moons around Jupiter) or the reality of a whole level of physical 
existence (such as sub-atomic particles), an honest search for an answer would 
require a number of things. First, the person, if ignorant of astronomy or 
physics, would need a guide--a trained scientist--and would have to become at 
least something of an amateur scientist. It would take considerable time and 
commitment from the seeker. After all, observations are often ambiguous; 
and, in any case, observations don't reliably interpret themselves. 
In almost all religious and spiritual traditions, a knowledgeable person--a 
guide, if you will--is needed. And, prayer and meditation are the primary 
instruments, the " telescopes," for contacting or interacting with spiritual 
reality. No scientist who refuses to seek religious experience has the 
intellectual right to say that spiritual reality doesn't exist or that the mind 
cannot be affected by that reality. A person who has had no religious 
experience is simply unqualified to comment on the existence, much less the 
nature, of most spiritual phenomena. Please note, I am not saying that the 
person must have a particular interpretation or understanding of his religious 
or spiritual experience--only that he must have had a reasonable amount of 
such experience. Perhaps, after various religious experiences the person will 
conclude it was all an illusion or something other than what it first appeared to 
be. Fine. Scientific observations, too, can be mistaken; they can be artifacts, 
and so can particular spiritual experiences. Or perhaps even all such 
experience is illusory. However, a scientist without systematic empirical 
understanding of a phenomenon is not in a position to give informed criticism. 
And a scientist who was ignorant of and refused to get involved with the 
experimental methodology used to demonstrate that a major phenomenon 
existed would be considered irrelevant to evaluating the claim. If he actively 
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persisted in rejecting the phenomenon on a priori grounds, his colleagues 
would rightfully dismiss his claims as unqualified--even should subsequent 
research prove his position to be right. 
I trust the argument is clear. Religion for most people is supported by 
religious or spiritual experience in which people claim a relationship or 
interaction with a spiritual realm. This may mean interaction with God, or 
Jesus, or with a dead person, or even with evil spirits. To evaluate the validity 
of these extremely important claims requires that an investigator seek contact 
with spiritual reality. There are various ways people do this--but first they 
must have the will to actively seek. The desire to seek, of course, is something 
rooted in psychological factors and has relatively little to do with what is 
usually called by such terms as "reason" or "evidence." Given the will to seek, 
then the most common instruments or techniques for contact with spiritual 
reality are prayer and meditation; they are, the telescopes of the religious 
person. No true scientist should be afraid to seek new knowledge or be afraid 
to look through any kind of telescope. 
The primary reason for presenting the preceding case for belief in the 
transcendent realm is because of its bearing on the intellectual problem of 
artificial intelligence. Al is involved in simulation of intelligence--often this 
means simulating the human mind. The possible existence of mental 
interaction with spiritual reality, in particular with God, relates to this task. 
For example, if God exists and if some people, some of the time, are doing 
God's will and not their own will--then the problem of simulating human 
mental life takes on serious difficulties, to put it mildly. On the other hand, if 
God and other spiritual "persons" or forces are purely psychological 
phenomena, projected into " heaven" so to speak, then such concepts may add 
complexity to simulating the mind, but no dramatic new or impossible 
challenge is involved. 
A secondary reason, however, for introducing the topic of spiritual reality is 
to provide a framework for comment on the moral implications of state ments 
and attitudes sometimes found in the world of Al. In my own contact with 
scientists in Al, cognitive psychology and neuropsychology, sometimes I have 
encountered an attitude toward humans that I find extremely disturbing. A 
small but significant number of these scientists have a hard, hostile attitude 
toward any appreciation of humanity that implies human specialness. 
Apparently, the very notion of special human characteristics such as our free 
will or having a transcendent spiritual meaning is viewed as a threat to an 
intellectual desire to demonstrate we humans are nothing but matter, or 
nothing but a complex computer. Let me quote from one prominent Al 
professor. He said that the next generation of computers will be so intelligent 
that we will " be lucky if they are willing to keep us around as household 
pets."11 The attitude of hostility and even contempt expressed toward humans 
in such a statement is obvious. That humans will soon be the slaves to a 
master race of machines is, however, fundamentally a totalitarian goal. Why 
should anyone support such a purpose? If the proposed outcome is possible, 
then it is certainly morally rational for people to refuse to fund such scientists 
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and their research. If the goal is not possible, then the attitude expressed by 
such remarks does much to harm the good name of science. Scientists today 
are rightfully worried about the growth of an anti-scientific mentality in the 
non-scientific community. This growth is quite real, both on the political right 
and especially on the political left. However, subtle or gleeful comments 
about humans having no free will and soon being replaced by powerful, 
complex computers or bio-computer systems does little to endear science or 
scientists to the non-scientific world. Instead such fundamentally non-
scientific and often irrational statements by scientists create a morally justified 
fear of science on the part of those outside the scientific community. 
The very power, size and complexity of contemporary science suggests that 
it should be especially interested in avoiding the dangerous attitudes that 
power, size and complexity so often create. The contemporary scientific 
environment is very different from that of even 50 years ago. Today in science 
the effects of personal ambition, ideology, unscrupulous empire building, 
obvious financial rewards and power are especially noticeable. Interest group 
pressures, moral anarchy and lack of mutual cooperation also are not 
uncommon in the contemporary scientific community. Unless scientists work 
conscientiously to counter anti-scientific attitudes within AI, as elsewhere, 
there is real danger that growing external criticism of science will cause the 
scientific baby to be thrown out with its dirty bath water. In fighting such 
external criticism, science, which is (or should be) a bulwark of sanity should 
not allow itself to be poisoned from within by the anti-human and other biased 
attitudes of a small group of its present practitioners. 
Now, I am convinced that AI, cognitive psychology and neuropsychology all 
have major positive contributions to make to the human condition. I am 
equally convinced that this field needs to recover more of an attitude of 
humility as it studies the mind. Let me suggest that if scientists recover an 
awareness of God and of our spiritual destiny it may be a great facilitator of 
such an attitudinal change. An attitude of humility and wonder before the 
natural world has been an essential quality of the great scientists from 
Copernicus, Galileo and Newton to Einstein. Historically this attitude has 
been rooted in the belief in God. u 
In any case, although there is much to learn about both artificial and 
natural mind, to reject in advance a spiritual perspective on human mind 
because it implies limits to scientific understanding is an irrational bias. 
Science has learned to live with uncertainty principles, Godel's proof and 
similar knowledge about intellectual limits. Science has also learned to live 
with the mind/body problem. It can also learn to live with (and even to 
benefit from) a mind/spirit problem. 
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From Pluralism towards 
Catholicity? 
The United Methodist Church after the 
General Conference of 1988 
GEOFFREY WAINWRIGHT 
The United Methodist Church is the most widespread Protestant 
denomination in the United States. It is also perhaps the most 
accommodating. Statistically, it is in decline, both in absolute membership 
figures and as a proportion of the population. While the flexibility of 
Methodism helped it to grow, overstretching appears to have led to such a loss 
of contour that there no longer exists a sufficiently coherent identity to attract 
and retain many new adherents. In recent decades, "inclusivism" and 
"pluralism" have become formal ideological substitutes for a true catholicity 
which is always both substantive and qualitative. At the General Conference 
of 1988, there were a few signs--no bigger maybe than a man's hand--that the 
Church is coming to that awareness of its own predicament which is the 
human precondition for acceptance of a divine renewal. 
It is a matter of the faith, which comes to expression in the teaching of a 
church and its worship. The two most important documents before the 
General Conference in St. Louis were therefore the Report of the Hymnal 
Revision Committee and the Report from the Committee on our Theological 
Task on "Doctrinal Standards and our Theological Task." That the proposal 
of a new hymnbook should have aroused popular interest is no surprise, for 
the Christian people has always maintained at least a lingering sense that the 
liturgy is the place where the faith is signified. Less expected, given the 
reputation and modern self-understanding of Methodism, was the attention 
shown before and at the Conference to the revision of the statement on 
doctrine and theology in the Book of Discipline of the United Methodist 
Church. In both matters, this represented, not only formally but (as we shall 
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see) substantially, something of a return to Methodist ongms. The early 
Methodist Conferences of Mr. Wesley with his preachers were much occupied 
with "what to teach." And Methodism "was born in song": John Wesley 
considered that his definitive Collection of Hymns for the Use of the People 
called Methodists of 1780 contained "all the important truths of our most holy 
religion, whether speculative or practical,. .. a distinct and full account of 
Scriptural Christianity." We need perhaps to see what happened in the 
intervening years in order to make a recovery of identity desirable. 
Liberal Methodists like to cite Wesley's dictum that "we think and let 
think." They forget that this magnanimity was confined to "opinions which do 
not strike at the root of Christianity."1 Wesby distinguished between opinions 
and doctrines. The doctrines essential to Christianity included "the Three-One 
God," the deity and redeeming work of Christ, original sin, repentance, 
justification by faith and sanctification. When, in his Letter to a Roman 
Catholic of 1749, Wesley set out " the faith of a true Protestant," he followed 
the Nicene Creed for its content ("the faith which is believed"), and he 
showed the attitude and act of faith ("the faith which believes") to consist in 
trust and obedience towards the God who is so confessed. In his generous 
sermon on The Catholic Spirit--"If thy heart is right with my heart, give me thy 
hand"--Wesley made clear, as in other writings, that Deists, Arians and 
Socinia ns did r.ol meet the conditions. Wesley explicitly rejected 
" latitudinarianism," whether of a doctrinal or a practical kind. H ow, then, did 
Methodism fall into the indifferentism which has increasingly marked its later 
history? 
Robert E. Chiles offered a perceptive interpretation in Theological 
Transition in American Methodism 1790-1935.2 He traced a shift "from 
revelation to reason," "from sinful man to moral man," and "from free grace 
to free will." I would put it briefly this way: What had been secondary poles in 
a Wesleyan ellipse--"reason," "the moral character," and "free will"--took 
over from the primary poles, in subordinate relation to which alone they find 
their proper place in a Christian understanding of the human condition and 
divine salvation--"revelation," " the sinful condition," and " free grace." 
Methodism thus both helped lo shape and, even more important, allowed 
itself to be shaped by an American culture that was already subject to the 
strong humanistic influences of an--at best deistic--Enlightenment. The 
distinctive Christian message was being lost. 
Constitutionally, Methodism retained as its "doctrinal standards" the first 
four volumes of Wesley's Sennons, his Explanatory Notes upon the New 
Testament and the Twenty-Five Articles of Religion adapted from the 
Anglican Thirty-Nine. At the union of the Methodist Episcopal Church and 
the Evangelical United Brethren in 1968, the Confession of Faith of the latter 
and the Wesleyan standards were judged "congruent" within the new United 
Methodist Church. Methodist academic and bureaucratic theology, however, 
had come to bear a more and more tenuous relation to the official standards. 
Prompted in part by the self-examination that the 1968 union had made 
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necessary, the Church undertook to clarify the continuing status and function 
of its doctrinal standards as well as what was to be expected of theology. 
Following the work of the Study Commission on Doctrine and Doctrinal 
Standards, the result is seen in paragraphs 68-70 of the 1972 Book of 
Discipline. First, the "historical background" of the official standards is 
described, with an admission of "the fading force of doctrinal discipline": "By 
the end of the nineteenth century, and thereafter increasingly in the twentieth, 
Methodist theology had become decidedly eclectic, with less and less specific 
attention paid Lo its Wesleyan sources as such."3 Then the "landmark 
documents" were laid out. Finally, "our theological task" was set forth. It was 
this third section which became, in the 1980s, the object of most controversy. 
The 1972 text spoke of "four main sources and guidelines for Christian 
theology: Scripture, tradition, experience, reason." Although the term is not 
used there, these four became known (fleetingly, one hopes) as the 
"Methodist" or "Wesleyan Quadrilateral." Scripture is said to be "primary," 
and the functions of the four are differentiated: there is a " living core" of 
"Christian truth" which--the 1972 text apparently wishes to affirm in continuity 
with the United Methodist "pioneers"--"stands revealed in Scripture, 
illumined by tradition, vivified in personal experience, and confirmed by 
reason." But there is such a stress on the "interdependence" and 
" interaction" of the four that--as the popular image of the quadrilateral both 
expresses and encourages--they have been perceived as placed by the 1972 text 
all four on an equal footing. There arose from the "evangelicals," but not 
from them alone, a call for clearer recognition of the normativity of Scripture. 
Thus the fifty pastors--by no means all conservatives but rather most of them 
traditional Methodists--who in December 1987 issued the Houston 
Declaration, spoke of " the confusion and conflict resulting from the ambiguity 
of the present doctrinal statement" and reaffirmed " the Wesleyan principle of 
the primacy of Scripture." The "primacy of Scripture" is doubtless to be 
understood analogously to Wesley's designation of himself as "a man of one 
book": his being homo unius libri makes Scripture not so much the "boundary 
of his reading" as "the center of gravity in his thinking."4 
Meanwhile, the Committee on our Theological Task, appointed from the 
General Conference of 1984, was hard at work in preparation for the 
(quadrennial) General Conference of 1988. Its report made a structural move 
to emphasize the special place of Scripture: a section on "The Primacy of 
Scripture" was followed by one which took "Tradition, Experience, and 
Reason" all together, without dignifying each by a heading that might appear 
to rank them severally with the Scriptures. A strong direct statement was 
made on the Scriptures as norm and nourishment of the Church: 
United Methodists share with other Christians the conviction that 
Scripture is the primary source and criterion for authentic Christian 
truth and witness. The Bible bears authoritative testimony to God's 
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self-disclosure in the pilgrimage of Israel, in the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ, and in the Holy Spirit's constant activity 
in human history, especially in the mission of early Christianity. As 
we open our minds and hearts lo the Word of God through the words 
of human beings inspired by the Holy Spirit, faith is born and 
nourished, our understanding is deepened, and the possibilities for 
transforming the world become apparent to us. The Bible is sacred 
canon for Christian people, formally acknowledged as such by historic 
ecumenical councils of the church .... Our standards affirm the Bible as 
the source of all that is "necessary and sufficient unto salvation" 
(Articles of Religion) and "the true rule and guide for faith and 
practice" (Confession of Faith). We properly read Scripture within 
the believing community, informed by the tradition of that 
community. We interpret individual texts in light of their place in the 
Bible as a whole .... 
With only a little retouching, that text was to stand in the version finally 
adopted by the General Conference. The most notable change was the 
insertion, after the first sentence, of this: 
Through Scripture the living Christ meets us in the experience of 
redeeming grace. We are that Jesus Christ is the living 
Word of God in our midst whom we trust in life and death. The 
biblical authors, illumined by the Holy Spirit, bear witness that in 
Christ the world is reconciled to God. 
As successive drafts of the Report of the Committee on our Theological 
Task had become available, there was some attempt in the press to align the 
cont roversy with that among Southern Baptists on the inerrancy of Scripture; 
but it is clear that that was not al all the issue for United Methodists. Much 
more important was the fear expressed by some that the new statement would 
place unnecessary and unacceptable constraints upon theological work. Thus 
John Cobb of the Claremont School of Theology, in an article for The Circuit 
Rider of May 1987, wanted lo "keep the quadrilateral"; and the faculties of the 
Wesley Theological Seminary in Washington, D.C., and of the Iliff School of 
T heology in Denver signed like memoranda. 
At the General Conference, treatment of the report was entrusted to the 
Legislative Committee on Faith and Mission, under the chai rmanship of Dr. 
Thomas Langford of Duke University. As we have seen, the strong statement 
on the normativity of Scripture is maintained; but sensitivity is also shown to 
the concerns expressed by those theologians who were most anxious that 
fixity5 be avoided: 
In [the theological] task Scripture, as the constitutive witness to the 
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wellsprings of our faith, occupies a place of primary authority among 
these theological sources. In practice, theological reflection may also 
find its point of departure in tradition, experience, or rational 
analysis. 
The last sentence quoted there was in fact reintroduced from the 1972 text. 
Further, the description of the differences allowed by the "catholic spirit" of 
Wesley and Methodism was extended to read "forms of worship, structures of 
church government, modes of baptism, or theological explorations" (though the 
Wesleyan distinction as to "all opinions which do not strike at the root of 
Christianity" is retained). 
Apart from one or two Promethean touches about creativity, the final text 
has managed to state the "constructive" and "contextual" nature of 
theology in a way that acknowledges the properly active human role in 
redemption without on the whole falling into the Pelagian temptation which 
perpetually besets Methodists: 
Our theological task is both critical and constructive. It is critical in 
that we test various expressions of faith by asking, Are they true? 
Appropriate? Clear? Cogent? Credible? Are they based on love? 
Do they provide the church and its members with a witness that is 
faithful to the gospel as reOected in our living heritage and that is 
authentic and convincing in the light of human experience and the 
present state of human knowledge? Our theological task is 
constrnctive in that every generation must appropriate creatively the 
wisdom of the past and seek God in their midst in order to think 
afresh about God, revelation, sin, redemption, worship, the church, 
freedom, justice, moral responsibility, and other significant 
theological concerns. Our summons is to understand and receive the 
gospel promises in our troubled and uncertain times .... 
Our theological task is contextual and incamational. It is grounded 
upon God's supreme mode of self-revelation--the incarnation in Jesus 
Christ. God's eternal Word comes6 to us in Oesh and blood in a given 
time and place, and in full identification with humanity. Therefore, 
theological reflection is energized by our incarnational involvement in 
the daily life of the church and the world, as we participate in God's 
liberating and saving action. 
Tradition, experience and reason are each given their own heading in the 
final text. Tradition is viewed in a preponderantly positive way, though with a 
recognition that "the history of Christianity includes a mixture of ignorance, 
misguided zeal, and sin. Scripture remains the norm by which all traditions 
are judged." Experience is given a largely confirmatory role: the authors 
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claim that we should be following Wesley in looking for confirmations of the 
biblical witness in human experience, especially the experiences of 
regeneration and sanctification, but also in the "common sense knowledge of 
everyday experience." My own greatest worry concerns the uncritical 
confidence which, after a nod towards the mystery of grace, the text places in 
"reason": 
By reason we read and interpret Scripture. By reason we determine 
whether our Christian witness is clear. By reason we ask questions of 
faith and seek to understand God's action and will. By reason we 
organize the understandings that compose our witness and render 
them internally coherent. By reason we test the congruence of our 
witness to the biblical testimony and to the traditions which mediate 
that testimony to us. By reason we relate our witness to the full range 
of human knowledge, experience, and service. 
There follows a further brief concession, this time to " the limits and 
distortions characteristic of human knowledge." But I cannot help recalling 
how much the modern sociology of knowledge has shown us to be governed by 
our " interests" --and remembering the insistence of the Christian tradition 
upon the human will as the perpetrator and victim of our fall. 
Although the 1988 text recognizes that "all Christians are called to 
theological reflection," it clearly sets the individual effort within the churchly 
community. Gone, certainly, is the glorification of "pluralism" in which the 
1972 text indulged itself. Gone, too, is the most unfortunate confusion made 
by the 1972 text between doctrine and theology. The new document makes 
abundantly clear that the theological endeavors of individuals and schools are 
to take place upon the solid base, and within the stable framework, of "our 
doctrines." The constitutionally protected texts are no longer labelled mere 
" landmarks" as they had been since the Discipline of 1972. Whereas 
" pluralism" risks having no center and no edges, true catholicity has a firm 
substantive center which makes the edges both rather easier, and yet perhaps 
also slightly less important, to define.7 
One major doctrine that had appeared under threat in the Report of the 
Committee on our Theological Task as it came to the General Conference 
was that of the Trinity. (This is not the place to establish systematically how 
utterly vital the doctrine and reality of the Trinity is to Christian faith. That 
was already done by the councils of the fourth century and the theological 
labors of Athanasius and Hilary and the Cappadocians. Here there is, in 
principle, ecumenical agreement. Wesley shared in it, amid all the 
questionings and debates of the eighteenth century.) In what may have been a 
concession to the liberals or progressives in return for a stronger emphasis on 
the primacy of Scripture, the report nowhere used the (allegedly sexist) 
trinitarian name of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. (The advocates of pluralism 
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usually follow the axiom familiar in liberal and progressive politics: pas 
d'ennemis a gauche! For their part, orthodox trinjtarians cannot treat the 
doctrine as merely optional.) The cited "Standards of D octrine" did, of 
course, use the trinitarian name, dating as they did from earlier times; but as 
to what the committee itself wrote, it would almost have been possible to read it 
in a Sabellian sense. That is the inadequacy of the "Creator, Redeemer, 
Sustainer" formula, which an early draft had seemed to countenance. When 
the Houston Declaration stated that "God's richly personal being cannot be 
defined merely in functional terms," it was echoing the perception of John 
Wesley that " the quaint device of styling them three offices rather than 
persons gives up the whole doctrine."8 In what may prove to have been its 
most significant single gesture, the Legislative Committee on Faith and 
Mission reintroduced the scriptural and traditional Name: "With Christians of 
o ther communions we confess belief in the triune God--Fatlzer, Son, and Holy 
Spirit." The formulation found the approval of the General Conference. This 
leaves room for the document to make proper use of the verbs of creating, 
redeeming and sanctifying, without their exclusive appropriation to particular 
trinitarian persons. In a similar move, the General Conference has now made 
the Discipline specify that candidates for ordination "are ordained by the 
bishop, who will use the historic language of the Holy Trinity: Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit" (paragraph 432). (In a related area, the General Conference 
rejected a proposal to reword the Preamble to the "Social Principles" in the 
Discipline--"We, the people called United Methodists, affirm our faith in God 
our Father, in Jesus Christ our Savior, and in the Holy Spirit, our Guide and 
Guard"--so as to read "Creator." It was no doubt the progressive reluctance 
to call God "our Father" which, perhaps subliminally, caused the Committee 
on our Theological Task to downplay, when stating "distinctive Wesleyan 
emphases," the category of adoption, which is a major soteriological figure for 
Wesley. In strictly trinitarian terms [where the Father is the Father of the 
Son], the substitute formula favored by some--"Creator, Christ, and Spirit"--
has neo-Arian implications. As the H ouston Declaration succinctly points out, 
"Christ and the Spirit are not mere creatures.") 
With that, we have moved into the liturgical realm, and it becomes 
appropriate now to move on to the Report of the Hymnal Revision 
Committee to the 1988 General Conference of the United Methodist Church. 
It is first to be noted that the baptismal services there all use the Apostles' 
Creed, address the prayer over the water in full trinitarian form, and give the 
sacramental formula " I bapti2.e you in the name of the Father, and of the Son, 
and of the Holy Spirit." Similarly, in the services of Word and Table, all the 
complete forms of the great thanksgiving over the bread and wine are fully 
trinitarian in address. 
Popular attention was most focused, in characteristic Methodist fashion, on 
the hymns which constitute the great bulk of the proposed new Hymnal. Some 
cynics said that in giving way to the outcry against the proposed omission of 
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" Onward, Christian soldiers," the Hymnal Revision Committee was ensuring 
it had a free hand to make other, less provocative but more significant, 
decisions in a liberal or progressive direction. In point of fact, the committee 
has proceeded with wide consultation and considerable expertise, and the 
results are, on the whole, admirable. The new hymnal will be more Wesleyan 
and more catholic than at least its two predecessors. Again, a little history is 
in order. 
Throughout the nineteenth century the official hymnals of Methodism 
remained strong repositories of the Wesleyan tradition, containing hundreds 
of hymns composed and edited by the Wesley brothers--even while competing 
in practice with the products of the camp meeting. With the twentieth 
century, however, liberal opinions took over the official hymnody. The nadir 
was reached with the hymnal of 1935, which, of course, then served the 
Methodist Church over the middle third of our century. This hymnal reduced 
the Wesleyan hymns to about sixty and characteristically contained the 
infamous bowdlerization of "Hark, the herald angels sing" from: 
to: 
Late in time, behold him come, 
Offspring of a virgin's womb 
Long desired, behold him come, 
Finding here his humble home. 
The 1964 hymnal marked the beginnings of an improvement, but it has taken 
until now, with the publication expected in 1989, to raise the Wesleyan texts 
back to eighty. 
An important potential for the 1989 hymnal resides in the order it has 
established for the hymns. The body of hymns is set out according to a 
creedal pattern, which thereby corresponds also to the history of redemption, 
the Heilsgeschichte. There are five main sections: 
I. The Glory of the Triune God 
II. The Grace of J esus Christ 
III. The Power of the Holy Spirit 
IV. The Community of Faith 
V. A New Heaven and a New Earth 
Under the " third article" the hymns are then arranged according to the ordo 
salutis, the way in which we are enabled to appropriate God's saving work and 
gifts: prevenient grace, justifying grace, sanctifying and perfecting grace. This 
subdivision is true to the principles of Wesley's classic Collection of Hymns for 
the Use of the People called Methodists. The overall schema is fai thful to 
Wesley's recognition that the ordo salutis is governed by the nature and works 
of God as these are rehearsed in the Scriptures, liturgies and creeds of the 
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Church--and for which the Wesley brothers provided in their hymns for the 
great dogmas and festivals. The general pattern, and the adequate number of 
boldly trinitarian hymns it contains, sets the interpretative context for all 
individual items. 
Happily, the 1989 hymnal makes great and proper efforts towards a 
cultural catholicity, drawing on and respecting Hispanic, Afro-American, 
Asian-American and Native American Christians, as well as turning to " the 
global Church" by way of the Cantate Domino of the World Council of 
Churches and the input of "missionaries and ethnic musicologists." The 
hymnal also contains modern hymns, some of which will not last, and some 
oddities, such as an alternate version of "The Church's one foundation" which 
manages to excise entirely the sustaining image of the Church as the bride of 
Christ--presumably on account of the anthropological "subordinationism" (as 
it is seen) of Eph 5:22-33; but the minor changes that were made throughout 
the hymnody in favor of "inclusive language" were not nearly so bad as they 
might have been. These are small prices to pay for a much improved hymnal. 
Another report that came to the General Conference of 1988 was entitled 
"Grace upon Grace: God's Mission and Ours." Here evangelism 1s 
consistently expounde d before service. Albeit under the slogan of 
"inclusiveness," one aspect of catholicity is well captured in paragraph 51: 
As a gracious community, a church in mission embraces those whose 
appearance, behavior, mental or physical conditions mark them as 
different. People who represent race, ethnic, class, age, and gender 
differences become one in the Body of Christ. The reach of grace is 
unlimited, the binding of grace is firm. 
This is wedded to the qualitative aspect of catholicity by being placed under a 
rubric that structures the report: "As United Methodists, we envision lives 
changed by grace, a church formed by grace, and a world transformed by 
grace." The substantive content of catholicity is stated epigrammatically: 
"Jesus Christ defines grace: Immanuel, God with us as a person." On two 
occasions, the report cites the great commission of Matt 28:18f in its full 
trinitarian form. 
Two other matters may be mentioned as possibly signaling a more general 
change within United Methodism. First, to the declaration in the "Social 
Principles" of the Discipline that " in continuity with past Christian teaching, 
we recognize tragic conflicts of life with life that may justify abortion, and in 
such cases support the legal option of abortion under proper medical 
procedures," there was now added the further sentence: "We cannot affirm 
abortion as an acceptable means of birth control, and we unconditionally 
reject it as a means of gender selection." Official Methodist monies had been 
going to the Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights--an organization whose 
name includes, it might be argued, a double oxymoron. Second, in the context 
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of qualifications for the ordained ministry, the General Conference retained 
the phrase concerning "fidelity in marriage and celibacy in singleness," and, 
echoing the declaration of the "Social Principles" that " the practice of 
homosexuality is incompatible with Christian teaching," once more stipulated 
that "self-avowed practicing homosexuals are not to be accepted as 
candidates, ordained as ministers, or appointed to serve in The United 
Methodist Church." A footnote on candidacy for ordination comments: "The 
General Conference, in response to expressions throughout the Church 
regarding homosexuality and ordination, reaffirms the present language of the 
Discipline regarding the character and commitment of persons seeking 
ordination, and affi rms its high standards." 
Now what are we to conclude about this General Conference overall? A t 
the outset I suggested that the signs in favor of a return to catholicity were no 
bigger than a human hand. Some pluralists have expressed the view that the 
perceptible shift in U nited Methodism may simply be the following of a 
conservative mood in the country at large--a mood which they expect will 
change. What is there to stop the General Conference of 1988 from turning 
out to be yet one more example of Methodist accommodationism--this time, 
for once, in a conservative direction? The answer must reside in the signs of 
qualit ative and substantial renewal throughout " the connectio n" (as 
Methodists like to designate their form of church life). We may look, for 
example, to the growth of "covenant discipleship groups" and to the very 
modest revival in sacramental observance. 
Bishop Richard B. Wilke gave a fresh twist to the Wesleyan hymn by which 
Methodist Conferences traditionally begin, "And are we yet alive?" Will 
Will imon and Robert Wilson spoke of " rekindl ing the fl ame."9 The 1984 
General Conference had set the implausible target of doubling the Church's 
membership to 20 million by the year 1992. It is not at all certain that such a 
growth of United Methodism in its present form is desirable. My argument 
would be that significant growth and renewal are impossible, or at least 
undes irable, without a prior or concomitant recovery of substantive 
catholicity--a reentry into that scriptural and creedal Christianity which 
undergirded and motivated the Wesleys' evangelism and social action. Sound 
doctrine is not a sufficient condition for the revitalization of a church, but it is 
a necessary one. The General Conference of 1988 will have made a lasting 
contribution, if it has promoted that cause in the seminaries, the bureaucracy, 
the pastorate and the episcopate--so that through preaching, teaching and 
singing the Methodist people may be shaped throughout its whole life of 
worship, witness and service for the glory of God and the salvation of the 
world. We shall see what emerges from the mandated study of the revised 
statement on " Doctrinal Standards and our Theological Task" and from the 
reception given to the new hymnal. 
From Pluralism towards Catholicity? 27 
Notes 
1. So in The Character of a Methodist (in Works, ed. T. Jackson [1872], vol. 8, p. 340). 
2. Robert E. Chiles, Theological Transition in American Methodism 17<)()...1935 (New 
York: Abingdon Press, 1965; reprinted Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
1983). 
3. On the history of the doctrinal standards, see Thomas C. Oden, Doctn·nal Standards 
in the Wesleyan Tradition (Grand Rapids: Zondervan/Francis Asbury Press, 1988). 
For an attempt to make the most of what unity there is in the theological tradition, see 
Thomas A. Langford, Practical Divinity: Theology in the Wesleyan Tradition (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1983). The distinction between official doctrine and the more 
individual but still ecclesial task of theology was unfortunately lost in the linguistic 
usage of the 1972 text. It has been respected in the 1988 text that we shall be 
presenting, and I have tried to observe it throughout this article. 
4. A dictum of George Croft Cell, quoted in Oden, Doctrinal Standards, p. 82. 
5. In his sermon on "The Catholic Spirit" Wesley says thal "a man of truly catholic 
spirit is fixed as the sun in his judgment concerning the main branches of Christian 
doctrine" (Works, ed. Jackson, vol. 5, pp. 492-504). 
6. A printer's proof read "come" rather than the "comes" of the final version in the 
Discipline. It would have been equally possible to retain "come" and replace the 
previous period by a comma. I have reason to believe that would have corresponded 
better to the thought of the Committee. It would probably make better theology. 
7. For insistence on the distinction between doctrine and theology, and the 
norrnativity of the former, credit goes to Jerry L. Walls, The Problem of Pluralism: 
Recovering United Methodist Identity (Wilmore, KY: Good News Books, 1986; updated 
1988). 
8. Letter of August 3, 1771, to Ms. Marsh. 
9. Richard B. Wilke, And Are We Yet Alive? The Future of the United Methodist 
Church (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1986); William H. Willimon and Robert L. Wilson, 
Rekindling the Flame: Strategies for a Vital United Methodism (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 1987). 

The World Will End in 1919 
Daniel Among the Victorians 
STANLEY D. WALTERS 
This paper is about a man who believed that the world would end in 1919, 
basing his announcement on the book of Daniel. He was Henry Grattan 
Guinness, Irish-born evangelist and missionary, and he died without knowing 
that he was wrong. 
Born in 1835, he was educated privately and went to sea at the age of 
seventeen. Returning home a year later, he experienced a religious conversion 
and was soon ordained and began evangelistic work. He was said to rival 
Spurgeon as a preacher. He established the East London Institute for Home 
and Foreign Missions (1873), and The Regions Beyond Missionary Union 
(1899), and traveled widely in all parts of the world.1 In 1889, he received a 
D.D. from Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island.2 He died in 1910. 
His family appears to be collateral to the Guinness ale family, and he is said to 
have pronounced his name Guin-NESS to distinguish the two lines. 
Grattan Guinness is interesting as the last great popularizer of the most 
common method of interpreting Daniel which the church has ever known. 
Now that we are living in the last days of the dispensational-futurist mode of 
interpreting Daniel, it may be worthwhile to look at the last days of that much 
more durable mode, the historicist. In the process we will learn something 
both about the book of Daniel aild about the history of its interpretation. 
DANIEL'S TIME PERIODS 
The terms "historicist" and "futurist" refer to broad ways of interpreting 
biblical apocalyptic materials, especially Daniel and Revelation. The futurist 
sees the events which the text refers to as belonging to our future; they have 
yet to take place. This is the method of all popular apocalyptic writers at the 
present time, although it is not a method much used by the scholarly 
community. The historicist, on the other hand, sees the events which the text 
refers to as events which have, for the most part, already taken place; they 
belong to our history. It was the method used in the church for many 
centuries, since well before the Reformation, rising to a special prominence in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and falling into decline as the 
nineteenth century progressed. 
Stanley D. Ph.D., is professor of Old Testament Languages 
and Literature at Knox College, University of Toronto. 
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And this brings us to the book of Daniel. It has always exercised an 
almost-occult attraction over many readers because of curious time periods 
mentioned in it which must elapse before the "end" and the coming of God's 
kingly rule. When Daniel's " end" is understood to be the "end of the world,"3 
these time periods appear to offer a means of knowing precisely when that 
event will occur. We begin by considering them. 
1. "A time, times, and half a time" = three-and-one-half years (7:25, 
12:7). 
2. "2,300 evenings and mornings" = 1,150 days = three years, two months, 
ten days4 (8:14). 
3. 1,290 days (12:11) = three years, seven months. 
4. 1,335 days (12:11) = three years, eight-and-one-half months. 
5. "Seventy weeks" (9:24), divided into seven, sixty-two, and one, with the 
" one" subdivided into two halves (9:25-27). Assuming that each "week" 
means seven years, the total period would be 490 years, divided into forty-
nine, 434 and seven, with the final subdivision into two three-and-one-half-
year periods. 
We have here several short periods and one long per iod. The short 
periods, although variable, are more or less the same length, and seem to 
correspond to the last segment of the long period. 
This period is described throughout the second half of Daniel as a period 
of oppression lo religious believers which would be followed by the fa ll of the 
oppressor and the arrival of God's kingly rule. It is probably to be associated 
with a Hellenistic ruler in Palestine, Antiochus IV Epiphanes, whose rule 
included the sixties of the second century n.c. (174-163). This earliest known 
outburst o f a nti-Semiti sm e nded with th e fall of th e oppressor 
(commemorated by the J ewish festival of Hanukkah), and gave way lo a 
period of Jewish political independence which lasted about a century. 
The basic figure of three-and-one-half years arose out of that persecution, 
perhaps as the actual length of time between the beginning of Jewish armed 
resistance to Epiphancs, led by the Maccahce family, and its end in the 
rededication of the temple (June 167-December 164 D.C.).5 I am disposed to 
see the variations among no. 1 - no. 4 above as having their rise in differing 
ways of calculating the onset and end of the resistance. In any case, the 
connection is with the oppression described in Daniel 7-12, and the numbers 
are calendaric in the sense that they correspond lo actual lengths of time. 
The book of Daniel entered the canon long after the Maccabean period, at 
a time when it would have been clear that not all its hopes for the future had 
been realized.6 There had been a period of independence under priestly rule, 
but the Kingdom of God had not arrived. The book continued lo be 
esteemed, thercf ore, not for historical reasons, but for typological reasons. 
That is, the Maccabean crisis came to stand for any oppression of faithful 
believers and for God's intent to support them and eventually to intervene on 
their behalf. The book was taken up by Christians as well as Jews in this 
sense. Even the time periods were understood symbolically, as their reuse in 
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the book of Revelat ion shows.7 
But as histo ry prolonged itself and the divine kingdom tarried, this 
understanding failed and was replaced by a more literal reading. The book 
was understood lo speak of the "end of the world" (and not ambiguously of 
the end of the persecution and the coming of God's kingly rule), and the time 
periods were again given a calendaric interpreta tion. These numbers, which 
had once referred lo a concrete situation in the second century 13.C., and had 
then been read symbolically in the first century AD., came once more to be 
taken literally, but with reference lo other histo rical circumstances. This was 
an epochal hermeneutic move. When the time periods had been linked lo 
actual events in the second century n.c., they "fit." When they were used 
typologically or symbolically they did no t need to " fit." But when they began 
to be applied lo other histo rical circumstances, they could never match up in 
the same way. 
Herein lay the difficulty. The Kingdom of God would arrive, in Daniel's 
hope, at the end of certain brief periods of time. Since the divine rule had not 
yet come, its future arrival should still lie at the end of such periods of time--
lite ral o r figura tive--and the faithful should wait accordingly. But 
interpretat ion did not wait. Since the starting point for these periods seemed 
to lie in Daniel's own time,8 the interpreter in the early centuries of our era 
had to cope with the passage of centuries o f time. And so the days in Daniel's 
time periods were taken instead as years, long epochs stre tching across the 
Middle Ages into the nineteenth and twentie th centuries. 
This is the " historicist" method of interpreting Daniel and Revelation, and 
it dominated the church's reading of these books from the Middle Ages well 
into the nineteenth century. Grattan Guinness stands at the very end of that 
tradition. The present article is based on his book 171e Approaching End of the 
Age.9 All references are to the first edition (1878) unless specified. 
THE YEAR-DAY SYSTEM 
At the ba is of this system is the subst itution of years for days. Since our 
texts plainly speak of days, Guinness advanced the following arguments to 
show that such a substitution should be made.10 
1. Since Daniel 7-12 obviously deals with symbols--grotesque composite 
anim als which have never existed and which have horns that visibly sprout, 
grow and even talk-- the "days" of Daniel should also be symbolic. And since 
the animals symbolize something vastly larger than themselves--an empire, for 
example--the day should symbolize something vastly larger than an actual 
twenty-four-hour day. What else should it be but a year? 11 
2. There are two passages in the Old T estament which explicitly make this 
substitution. In Num 14:34 the Israelites were punished by being kept in the 
wilderness for for ty years, a year for each day of the abortive spy mission. 
Herc a year explicitly corresponds lo a day. And in Ezek 4:1 -9, the prophet 
was commanded to perform the symbolic act o f lying on his left side for 390 
days and on his right for forty days, a day for each year of the sins of the 
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kingdoms of Israel and Judah. Here a day explicitly corresponds to a year.12 
3. It was claimed by some that even Daniel 9 testifies to this symbolic 
equivalence, for it describes the 490-year period as "seventy weeks of years" 
(KJV); seventy weeks would be 490 days. Since, in all views of Daniel, this 490 
years had already elapsed, the book itself could be thought to offer positive 
proof that this is the way its numbers should be understood.13 
4. It was also pointed out that if Daniel's numbers referred to the ordinary 
passage of time, they are given in a peculiar form. Why would not the angelic 
guide speak of "three years and six months," as the Bible docs elsewhere (e.g., 
Luke 4:25, Jas 5:17), instead of " time, times, and half a tim e"? And why arc 
there multiple expressions for the same period of time, such as forty-two 
months, and 1,260 days? The unusual forms of expression point to a non-
literal meaning. 
5. A saying of Jesus is said to support the year-day theory. In Luke 13:33 
he spoke of continuing his ministry for "Today, tomorrow and the day 
following," which could be understood as referring to the three years of his 
adult ministry. Jn this case, Jesus himself spoke of a day when he actually 
meant a year. 
6. Finally, someone might ask, Why didn't God say plainly what he meant? 
How could anyone in Daniel's time know that a long period of time was 
intended? Here the historicist interpreter boldly grasped the nettle and 
claimed that God did not intend the ancient readers of Scripture to 
understand this. No, if they had thought the time would be so long, they 
would have grown lax in their hope and life, and would have grown weary of 
waiting for the Kingdom of God lo come in. God wished the prophecies not 
to "be understood too early, when they would have interfered with the 
earnestness of continual expectat ion" (p. 312). 
It was only much later, when the events spoken of in Daniel had begun to 
take place, th at people realized that God had actually used a symbol and that 
the end would come some twenty-five centuries from Daniel 's time. God "did 
not intend it [the book of Daniel] to be understood for ce11t11ries" (p. 82, 
emphasis his). This view was defended as the "doctrine of progressive 
interpretation," in which later biblical writers understood things better than 
earlier ones did, and later interpreters understood the Bible better than earlier 
interpreters did (at least, with reference to these calculations).14 
On the basis of such arguments, the three-and-one-half years was 
understood to mean 1,260 years. 15 This would be the length of the antichrist's 
oppression of God's people, and at its close, Christ would return and the 
Kingdom of God come in . The other numbers--2,300, 1,290, 1,335--would also 
denote years instead of days. This is why the scheme is called "historicist," 
since the time covered stretches over many centuries of history, alm ost all of 
which lay in the interpreter's past. 
WHERE DOES THE COUNT BEGIN? 
Historicist interpreters worked first of all with the period of 1,260 years, 
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and secondly with the 2,300 evenings and mornings, which they took as 2,300 
rather than as 1,150 days. With these durations in hand, all you really have to 
know is when lo begin counting. 
Unfortunately, although the texts speak clearly of an arrogant oppressor of 
God's people, they are not specific enough to allow interpreters confidently to 
identi fy a specific event as the starting point for the countdown. For the book 
of Daniel in itself, the oppressing power is clearly Grecce.16 But once Rome 
had assumed the im perial role in Europe and the Levant, it became the enemy 
instead. 17 Rome, in some form or o ther, especially the Holy Roman Empire, 
remained alive until the Congress of Vienna (1815), and so for most of 
Christian history, in terpreters of Daniel's calculations always had some 
" Rome" present to serve as the oppressor. Well prior to the Protestant 
Reformation, the oppressive " Rome" was understood as the political papacy, 
with the pope playing the ro le of the antichrist. 
But at what point should the count begin? After the seventh century AD., 
the 1,260 years was already too short to reach back to the Babylonian exile 
(587-536 13.C.). The development of classical Rome into the Holy Roman 
Empire took place slowly and its history affords various important events that 
might have some claim lo be a pivotal transition or starting point. The 
publication of the Code of Justinian in 533 was sometim es used, but, as the 
1,260 years would have run out in 1793,18 this date was not useful in the 
nineteenth ce ntury. The date of 800, Pope Leo's coronation of Charlemagne, 
would seem to be logical; one can hardly go further into the Middle Ages than 
C harlemagne to find the starting point for the oppression which the papacy 
was regarded as having inflicted. The 1,260 years would end in the year 2060, 
and for all we know now, someone in the twenty-first century may reintroduce 
these calculations. 
But in the 1870s, the real difficulty was that the in terpreters were living on 
borrowed time. The reason is that historicism correlated its interpretation of 
Daniel with that of Revelation, and most of the latter book was said to fall 
within the 1,260-year period. Every detail of it had been identified with 
successive events in European history from the tim e of the New T estament 
down to that of the wri ter. 
For example, Revelation lists three cycles of disasters: the seven seals (6:1-
8:5), the seven trum pets (8:6:11:19) and the seven bowls (15:1-16:21). The 
historicist interpreter held that the seals referred to events which accompanied 
the breakup of the old Rom an Empire and had already occurred during the 
second, third and fourth centuries A D. The seven bowls of wrath, latest of the 
three cycles, must refer to the last events before the return of Christ. 
G uinness followed E. B. E lliott, the last great historicist commentator on 
Revelation, who had identified six of the seven bowls with events of and 
following the French revolution (pp. 371-372). 19 Time was obviously short, 
and a tem1i1111s ad q11e111--a point of ending--in the year 2060 was simply too 
remote to be correct. 
Thus, even with 1,260 years to play with, histo ry may still overtake a school 
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of interpretation, and this is what happened in the nineteenth century. The 
French R evolution, standing 1,260 years from Justinian's Code, had not 
proved to be a final terminus; the 1844 terminus (see below) passed without 
event; Elliott played for time by making the events of the French Revolution 
penultimate to the end; but by the last third of the century, the entire 
approach was threatened. 
GUINNESS'S CALCULATIONS 
But, historicists did not give up without a struggle, and that is why Grattan 
G uinness is interesting. He wrote voluminously on historicism at a time when 
it was alr eady virtually discredited by haV:ng run out of time, and when 
futurism had long since appeared and asserted itself.20 He is on the transition 
between those two systems. He is also interesting because he utilized 
elaborate astronomical and mathematical calculations to buttress his 
calendaric conclusions. It is his specific calculations which point to 1919 as the 
end of the age. 
My intention is initially to present his scheme favorably, so as to represent 
the impressiveness and weight which it carried in the circles where these 
calculations were pursued and encouraged. An analysis and critique will 
fo llow. 
1,260 Becomes 2,520 
Like his predecessors, Guinness also began working with the 1,260-year 
period (above, pg. 30, no. 1) . His fi rst problem was to get more time out of 
Daniel's calculations. What was really needed was a point beyond the failed 
1793 date, but closer than 2060. He found a clue in the "Seventy Weeks" 
passage (above pg. 30, no. 5), where the " half a week" of Dan 9:27 seems to 
be three-and-one-half years (1,260 days, which equals 1,260 years). If 1,260 
years is half a week, Guinness reasoned, there must be another 1,260 years 
somewhere, and he therefore began to work with a period of 2,520 years (pp. 
333, 352, 355). 
This is an artificial number, nowhere mentioned in the Bible,21 but 
Guinness finds support for it from the unlikely book of Leviticus. Chapter 26 
contains a long list of misfortunes which will befall the Israelites if they are 
disobedient to God (vs 14-15), nowadays sometimes spoken of as the 
"covenant curses." Among these maledictions, God says three times, " I will 
discipline you sevenfold for your sins" (vs 18, 24, 28). T he Hebrew says 
simply, " I will strike you seven for your sins," which the KJV rendered, " I will 
punish you seven times for your sins."22 Guinness calculates as follows: one 
" time" means one year; a year is 360 days; by the year-day theory, this means 
360 years; seven times 360 is 2,520. Therefore, the "seven times" of 
punishment means 2,520 years of punishment. 
This period would be "the times of the Gentiles," an expression used by 
Jesus, "Jerusalem will be trodden down by the Gentiles, unt il the times of the 
Gentiles are fulfilled" (Luke 21:24). Jerusalem began to be trodden down, 
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Guinness said, when Nebuchadnezzar destroyed it and deported Judaean 
leaders to Babylon. He dates this event at 602 B.C., and so the 2,520-year 
period stretches to 1919 (pp. 360-361, 377, 439). 
602 B.C.--- 2,520 years - - --1919 
This has the advantage of returning the starting point for the count to the 
biblical period, since the Holy Roman Empire never trod Jerusalem down,23 
but it does leave the "papal oppression" stranded. Although Guinness has 
constructed the 2,520 years out of two 1,260-year periods, he simply ignores 
the mid-point. The 1,260 years becomes a floating period within the longer 
"times of the Gentiles," and he gives several sets of dates to which the 1,260-
year oppression could correspond, not as alternates to one another, but all as 
satisfying the conditions. 
171e 2,300 Years 
With this, Guinness had dealt with the three-and-one-half-year period by 
doubling it into a "full dispensational week," and could move on to the other 
time periods, starting with the 2,300 evenings and mornings. When should it 
begin? 
The number is in Daniel 8, which speaks of the oppressive actions of the 
"little horn," including violence to the temple and to its services. Three times 
we hear that the daily morning and evening sacrifice has been suspended (vs 
11, 12, 13), and once of the surrender of the sanctuary (v 13). When Daniel 
asks how long this oppression wiJI last, the angel replies, "For 2,300 evenings 
and mornings; then the sanctuary shall be cleansed" (v 14). Dan 8:14 does not 
mention a starting point at all, so Guinness links the 2,300 years to the 490 
years of Daniel 9, which begin with "the issuance of the word to restore and 
rebuild Jerusalem" (9:25).24 This "word" would be the decree of rebuilding 
issued by the Persian king Artaxerxes and mentioned in Neh 2:1. Accordingly, 
the 2,300 years run from 457 B.C. to 1844 (p. 430). 
457 B.C. ---- 2,300 years - ---1844 
Since 1844 was already more than thirty years in the past when Guinness 
wrote, he cannot very well claim that the end of the age occurred then.25 But 
he at least has to explain how the sanctuary was cleansed in that year, since 
this is the specific wording of Dan 8:14. 
The word "sanctuary'' brings up the fact that in the late nineteenth century, 
Jerusalem was still part of the Ottoman (i.e., Turkish) empire, and therefore 
under the control of Muslims. Turkish abridgement of the religious rights of 
non-Muslims had been a concern of Europe for a long time, and England had 
made strenuous representations with the "Sublime Porte" to obtain tolerance 
for them. Guinness states that in 1844 the Ottoman empire acknowledged in 
writing that it would protect and guarantee these religious rights.26 That, he 
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says, represents the beginning of the end for the Turks, and begins to fulfil the 
prediction of Dan 8:14 for the city of Jerusalem itself.27 
Dealing With Disparity 
There are thus two spans of time, each with its own length and with 
different termini. 
602 B.C. --- 2,520 years ----1919 
4578.C.-- - 2,300 years ----1844 
This appears to be awkward, since they really ought to end at the same time, 
especially since the vision of Daniel 8 is about the end, when the final 
cleansing of the sanctuary occurs. 
But, there is a way of removing this awkwardness. One of Guinness's 
special interests was that the sun and the moon provide different systems of 
measuring the passage of time. 
The solar year is about 365 1/4 days. There is no lunar year as such (or, 
rather, we call the lunar year a "month"), but twelve lunations cover about 354 
1/ 3 days, about eleven days less than in solar reckoning. If you are calculating 
the extent of a long period of time--say, 2,520 years--it would make a 
difference which system you used, since the " lunar year" is about three 
percent shorter. The Jewish cultic calendar was tied to the agricultural year 
and was basically lunar, and so Guinness's interest in lunar measurement has a 
certain plausibility to it. 
What if the 2,520-year period were " lunar" as well as solar? 
2,520 lunar years x 354 1/3 = 892,920 days 
892,920 day+365 1/4 = 2,445 solar years 
If the times of the Gentiles be calculated from 602 B.C. using this figure, it 
comes out exactly at 1844, the same date as the end of the 2,300 years. 
602 B.C. ---- 2,520 " lunar years"---- 1844 
The concurrence of both time periods in ending at 1844 is very striking. 
The difference between solar and lunar reckoning of the 2,520-year period 
(technically called the "epact" ) is seventy-five years. Guinness then introduces 
the two measurements of Dan 12:11, 1,290 and 1,335 days ( = years). If you 
assume that these are extensions of 1,260, the additions total seventy-five. He 
cannot doubt that 12:11 suggests the epact of the 2,520-year period, and so the 
"soli-lunar measures" of the times of the Gentiles, "as now accurately 
ascertained by modern science," confirm the Bible (p. 438). 
Finally, since part of Guinness's method was to allow for multiple starting 
and stopping points for Daniel's time periods, he does the same for the 2,300 
years.28 Twenty-three hundred "lunar years" are 2,231 solar years. "The 
second starting point" (p. 437) is 312 s.c., the beginning of the "Seleucid era" 
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of reckoning time, and the terminus comes out to be 1919.29 Thus both major 
time periods--2,520 and 2,300--can be shown to end at the same two 
endpoints, 1844 and 1919. 
602 B.C. 2,520 "solar years" 1919 
457 B.C. 2,300 "solar years" 1844 
602 B.C. 2,520 "lunar years" 1844 
312 B.C. 2,300 "lunar years" 1919 
With this, Guinness has incorporated all of the time references of Daniel 7-
12 into his scheme,30 showing that the times of the Gentiles, which began with 
Nebuchadnezzar's capture of Jerusalem, would run out in 1919. " It is a 
solemn fact," he says, " that we are now living in the interval between these 
two latest termini--in that supplementary seventy-five years which are created 
by the inequality of the solar and lunar movements during the lapse of the 
whole 'seven times"' (p. 439). " In about forty years from the present time 
(1878) the great week of the times of the Gentiles will have run out..." (p. 
556). 
Elsewhere, he becomes more cautious: although students of prophecy 
"know that they are living in the time of the end" (pp. 564-565, emphasis his), 
we must allow for multiple points of terminus. The twin periods of 2,520 and 
2,300 years "appear to run out first in 1844 and fully in 1919, but whether our 
data are accurate, and what the exact nature of the terminal event may be, it is 
impossible to ascertain and foolish to surmise" (p. 565, emphasis his).31 
Nevertheless, he compares Christians to travelers on a long train journey: the 
time needed for the journey has elapsed, and they have already passed the last 
station before their destination (p. 566). 
SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT 
I have drastically simplified Guinness's argument, which fills hundreds of 
pages. He goes on to buttress his position with an elaborate array of 
mathematical and astronomical calculations, showing that the number seven is 
divinely imprinted on the world of nature and in the Bible, and that the 
numbers 1,260 and 2,300 also have a special divine character when both solar 
and lunar reckonings are considered. 
171e Number Seven 
Regarding the former, he believes that the number "7," with its multiples 
and fractions, has been divinely appointed as a basic unit in the duration of 
time, both in ordinary human life and in biblical statements of duration. "The 
week reigns supreme" (p. 278). Thus, wherever he can find a period of time 
divisible by seven, he regards this as proof that the number has special divine 
importance. The occurrence of septiform periods of time in human life is 
given as evidence for the importance of the number itself (pp. 265-383). "A 
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septiform periodicity has been, by God Himself, impressed upon nature" (p. 
277). 
So/i-lunar Cycles 
The interplay of solar and lunar measurements of time is more compli-
cated. Because of the fractional character of the actual solar and lunar meas-
urements, the year and the month very rarely come out even. It would have 
been nice, Guinness remarks, if God had arranged the solar and lunar meas-
urements to coincide with each other. For example, a solar year might have 
been exactly twelve thirty-day months (p. 388). But because 365 1/ 4 is not 
evenly divisible by 29 1/2, a great many lunations must go by before you get 
one whose end coincides exactly with the end of the solar year. 
It was already a concern of the Greeks to determine how much time must 
elapse before this happens, and the ancient astronomer Meton discovered that 
in nineteen years the sun and the moon come out nearly even. Such a period 
of time, in which the solar and lunar time reckonings come once more to 
agree with each other, is a "soli-lunar cycle," and Guinness holds that any such 
elapse of time would be a duration of special significance in the divine order 
of things. 
He cites the researches of an eighteenth-century astronomer, Loys de Che-
seaux, which showed that the periods 1,260 and 2,300 years were such "soli-
lunar cycles" (pp. 395-403, quoting de Cheseaux at length). Since Daniel, liv-
ing in neo-Babylonian times, could not well have known what only modern as-
tronomy has discovered, Guinness follows de Cheseaux in concluding that 
these two durations were divinely revealed to Daniel, and, accordingly, pro-
phetic periods of pivotal significance in the divine plan. 
Guinness goes farther still, and tries to show how the biblical time periods 
in which he is most interested, including their epacts, can be analyzed into sep-
tiform numbers. Thus, he calculates the epact of 490 years at "twice seven 
solar years, and seven months," while that of 2,300 years is "seventy lunar 
years, and seven months" (p. 443). "The epacts of the prophetic periods of 
Scripture form a remarkable septiform series" (p. vi). 
The case of 1,260 years is different. Guinness analyzes it as 66 Melonie 
cycles of 19 years each, with a remainder of 6 years. This is striking to him, 
because the events covered in the biblical writings by this particular time 
period (in its various forms) are the persecutions of the arrogant oppressor 
(see above, pg. 30, and note 7). In Revelation 13, the second beast, which 
Guinness identifies with that oppressor, is associated with the number "666" 
(the "mark of the beast"). Guinness finds this number hidden in the 60 plus 6 
Melonie cycles and the remainder of 6 years. "God has-- in secret cipher--
engraven this stigma, this mark of reprobat ion, on the very brow of the period 
of the self-exalting blaspheming, saint-persecuting, power" (p. 419) . 
He brings in these two sets of mathematical demonstrations--septiform 
numbers and soli-lunar cycles--in order to assert that " the periodicity of 
nature, and the periodicity of Scripture, are demonstrably two parts of one 
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whole" (p. 234). His intent is apologetic. The study of science is marked by 
"a pleasing element of certainty'' (p. 234) ; if he can show that the "Bible times 
and seasons harmonise with the system by which the entire universe is 
regulated," the divine inspiration of Scripture may be regarded as proven, to 
account for which "will tax the ingenuity of infidels" (p. 235). 
These calculations cannot really figure in Gu inness's historical 
computations, because the time periods themselves are given in the Bible. But 
the elaborate system of congruences which he works out using them gives the 
entire book an aura of scientific accuracy and preciseness. He is not 
interested in "speculations about the future," and his book "DEALS NOT wrrn 
THEORIES BlJf wrrn FACT'S" (p. x, emphasis his). Unlike others who have 
calculated the times of the Gentiles and the end of the age using only 
historical data, Guinness is able to incorporate his projections into a much 
larger scheme which seems to be embedded into the very structure of the 
cosmos, from the gestation period of the ovum of the wasp (half a week), to 
the length of human life (ten septenaries or seventy years), to the coinciding of 
the sun and moon after the elapse of 2,300 years. 
Historicist biblical interpretation was seriously threatened by futurism, but 
no one had ever before shown that the historicist method depended on 
scientific observations which linked it with the workings of the solar system. 
The effect, especially on uncritical hearers and readers, of his elaborate 
presentations of the divine character of septiform numbers and soli-lunar 
cycles, was to secure historicism in the very fabric of the cosmos.32 
ANALYSIS 
When the first edition of The Approaching End of the Age appeared, the 
terminus of 1919 was forty years in the future. Guinness died in 1910, before 
finding out that he was wrong, although a revised edition of this book 
appeared as late as 1918. H e was proved wrong by history, but we must also 
ask the question, Where did he go wrong in his calculations? Everything 
comes out so neatly. How could such striking agreements be accidental? 
The answer is that they are not accidental. They have been arranged that 
way by Guinness himself. 
He works with two basic numbers, 2,520 years and 2,300 years, and there is 
an oddity in his handling of each which serves as a clue. For the first, he never 
tells us how he knows the 2,520 years should be counted from 602 B.C. Of 
course, he says that this is the time of Nebuchadnezzar's destruction of 
Jerusalem and therefore the beginning of the Holy City's treading down by the 
Gentiles. But how does he know that year was 602 B.C.? 
For the second, he holds to the 1844 terminus for the 2,300 years, even 
though it is awkward to do so because it had already passed without the arrival 
of the end suggested Daniel 8. Why would he not abandon the 457 B.C. 
starting point, and settle for his other date, 312 B.C., which by lunar reckoning 
also comes out to 1919? 
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The 2,520 Years 
To return to the first. The actual date of Jerusalem's fall was 587 B.C., a 
date quite clearly fixed by secular sources. Guinness cites no authority for the 
date 602 B.C. He simply asserts it. 
You might think that Guinness did not know what the twentieth century 
has learned; granted. But he should be expected to know what the nineteenth 
century had learned, and he does indeed quote authorities for many of his 
dates. 
He refers several times to the gentleman-scholar H . Fynes Clinton, whose 
elaborate chronographic studies of Greece and Rome were published during 
the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Guinness quotes thirteen dates 
from Clinton for a series of events from the biblical deluge to Jesus' birth. 
The date for Nebuchadnezzar's capture of Jerusalem and the burning of the 
temple is given there as Anno Mundi 3552 (or 586 B.C.).33 
In a fold-out chart, Guinness gives "The Scripture Chronology of the 
World," taken from the four-volume commentary on Revelation by E . B. 
Elliott. It contains fifty dales, from AM. 1 lo 6006, Guinness's own year of 
1878. Elliott's date for "the captivity" is AM. 3522 or 606 B.C.34 
And this is not all. Guinness actually knows the correct date of 587 B.C. (p. 
557 note). 
And so he cites four separate dates for the destruction of Jerusalem. One 
is the correct date of 587 B.C., and another is a well-informed, early-
nineteenth-century date of 586 B.C. Why does he not use them? How can he 
set aside Fynes Clinton, after saying that his dates are "about the nearest 
possible approach to truth, and ... probably a very near approach indeed" (p. 
300)? Of course, he needs time, and so an early date is preferable. But why 
wouldn't he count from 606, for which he could cite Elliott's authority? 
But, no. The "final fall of the throne of Judah" and the " latest 
commencement" of the times of the Gentiles is 602 (pp. 360, 411, etc.). It 
remains his key date, and it is precisely the one which he does not justify in 
any way. Where does this date come from? 
The tenacity with which Guinness holds to the 602 date, when by his own 
tacit admission it has no justification, tells us that it is a date which is in some 
way necessary to his scheme. IL is not that history requires it; his network of 
calculations requires it in some way. It is a date which cannot be changed, for 
some reason we have yet to discover. 
The 2,300 Years 
We turn now to the second time period, 2,300 years, running from 457 B.C. 
to 1844. Although Dan 8:14 does not give a starting point for this period, the 
clock could not begin running on it until the temple was rebuilt, since the 
oppressions associated with the period feature the temple and the cult. This 
suggests a link with one of the other periods in Daniel, the 490 years, which 
starts with " the issuance of the word to restore and rebuild Jerusalem" (Dan 
9:25). For Guinness, this is 457 B.C. (see p. 430). The 490 years, then, arc 
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coextensive with the first part of the 2,300 years (p. 427, 430). The slender 
thematic linkage of the two Daniel passages provides a starting point. 
But 1844 was over thirty years in the past, and his claim that Dan 8:14 had 
been fulfilled al that time35 is lamentably weak. Not only that, Guinness 
actually plots another span for the 2,300 years which ends where he wants it 
to, in 1919. Since Dan 8:14 states no starting point for the count, the thing for 
him to have done was to justify 312 B.C. as a starting point and abandon the 
1844 date altogether. 
Besides that, the date had been used before as the date of Christ's return, 
lo the great disappointment of its believers. It was the terminus awaited by 
the followers of William Miller, some of whose views were taken up by the 
Seventh Day Adventists.36 As the nineteenth century moved towards its close, 
the 1844 date belonged primarily lo fringe Adventist groups such as the 
Milleritcs and the Russellites (later Jehovah's Witnesses). 
The date is--or should have been--an embarrassment to Guinness. W7iy 
does he insist 011 it as a pivotal date in his scheme? 
The answer lies in Guinness's linkage of Dan 8:14 to Dan 9:25. He has 
done this in order to provide some justifiable starting point for the 2,300 years, 
but to do so he has linked the 490 years with the 2,300 years. This linkage has 
a fatal entailment, for he cannot now move the 2,300 years without also 
moving the 490 years. 
And the 490 years was not movable. 
Herc is why. In general, interpreters believed the 490 years, or at least the 
larger part of it , ran down to the time of Christ. He was "Messiah the Prince" 
of Dan 9:25, who would be "cut ofP' at the end of the sixty-nine weeks. It has 
never been easy to gel a calculation which would neatly end at the time of 
Christ's crucifixion,37 and Guinness does not try to do so. The period extends, 
he says, to "the days of 'Messiah the Prince,"'38 and had therefore long since 
been fulfilled. Guinness has taken this interpretation over from many 
decades, if not centuries, of calendaric study and speculation, and when we get 
to it, we have gotten to the one set of dates which he must accept and work 
with. 
A different starting point for the 490 years would destroy a fulfillment with 
J esus Christ. There was simply no way Guinness could abandon the 
interpretation that "Messiah the Prince" was Jesus. No one in the orthodox 
interpretive tradition ever doubted this, and it was simply a given for anyone 
working on Daniel. But this meant that, as long as he linked the start of the 
2,300 years with the start of the 490 years, the 1844 date was also a given for 
him, and the other biblical data must be made to conform to it. 
Counting Backward 
The only problem now is lo fix the tenninus a quo--the beginning poinl--of 
the 2,520 years. The Babylonian capture and destruction of Jerusalem is 
obviously the correct general period for the beginning of the oppression, and, 
since he has locked himself iuto 1844 as an end point, the 2,520 years should 
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Alas! Subtracting 2,520 years from 1844 yields 677 B.C., nearly a century 
too early. But wait a minute. That is using solar years. What about using the 
360-day year? That would be the equivalent of 2,485 years. Oh, dear. Still 
too early; the tenninus a quo would have to be 641 B.C. Well, there is one 
more possibility. Suppose we use true lunar reckoning in which one year is 
twelve lunations or 354.367 years? Counting 2,520 such "lunar years" equals 
2,445 solar years ... which reaches back to 602 B.C. Bingo! 
In my view, this is how Guinness arrived at the date 602 B.C. for the 
beginning of his times of the Gentiles. He gives no justification for it, for he 
has reached it artificially, from within an existing scheme of calculations, and 
not from history. He holds on to it, even when he is aware of other dates for 
Nebuchadnezzar, for he cannot move from it without losing his link to 1844 
and to the fulfillment of the 490 years in the coming of Christ. 
From this point, it was easy for him to reach the terminus of 1919, by 
counting 2,520 solar years forward from the starting point of 602 B.C. (Note 
that if he had used 360-day years instead, his terminus would have been 1883, 
only five years beyond the publication of his book. I do not know whether he 
ever considered this, but it would have been easy to consider that date too 
close for comfort.) 
There was only one more step necessary: lo find in the Bible the seventy-
five year difference between the solar and lunar reckonings of the 2,520 years. 
Here the still-mysterious numbers of Dan 12:11 came to his rescue. Assuming 
that they are variants of some sort on the number 1,260, there are indeed an 
extra seventy-five days (years for Guinness) between them. This discovery 
must have been very striking to him; it would be more impressive to us if he 
had used both numbers; but 1,290 does not figure, since the seventy-five days 
can be gained from 1,335 alone. At one point he says he does not know 
whether the seventy-five years should be added to 1844 or 1919 (p. 485). But 
if 1883 was too close for him, 1919 plus seventy-five, or 1994, might have 
seemed too distant. Besides, it would allow a cushion of seventy-five years in 
case the end did not arrive in 1919. 
I assune that he reached the 312 B.C. starting point in the same way, by 
playing with the 2,300 years until he found a suitable temtinus a quo. 
Subtracting 1919 from 2,231 solar years39 (which equals 2,300 "lunar years") 
brought him to 312 B.C., which, by coincidence, was the beginning of the 
Seleucid era of reckoning. Antiochus IV was one of the Seleucid rulers, 
lending a spurious plausibility to this starting point, which cannot otherwise be 
defended. 
SLIPPAGES IN METHOD 
Was Guinness dishonest? One would hate to say so, for we know how 
strongly our preliminary conclusions influence our later deliberations. And he 
would probably say that the date 1844 was a fixed terminus, and therefore he 
was justified in counting backwards to reach a starting point. But his 
legerdemain with figures certainly strikes us as slippery, and one thinks that at 
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some point, he must have known he was fudging. 
There are several features of Guinness's working method which make his 
final outcome possible, and which probably served as a cushion against the 
cognitive dissonance which we think his methods would surely have caused. 
First, he allows for multiple termini for the same time period. He says that 
great events never happen in isolation, but always have precursors. For 
example, he presents the 1,260-year papal oppression as three different 
possible epochs (p. 423), and the 2,520 years as four different epochs (pp. 361, 
376-377). And so he could allow several dates which correspond to various 
stages in the beginning and ending of the oppression which he calls the times 
of the Gentiles. This explains his repeated statement that the year 602 B.C. is 
the " latest commencement" of the times of the Gentiles. 
Second, he finds a safeguard in being able to disregard minor differences. 
The justification for this is: 
1. with such long periods, minor differences are really negligible; 
2. the ancients may not have observed the solar and lunar movements 
accurately; 4{) and 
3. God did not wish to be so precise with people that they would know 
exactly when the end would come, for then they would become cavalier and 
would leave off their spiritual duties.41 
Third, he has years of three different lengths available to him: the solar 
year of 365 1/4 days, the " lunar year" of 354 1/3 days, and the 360-day year 
which he variously calls the "calendar" year or the "Sabbatical" year. 
Fourth, Guinness is both careless and highly selective. Careless, in that he 
frequently quotes dates differently (usually off by a year), and sometimes 
seems simply to have done his calculations wrongly.42 
The selectivity applies more to his pseudo-scientific work. He claims that 
the number seven and its multiples are deeply imbedded in biblical 
chronology; but he ignores important biblical numbers which cannot be 
analyzed this way, such as the number twelve and forty. 
And he says that the figures of 1,260 and 2,300 years are "soli-lunar cycles" 
of very great accuracy. But, in fact, there are periods of time which are more 
accurate in the coincidence of sun and moon. One of them is 315 years, with a 
discrepancy of not quite three hours.43 Another is 1,040 years, with the very 
small discrepancy of just over an hour. Guinness refers to both of these 
numbers, but makes no use of them at all, presumably because they are not 
mentioned in the Bible. But, one might argue, if God were going to reveal 
"soli-lunar cycles" to Daniel, why not reveal those which had the greatest 
accuracy? 
Now, anyone with three different years to choose from, plus the right to 
find multiple starting and stopping points, plus the liberty to disregard small 
discrepancies, plus the selectivity to which all humans are subject, can 
certainly make any time period come out anywhere he wants it to. 
44 Walters 
REFLECTIONS 
I have had several reasons for writing this paper. 
First, I was drawn into study of Guinness's writings because I found 
twentieth-century apocalyptic writers quoting him. For example, in 1926, 
Oswald J. Smith wrote that Guinness discovered that 1917 [sic] was a 
" terminal year in the history of the Jews," and sure enough, in 1917 the 
Balfour Declaration was issued, through which the Jews were enabled to think 
of a homeland in Palestine.44 I found it ironic that Smith and other futurists 
should quote an arch-foe of futurism, and wondered just what Guinness had 
said and how he arrived at his conclusions. 
Second, Guinness belongs to the social and intellectual history of a 
particular time and place. Even his eccentric use of septiform numbers and 
soli-lunar cycles does not belong entirely to the category of curiosa, but is at 
home in a preoccupation with chronology and statistics characteristic of 
Victorian England.45 And the transition from historicism to futurism is a 
fascinating chapter in the popular interpretation of biblical apocalyptic. It has 
yet to be fully documented, but Guinness's last hurrah for historicism 
instantiates the renewed vigor with which any system defends itself against 
cognitive dissonance. We see with our own eyes what happens when a whole 
system of prediction is overtaken by history. 
Third, a major factor, I admit, was my conviction that everyone, historicist 
or futurist, who claims to determine specific modern dates from the figures of 
Daniel can do so only by means of the kind of fudging with the evidence which 
we see in Guinness. Careful scrutiny of a writer's work will invariably turn up 
misrepresentation or mishandling of the evidence. 
For example, Oswald Smith fundamentally misrepresents Guinness. To 
start with, Smith has the year wrong; for another thing, Guinness did not say 
that 1919 was a terminal year in Jewish history, but that it was the probable 
end of the age; and then his entire system of understanding biblical 
apocalyptic is at odds with Smith's. I have elsewhere given a brief critique of 
the attempt to show that Daniel's 69th week ends on the very day of Jesus' 
triumphal entry.46 Today's most widely read apocalyptic popularist, H al 
Lindsey, has done the same thing by loosening the return of Christ from the 
absolute countdown point of 1948 of his early writings, and substituting a 
clutch of multiple starting points (the taking of old Jerusalem in 1967 and the 
entry of Greece into the European Economic Community in 1981).47 
When we have made every allowance for the very hum an impulse to 
protect our own views, with which we all must struggle, we must still call this 
what it is. 
It is dishonest. 
The interests of the system have come to override exegetical integrity. This 
is not Bible study, it is indoctrination into a system which can be squared with 
Scripture only by misrepresentation and legerdemain . It is wrongly dividing 
the Word of Truth, and the Church will allow it to her own very great peril. 
In today's world of popular apocalyptic interpretation, the futurist model is 
The World Will End in 1919 45 
the only one in use. People who dissent from it are said not really to believe 
the Bible. I think it is helpful for us to see that dispensationalist futurism is 
only the latest in a series of schemes for interpreting Daniel and Revelation, 
and has not yet had even the long life which historicism had. 
Here the history of interpreting Daniel gives us perspective. Today's 
futurism is not a divine system, but one of many human approaches to this 
material. My own view is that no calendaric approach to Daniel and 
Revelation is a suitable one, but the basic point is that today's Church has the 
right to choose a method which is appropriate to the biblical materials, so that 
we may listen afresh to what the Spirit of God will say through Scripture. 
• • • 
A Prayer for Those who Interpret Scripture 
0 God, the creator of morning and evening, 
of cycling seasons and echoed aeons, 
of time, 
of eternity; 
who formed the world with words, 
who made us speaking beings, 
who appeared in time as Word made flesh: 
G rant us the gift of the Advocate, 
lo chasten us with divine sharpness, 
to cleanse all that blinds us to the truth of Scripture, 
the cynicism that disregards, 
the reluctance to hear, 
the fear of being wrong, 
the determination to be right, 
the eagerness to impress 
and lo recreate us open, alert, and intent; 
That we may struggle with words and meanings, 
wrestle until they yield their sense, 
frame the truth vivid and memorable, 
and speak as the Spirit has spoken; 
Through Jesus Christ, our Lord. Amen. 
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Notes 
1. Dictionary of National Biography, Second Supplement, vol. 2 (London: 1912), p. 
175-176. 
2. This recognition probably came about because of his influence on Rev. A. J. 
Gordon, long-time minister of the Clarendon Street Baptist Church in Boston. 
Gordon, who was on the board of Brown at the time, had adopted many of Guinness's 
views on eschatology, and quotes him frequently in articles written for the paper which 
he edited, The Watchword. (I owe this information to Rev. Scott Gibson, whose 
researches on Gordon have included compiling an index to The Watchword .) Gordon 
was doubtless close to Brown's president, Rev. Ezekiel Gilman Robinson, former 
president of Rochester Theological Seminary and of the American Baptist Missionary 
Union, who presided at his last commencement in 1889. (I thank Martha L. Mitchell, 
Brown University archivist, for this information.) 
3. On the ambiguity of the term "end" in Daniel, see S. D . Walters, ' 'The End (of 
What?) is Al Hand," Toronto Journal of Theology 2(1986):40-43. 
4. Earlier interpreters usually held this to mean 2,300 days. 
5. An alternative is that the three-and-one-half year figure was symbolic, being half of 
seven, a number which has always signified completeness. In this case, the number 
would symbolize a fini te period of time: the persecution will have a limited duration. 
6. See Brevard Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1979), p. 618-621. 
7. Time, times and half a time (12:14); as forty-two months (11:2, 13:5); and as 1,260 
days {11:3, 12:6). I hold that Revelation, like Daniel, focuses more on the persecution 
than on an absolute end to all things, sharing Daniel's ambiguity about the "end." 
8. Modem dispensationalism, which takes the time periods literally, boldly asserts that 
the three-and-one-half-year period does not begin until just before Christ's return; it 
belongs in its entirety to the future. 
9. H. Grattan Guinness, The Approaching End of the Age Viewed in the Light of 
History, Prophecy, and Science (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1878). After a 
"thirteenth edition" in 1897, it was reissued in 1918, when a "New Edition" appeared, 
edited and revised by Rev. E . H. Home, MA. (London: Morgan & Scott Ltd.). In the 
meantime, Light for the Last Days had appeared, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1886), subtitled, "A Study Historic and Prophetic" and authored by both Mr. and Mrs. 
Guinness (who are said on the title page to be "authors of The Approaching End of the 
Age, Etc."), which was also eventually reissued, in an edition by Rev. E. Cachemaille 
(London: Morgan & Scott, 1917). 
10. See the section in End titled "Prophetic Chronology," especially pp. 309-329. 
Guinness acknowledges dependence on Thomas Birks's First Elements of Sacred 
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Prophecy (London: W. E. Painter, 1943), but some such system of equivalence goes 
back at least to the Babylonian Talmud (Sanhedrin 97b), attributed to Rabbi Qattina 
(ca. 300), and was explicitly used by Saadia Gaon (882-946) in The Book of Beliefs and 
Opinions (Samuel Roscnbaltt, trans., Yale Judaica Series I [New Haven, 1948), p. 296-
298); Rabbi Aqiba (ca. 40-134) was later said to have held such an opinion, see William 
G. Braude, The Midrash on Psalms, (Yale Judaica Series 13 (New Haven, 1959), p. 97-
98). I thank Rev. Michael Farris for the rabbinic information, drawn from his thesis on 
Daniel 9:24-27 (University of Toronto, in progress). 
11. It could, of course, be a century, or even a decade. But such an equivalence would 
yield numbers so large that the end would be impossibly remote. Interpreters seem to 
prefer an end near enough to motivate intense religious devotion. This is probably 
also the reason that no one ever sought to apply the year-day principle to the 490-year 
period of Daniel 9; it is the only time period in Daniel to be spared. For to do so 
would yield 178,850 years ( 490 x 365). The selective and subjective character of 
calendaric interpretation is already apparent. 
12. By rights, the Ezekiel passage should have led interpreters to reduce the 490-year 
period back to 490 days (seventy weeks). 
13. This is not a strong argument, as the Hebrew reads literally "seventy heptads of 
years," i.e., seven years for each year. The word "week" enters English translations 
because the most frequent heptad in the Bible is of days, but there is nothing in the 
word itself which implies "seven days." 
14. The first two major parts of End are devoted to " Progressive Revelation" and 
"Progressive Interpretation," respectively, comprising a total of 139 pages. The plea 
that God did not intend earlier generations fully to understand the biblical prophecies 
was commonplace in nineteenth-century prophetic interpretation. 
15. The actual number 1,260 does not occur in Daniel, but Revelation refers to the 
three-and-one-half-year time period as 1,260 days, and this numeral was always 
transported back into the interpretation of Daniel. Guinness did so on the grounds 
that "earlier and more elementary predictions" must be understood in light of 
Revelat ion, much as the "latest and fullest edition" of a book throws light on "an 
earlier and less explicit one" (p. 54). 
16. This is made clear by the text itself; see Walters, "The End (of What?)," p . 33-34. 
17. This is already attested in Revelation's reuse of the animal symbolism of Daniel 7-
the four animals are rolled together into one (chap 13)-and in the Eagle Vision of the 
Apocalypse of Ezra 12. 
18. Thus the French Revolution became involved. Sometimes Napoleon was the 
antichrist, but in other writers he was celebrated as the one who broke the political 
power of the Roman Catholic Church in France. 
19. E. B. Elliott, Horae Apocalypticae, vol. 3, 5th ed, (London: Seeley, Jackson & 
Halliday, 1862), pp. 328-454. Elliott's explanations are: 
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First bowl (Rev 16:1), foul sores = social and moral evil in the wake of the French 
Revolution. 
Second bowl (v 3), sea becomes blood = naval wars of 1793-1815. 
Third bowl (vs 4-7), rivers become blood = wars on the Danube, Rhine and Po, 1792-
1805. 
Fourth bowl (vs 8-9), scorching heat = Napoleonic wars of 1809-1812. 
Fifth bowl (vs 10-11), beast's kingdom into darkness = waning of papal political power. 
Sixth bowl (vs 12-16), drying up of Euphrates = decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1820s 
and 1830s. 
20. Futurism emerged in the 1830s with the work of John Nelson Darby, and with the 
Oxford Movement's rejection of a papal antichrist. On Darby, see, inter alia Ernest 
Sandeen, The Roots of Fundmnentalism (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 
59-80; for the Oxford M ovement, consider as an example [E. B. Pusey?], "The Times 
of Antichrist," an Advent sermon preached in 1838, Tracts for the Times, Vol. 5, No. 83 
(London: Rivington, 1840). 
21. "This is infen-ed from Scripture rather than distinct ly stated in it; but the inference 
is so weU grounded as to be of almost equal weight with a distinct declaration" (p. 352, 
emphasis his). 
22. T he word " times" is not in the Hebrew, although ellipsis of pe'iim fm (" times") may 
be assumed. But this word does not mean "time periods," but "occurrences," and is 
not the same as the words used in Dan 7:25 (Ara maic, 'iddan) and 12:7 (Hebrew, 
m6'ed). In giving the Levit icus passage a chronological sense, Guinness 
misunderstands it at a basic level. 
23. A difficu lty which Guinness's vigorous anti-Catholicism never allowed him to 
recognize at all. The villain was, of course, Islam. Hence, the Crusades, to rescue 
Jerusalem from the infidel. 
24. This is largely an arbitrary choice, to wh ich we retu rn below, p. 13. 
25. Followers of William Miller found themselves in the same situation, having used 
the same calculations to predict Christ's return in 1844. Their solution has been to 
posit a heavenly sanctuary, also ment ioned in Rev 11:19, to which Christ came in 1844 
and which he is now in the process of cleansing. See Desmond Ford, Daniel 
(NashviUe: Southern Publishing Associat ion, 1978), p. 189. 
26. Pp. 430-436. The Turkish Sultan Abdul M ej id had promulgated sweeping reforms, 
including religious tolerance for non-Muslims, in November 1839. This is the obvious 
candidate for a crucial religious event in the Levant, but it is too early to fit Guinness's 
calculations. Guinness has in mind, as a long footnote shows, a letter of March 21, 
1844, from the Sultan to Sir Stratford Canning agreeing to give up the death penalty 
fo r Muslims who apostasize to Christianity. (His date is correct; see E . C. Blech in 
Cambn"dge Modem His101y, vol. 11 [1909], p. 275.) This was a significant move, but 
does not really qualify for Guinness's description; the "decree granting rel igious 
toleration" had been made five years earlier. 
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27. Of course, Guinness wrote before World War I, when the Ottoman empire came to 
an end. But he believed that its decline, which had long been noted in Europe, was 
predicted in the book of Revelation. His anti-Muslim bias was probably typical of his 
own time and place, and in popular apocalyptic writings, Islam had long shared the 
stage with the pope as the diabolical oppressor. 
28. "As with all the other periods we have considered, this 2,300 years seems to have a 
double commencement and conclusion" (p. 430). 
29. Guinness erred in his calculation here (see note 36), and the correct terminus 
should be 1920. Jn later editions he gives it as "1919-20," tacitly acknowledging his 
error but still holding on to 1919 (e.g., End, fifth ed., p. 440). 
30. On the 490 years, see below p. 13. 
31. Already in 1880, Guinness had changed these dates to "1844-48" and "1919-23," 
and had replaced the clause "whether our data are accurate" with the words, "whether 
these are the final dates." This is in the "Fifth Edition," but I do not have access to 
editions between the first and the fifth. 
32. In the revision of End which appeared in 1918 (see note 9), virtually all of 
Guinness's scientific material was omitted. 
33. Guinness gives the dates only in their Anno Mundi form, which prevents the reader 
from knowing their equivalent in the Julian calendar (seep. 300). 
34. This chart faces p. 229, but the dates are given only in their A.M. form (see 
preceding note). The 606 B.C. date also appears on the chart facing p. 380. 
35. See note 26. 
36. They had first fixed 1843 as the date, and expected Christ's return then; but, when 
He didn't come, they reexamined their calculations and discovered that they had made 
an error of one year, and that the 2,300 years actually ended in 1844. The error is 
noteworthy in itself; since there are two years "l," when you subtract B.C.-year numbers 
from a total number of years, you must add in an extra year. (You collect one when 
you pass "Go.") 
37. Contemporary dispensationalists, using a starting point in 444 B.C. instead of 457, 
end the 69th week on the very day of Christ's triumphal entry into Jerusalem, see 
Harold W. Hoehner, "Chronological Aspects of the Life of Christ, VI: Daniel's 
Seventy Weeks and New Testament Chronology," Bibliotheca Sacra (1975):47-65. For 
a brief critique, see Walters, "The End (Of What?)," p. 45. 
38. Including the conversion of the Gentiles and the destruction of the Temple, p. 287; 
it is " the period of the Advent, the atoning death, and the world redeeming work of 
the Son of God," p. 415. 
39. This explains his mistake of one year, see note 29 above. 
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40. Although, surely, this has nothing to do with the numbers revealed in Scriptu re! 
41. I find the same extraordinary latitude in the Schofield Bible, where the annotator 
says, "Prophetic time is invariably so near as to give full warning, so indeterminate as 
to give no satisfaction to mere curiosity" (p. 915, note 2). 
42. For example, the date is 553 on p. 425, 552 on p. 400; 677 on p. 430, 676 on p. 360; 
606 on p. 411, 605 on p. 315. I have tried to verify many of his calculations involving 
solar years, lunar years, and the epacts between them, some successfully, some without 
success. 
43. Guinness's primary astronomical source, de Cheseaux, discovered this, and then 
realized that the biblical 1,260 was four times 360. But the discrepancy is four times as 
large, too. 
44. Oswald J. Smith, Is the Antichrist at Hand? (f oronto, Tabernacle Publishers: 
1926), p. 17. Guinness wrote End before the return of the Jews to Palestine-the 
linchpin of twentieth-century popular apocalyptic-became important. It features 
somewhat more largely in Light for the Last Days. 
45. I owe this observation to my colleague in the Toronto School of Theology, Prof. 
Thomas Mcintire, as I do also references to Steven J . Gould, Time's Atr0w, Time 's 
Cycle (Harvard: 1987) and to David Landes, Revolution in Time (Harvard: 1983). 
46. See note 37. 
47. S. D . Walters, " Hal Lindsey: Recalculating the Second Coming," The Christian 
Century 96 (1979): 839-840. 
Pannenberg's Quest for the 
Proleptic Jesus 
R. DA YID RIGHTMIRE 
MODERN APPROACHES TO THE RELATIONSHIP 
OF FAITH AND HISTORY 
The nineteenth century "Quest for the Historical Jesus" (Schweitzer) 
attempted to get behind the dogma of the Church to discover who Jesus really 
was. The efforts of the old liberal quest yielded a picture of the historical 
Jesus that was stripped of all kerygmatic accretion. Such de-husked 
presentations revealed a kernel that often made the Jesus of history the 
reflection of modern historiographical and theological constructs. 
Martin Kahler, in responding to the rise of quest theology, wrote The So-
called Jesus of History and the Biblical, Historic Christ (1896). Jn this work he 
distinguished between the Jesus of historical research and the biblically 
revealed, historic Christ. Basic to Kahler's critique of the Lives of Jesus 
school was his suspicion of a hidden Ebionitism at work in their de-
dogmatization. Kahler, as the father of kerygma theology, sought to safeguard 
the Jesus of biblical revelation from the whims of historical research. Jn doing 
so, he chose to differentiate between historical facts and historic events, 
between outer and inner history. Such bifurcation was the natural result of a 
neo-Kantian dichotomy between fact and value which found its roots in 
Lessing and Kierkegaard. 
Although holding to historical rootage for the kerygma in Jesus Christ, 
Kahler emphasized the message of Christ to be ultimately decisive. What was 
a tenuous relationship in Kahler became dissolved into the preaching of Christ 
in the teaching of the foremost kerygma theologian--Rudolph Bultmann. 
H istorical bases for his demythologized kerygma were negligible at best. The 
past became subsumed by the present, just as the future became the vehicle by 
which the individual was confronted with the eschatological decision of the 
present. 
Bultmann not only signalled the end of the quest but also served as the 
catalyst for the new quest in the mid-twentieth century. Ernst Kasemann 
(1953) was the first of Bultmann's students to recognize the fallacy of 
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removing the kerygma from its historical bearings in J esus. In 1956, G unther 
Bornkamm, another Bultmannian, wrote a book on this very subject: Jesus of 
Nazareth. He was to be followed by others, but stands out as the only figure in 
the Bultmannian school who wrote a full length treatise on the relationship of 
the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith . 
Jesus of Nazareth reveals Bornkamm's desire to find history in the 
kerygma and kerygma in that history. He views the Jesus of history and the 
Christ of faith as inseparable, although the former is cautiously approached by 
way of form-critical methodology. As an attempt in doing "Christology from 
below," this work fails to overcome the hiatus between the Jesus of history 
and the Christ of faith, by failing to take the resurrection of Jesus Christ 
seriously as a historical event. It is difficult to understand how it is possible to 
bridge the gulf between fact and value if the interpretive key is not given equal 
access to both sides of the dichotomy. 
PANNENBERG'S "SOLUTION" 
Fact-Value Dichotomy 
A reaction to the kerygma theology of the Bultmannian school is 
evidenced in the writings of Wolfhart Pannenberg. Redemptive history 
contains both the fact of God's revelation and the meaning of the event. 
Pannenberg sympathizes with the attempts of Kahler lo safeguard the gospel 
from historicism, but vehemently disagrees with the total separation of the 
historical Jesus from the Christ of faith evident in later kerygma theology.1 
For him, historical verification is not a crutch, but the integrating feature of 
his theology as a whole. 
Pannenberg rejects the subject-object antithesis as presented by Kant and 
views the bifurcation of fact and value as a false dichotomy. 
The distinction ... between the facts of J esus' history and their meaning 
as revelation, which allegedly only faith can find in them, is 
widespread .. .. Under the influence of positivism a nd of neo-
Kantianism, scholars have come to distinguish more sharply between 
the facts on the one hand and their evaluation or significance on the 
other hand. Most radically of all, Rudolph Bultmann carries out this 
distinction by relegating the early Christian Easter message totally lo 
the significance side .... Such a splitting up of historical consciousness 
into a detection of facts and an evaluation of them is intolerable to 
Christian faith, not only because the message of the resurrection of 
Jesus and of God's revelation in him necessarily becomes merely 
subjective interpretation, but also because it is the reflection of an 
outmoded and questionable historical method. It is based on the 
futile aim of the positivist historians to ascertain bare facts without 
meaning in history.2 
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He insists on holding together fa..:t and value. There is unity between facts 
and their meaning. "Every event, if not artificially taken out of context, brings 
its own meaning for each particular inquirer, brings it with its context, which 
of course is always a context o f tradition."3 
Pannenberg decries the bifurcation of fact and meaning inherent in the 
positivistic understanding of the historical method. Fact and meaning, history 
and kerygma are integrally related. The kerygma must be rooted in the 
historical Jesus, for the kcrygma expresses the meaning inherent in the events 
o f his life, death and resurrection. "All meaning has its criterion in the fact in 
which it inheres."4 He reacts to the theology of the Word (Barth and 
Bultmann), believing that it has allowed the histo rical-critical method to be 
taken hostage by positivism. Revelat ion is not g iven in or th rough history, but 
as histo ry. Events and interpretations, facts and meanings must be viewed 
together in their original histo rical context. 
The whole problem is already contained in this distinction. Is not the 
" revelatory value" related to the "fact" as something added from the 
outside? Does not this argument accept all too uncritically the neo-
Kantian distinction between being and value? Docs not the meaning 
of an event belong to the eve nt itself insofar as it is to be understood 
only within its own historical context [ Gesche11he11sz11samme11ha11g]?5 
The " historical docctism" inherent in both existential theology (Gogartcn 
and Bultmann) and the tradi tion of redemptive history--Heilsgescl1ichte 
( Kahler and Barth) , is rejected by Panncnbcrg. Both of these schools 
depreciate real history. 
Their common starting point is to be seen in the fact that critical-
histo rical invest igat ion as the scientific ve rification of events did not 
seem to leave any more room for redemptive events. Therefore the 
theology of redemptive history fled into a harbor supposedly safe 
from the critical-historical llc od tide, the harbor of a suprahistory--or 
with Barth, of pre- history. For the same reason the theology of 
existence withdrew from the meaningless and godless course of 
"objective" history to the experience of the significance of history in 
the " historicity" of the individual.6 
But neither is the historical-critical method without its problems. Pannenbcrg 
denies that anyone engaged in histo rical research is free of presuppositions. 
Proponents of the historical-critical method arc far less objective than they 
think, being governed by positivistic presupposi tions.7 In contrast to both 
kerygma theology and historicism, he stresses the histo rical character o f 
redemptive events, believing that " histo ry is the most comprehensive horizon 
of Christian theology."8 
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Revelation as History 
Pannenberg seeks to overcome the distinction between Historie and 
Geschichte by way of universal history. Borrowing the construct from Dilthey 
and its modifications in Heidegger, Pannenberg seeks to show that all of 
history is an indirect revelation of God. Together with modern theology, he 
agrees that revelation is not the communication of supernatural truths about 
God. Rather, it is the self-disclosure of God himself. In response to the 
Enlightenment's attack on revelation as the inspired words and doctrines of 
Scripture, German idealism had redefined revelation as the self-revelation of 
God. Pannenberg does not disagree with the understanding of revelation as 
the self-disclosure of God. What he does object to is the notion of a direct 
self-communication of God. Revelation is an indirect self-revelation of God 
reflected in history. The historical activity of God is the means of his self-
disclosure. 
For Pannenberg, only the totality of history is the self-manifestation of 
God. The notion of universal history as the indirect self-revelation of God is 
nothing new, being found in the thought of Schleiermacher, Schelling and 
Hegel. The problem with the concept of universal history, however, is the lack 
of significance the Christ event has for those who view all of history as 
revelatory. What is new in Pannenberg's understanding of universal history is 
that it avoids relativizing the Christ event by emphasizing the eschatological 
role of Jesus as the proleptic9 presence of the end of history. 
It is precisely this understanding of history as something whose 
totality is given by the fact that its end has become accessible in a 
provisional and anticipatory way that is to be gathered today from the 
history of Jesus in its relationship to the Israelite-Jewish tradition. 
Hegel was unable to see this because the eschatological character of 
the message of Jesus remained hidden to him .... 10 
If the totality of history is the self-revelation of God, then the end of history 
alone reveals the meaning of the whole. For Pannenberg, Jesus is the 
anticipation of the final end of universal history.11 
Pannenberg holds that particular events cannot be understood apart from 
the universal scope of history. "It is the horizon of world history which first 
makes it possible to appreciate the full significance of an individual event."12 
It is the particularity of the event of Jesus that through it for the fust 
time the totality of reality was constituted as a whole, whereas all 
other occurrences have a relation to the whole of reality only through 
their relation to this unique occurrence .... For history receives its 
wholeness for the first time precisely by the fact that the end of 
history--which had occurred in an anticipatory form in the claim and 
fate of Jesus--comes into view.13 
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Thus God reveals himself in the history of Jesus. But more than this, 
Pannenberg maintains that "the God who constitutes history has himself fully 
entered the process of history in his revelation."14 
Historical Probabilities 
Pannenberg reacts to the self-authenticating Word in dialectical theology, 
emphasizing instead the historical bases of revelation. The revelatory 
meaning of the activity of God in history is not understood only by faith, but is 
inherent in the activity itself. "The events in which God demonstrates his 
deity are self-evident as they stand within the framework of their own 
history."15 Thus, he rejects the dichotomy between event and interpretation. 
The results achieved by the use of historical evidence are, at most, 
probabilities. Probable knowledge, however, is the basis of all human 
decisions and commitments. 
We must see that this difficulty--the difficulty of building final 
convictions on chance historical facts and of basing eterna l 
blessedness on a history which can at best only be ascertained with 
some degree of probability--is a basic problem of the Christian faith. 
It is impossible to evade it in any way at all without losing sight of 
Christianity's fundamental connection with the historical figure of 
Jesus.16 
What can be known of the historical Jesus? Pannenberg believes that 
"certain important events and facts can be determined with sufficient 
probability [lo] be viewed as historical." Included in these are Jesus' death 
and resurrection.17 Religious faith is based on probabilit ies, not certainties.18 
Faith is risk-taking on the basis of reasonable probabilities. Provisionality19 is 
the basis of Pannenberg's Christology from below. In fact, his view of reality 
is marked by an awareness of provisionality, an openness to the future. Even 
though existence is tentative, it must be embraced as the only existence 
possible.20 
Faith and Reason 
What is essential for Pannenberg's conception of faith is its future 
orientation. The past and present are the domains of reason; the future 
belongs to faith. Faith is defined in terms of truth in the revelation of God in 
universal history, that is, in the future which has been revealed in the events of 
J esus' destiny. Reason provides the basis for such faith. The self-revelation of 
God in Christ can be comprehended by reason and responded to by faith. 
Revelation is not separated from the historical process. Jn fact, for 
Pannenberg there is one historical reality, the self-revelation of G od to man. 
The meaning of this universal history is only known at the end of history. 
Since the end gives meaning to the historical process, one must remain open 
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to the future. In Jesus' resurrection, this future end is manifest in the present, 
thus giving meaning to the present historical process and calling forth hope in 
the future consummation of universal history.21 
Pannenberg argues against an either/or relationship of faith and 
knowledge. They are "co-essential dimensions of the act of a total person." 
Both are necessary for recognizing God's revelation in Christ, although the 
emphasis is clearly on the role of reason. 
One cannot really know of God's revelation in Jesus Christ without 
believing. But faith does not take the place of knowledge. On the 
contrary, it has its basis in an event which is a matter for knowing and 
which becomes known to us only by more or less adequate 
information. To be able to have Christian faith one must at least 
presuppose that the message about Jesus Christ is true .... The 
knowledge of Jesus' history, including his resurrection from the dead, 
is the basis of faith .... Knowledge is not a stage beyond faith, but leads 
into f aith .... 22 
Such an emphasis on the rationality of faith leaves little room for mystery.23 
Pannenberg, however, is concerned to define faith as something more than a 
subjective way of knowing. Christian faith is not to be equated with a "pious 
subjectivity'' that makes up for historical uncertainty concerning the life of 
Jesus. 
Faith is not something like a compensation of subjective conviction to 
make up for defective knowledge .... But faith is actually trust in God's 
promise, and this trust is not rendered superfluous by knowledge of 
this promise; on the contrary, it is made possible for the first time.24 
Pannenberg thus reacts to the attempt to drive revelation from the experience 
of faith rather than from reason's knowledge of history. 
But the act of faith or trust presupposes a knowledge of the 
trustworthiness of the partner. Without such well-founded knowledge 
faith would be blind gullibility, credulity, or even superstition. For 
much too long a time faith has been misund erstood to be 
subjectivity's fortress into which Christianity could retreat from the 
attacks of scientific knowledge.25 
Pannenberg's position on the objective, historical content of revelation 
must be viewed as a reaction to the loss of history in kerygma theology and the 
escape to suprahistory in Heilsgeschichte theology. 
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We see that Christian faith builds its hope on the truth of an event 
which occurred in the far-distant past. Therefore everything naturally 
depends on our having a knowledge, an exact and reliable knowledge, 
of these events. Faith cannot replace that knowledge. It would have 
to be reckless and desperate faith which attempted to guarantee the 
reality of its ground from its own resourccs.26 
This over-reaction reduces the apprehension of revelation to historical reason 
and historico-scientific methodology, failing to realize the importance and 
place of personal faith and the Holy Spirit in the mediation and reception of 
divine revelation.27 
Reason alone is needed for perceiving historical facts. Thus, revelation, as 
God's activity in history, does not require special illumination. Neither faith 
nor the Holy Spirit enhance the revelatory content of the historical facts. He 
is convinced that the doctrine of the Spirit has been misused as "a fig leaf to 
protect the nakedness of the Christian tradition from the questionings of 
modern critical thinking."28 Neither does faith lead to understanding, but 
rather, rational knowledge is the presupposition of faith . Panncnberg avoids 
positivistic historicism by insisting on keeping historical facts in the context of 
their tradition ( Oberliefenmgsgeschichte ).29 
What then is the role of faith? For Pannenberg, faith is trust or 
confidence (jiducia) in the knowledge of Jesus' history, including his 
resurrection from the dead .... " Faith not only involves presupposing that 
certain historical events took place as the New Testament records them, but it 
also involves hope, that is, trust in the promise of God and his future.30 
Knowledge of God's revelation in history is future-oriented, since it can only 
be ascerta ined in the light of the anticipation of the end of history. Faith does 
not add to the knowledge of revelation, but it is still important for 
Pannenberg. 
The fact that the demonstration of the deity of the God of Israel in 
the life-history of J esus is a matter of insight and knowledge, does not 
render faith superfluous. People do of course say that what they 
know for a fact, they do not need to believe any more. But 
statements of that kind arc superficial in this matter. For faith 
involves the participation of the believer himself in the reality in 
which he believes, and this cannot be replaced by any knowledge. 
Moreover, faith always has to do with the future. The believer 
attaches his own future to what he has come lo recognize. Precisely 
for that reason faith cannot be its own basis. Faith as pure risk would 
be blind credulity. Trustful belief needs a ground on which to build.31 
For Pannenberg reason provides the objective certainty necessary for faith. It 
is obvious that reason is necessary to perceive historical facts, but Pannenberg 
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fails to see the role of faith or the Spirit as necessary in the hermeneutical 
process. 
The crux of the issue of the relationship of faith and knowledge in 
Pannenberg's thought has to do with the mediation of faith. Is faith mediated 
through historical events, or is it mediated in the crisis of personal decision? 
Pannenberg has opted for the former, against the tide of much of modern 
theology, by refusing to allow faith to add anything to the certainty of the truth 
of revelatory history.32 This is most clearly evident in Pannenberg's view of 
Jesus' resurrection. If the resurrection cannot be spoken of as a historical 
event that can be investigated by historical methodology, it ceases to be 
relevant and takes on a mythological character. Pannenberg firmly upholds 
the historicity of Jesus' resurrection, not from a confessional stance, but based 
on the historical evidence. Against those who seek to find existential meaning 
in the resurrection outside of his tory, he believes that the relevance of the 
resurrection is based solely on the historical reality of the event itself. 
Trust in the promised resurrection to life is certainly opposed to what 
we human beings experience in ourselves (cf. Rom 4:19 ff.), but that 
trust is not a frivolously accepted risk or a blind readiness to believe 
authority in view of the witness of the apostles, but is grounded on 
Jesus' resurrection which has already occurred.33 
Christology From Below 
Pannenberg rejects Christology "from above," with its emphasis on the 
divinity of Jesus and the centrality of the incarnation, as expressed in 
traditional Christian theology and powerfully reasserted by Karl Barth. 
Rather, Pannenberg advocates a Christology " from below," being more 
interested in how Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ than in how Christ is Jesus of 
Nazareth.34 Christology from above presupposes the doctrine of the Trinity, 
and thus, the divinity of Jesus. He rejects the methodology of doing 
Christology from above, for one would have to stand in the position of God 
himself in order to follow the way of God's Son into the world. 
Christology must begin with the man Jesus, its first question has to be 
about his relationship to God. Every statement about Jesus taken 
independently from his relationship to God could result only in a 
crass distortion of reality. The modernistic presentation of Jesus at 
the height of the quest of the historical Jesus offers enough examples 
of this .. .. The specific element in the Christological question about 
Jesus is that it does not begin with some preliminary aspect of his 
deeds and words or of his effect on men, but with his relation to God 
as it is expressed in the whole of his activity on earth.35 
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In seeking to present the deity of Christ without violating his true 
humanity, Pannenberg attempts to formulate his Ch.ristology in terms arising 
from the historical situation of Jesus mission.36 Thus, instead of starting with 
the incarnation and divinity of Christ, the historical Jesus is the basis of his 
Christology.37 More specifically, Pannenberg views the resurrection of Jesus 
as the main focus of Christology, and seeks to approach it as a historical event 
within the matrix of the historical process ("from below"). The historical 
facticity of the resurrection is the only proper basis for Christian faith.38 
By emphasizing the revelation of God through the Jesus of history, 
Pannenberg employs the Hebraic concept of understanding the revelation of 
God through the activity of the divine in the historical process. Rather than 
starting with philosophical presuppositions about God, he maintains that God 
can only be known through his historical activity with people.39 The 
incarnation, according to Pannenberg, is an emphasis that was a result of 
Hellenistic cultural influence upon Christianity. He sees a shift away from a 
"from below'' to a "from above" approach in the early church; away from an 
emphasis on eschatology, to that of epiphany.40 
Resu"ection 
Most attempts to do Christology from below try to substantiate Jesus' 
unity with God by his pre-Easter claim to authority, not by his resurrection. In 
contrast, Pannenberg finds a "proleptic element in Jesus' claim to authority."41 
The resurrection of Christ is viewed as the "eschatological self-revelation of 
God." 
Now the history of the whole is only visible when one stands at its 
end. Until then, the future always remains as something beyond 
calculation. And, only in the sense that the perfection of history has 
already been inaugurated in Jesus Christ is God finally and fully 
revealed in the fate of Jesus. With the resurrection of Jesus, the end 
of history has already occurred .... the end of the world will be on a 
cosmic scale what has already happened in Jesus.42 
Thus, the resurrection of Jesus not only reveals God, but serves as the telos of 
history. "In Jesus' history, the God whom Jesus revealed is the infinite God. 
However, this revelation does not happen as the annihilation of the finite but 
as its effusive fulfillment.'143 God's revelation in Jesus is open to the future, 
but at the same time, this event is final. "The history of Jesus, precisely in the 
form of mere anticipation, is the final revelation of God."44 
Jesus' importance is measured by his proleptic eschatology. He revealed 
the coming Kingdom of God in his life, death and resurrection. "Jesus is the 
final revelation of God to the extent that his ministry and his history have 
eschatological character."45 The expectation of the fulfillment of God's 
Kingdom on earth is the focal point of the revelation in Jesus. This revelation 
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is not without a background and context. Jesus shared with Judaism a 
common religious heritage and hope. His authority grows out of a message 
that had its roots in the history of Israel. In Jesus' proclamation, however, the 
revelation of the one true God was not only complete, but also was made 
available to the Gentile world. 
The presupposed Jewish knowledge of God was recast by the 
appearance of Jesus. Only then for the first time was the God of the 
Jews revealing himself as the God he really is. And the Greeks' quest 
for God was revised and corrected when it found its answer in 
Christianity. 
Jesus of Nazareth is the final revelation of God because the End of 
history appeared in him. It did so both in his eschatological message 
and in his resurrection from the dead. H owever, he can be 
understood to be God's final revelation only in connection with the 
whole of history as mediated by the history of Israel. He is God's 
revelation in the fact that all history receives its due light from him.46 
The significance of Jesus' resurrection is set forth by Pannenberg m a 
series of propositions: 
1. If Jesus has been raised, then the end of the world has begun. 
2. If Jesus has been raised, this for a Jew can only mean that God 
himself has confirmed the pre-Easter activity of Jesus. 
3. Through his resurrection from the dead, Jesus moved so close to 
the Son of Man that the insight became obvious: the Son of Man 
is none other than the man Jesus who will com e again. 
4. If J esus, having been raised from the dead, is ascended to God 
and if thereby the end of the world has begun, then God is 
ultimately revealed in Jesus. 
5. The transition to the Gentile mission is motivated by the 
eschatological resurrection of the crucified One. 
6. What the early Christian tradition transmitted as the words of the 
risen Jesus is to be understood in terms of its content as the 
explication of the significance inherent in the resurrection itself.47 
Thus, for Pannenberg, the resurrection of Jesus is "absolutely decisive for any 
Christian proclamation and for the Christian faith itself."48 
What docs Panncnberg mean by the term " resurrection"? H e prefers to 
understand it metaphorically. "To speak about the resurrection of the dead is 
not comparable to speaking about any random circumstance that can be 
identified empirically at anytime. Here we are dealing with a mctaphor."49 
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Evidently something had happened to the witnesses of the 
appearances of the Risen O ne for which their language had no other 
word than that used to characterize the eschatological expectation, 
i.e., resurrection from the dead. This expression is a metaphor. It 
suggests the idea of being awakened and arising from sleep. Hence 
Jewish traditions often join mention of the future resurrection of the 
dead with the metaphorical description of death as sleep. It is 
important to notice this metaphorical meaning of our talk about the 
resurrection, though of course not of the thing itself .... The most we 
can really know is whether or not Easter witnesses were confronted 
by a reality which we too can comprehend only in terms of that 
parabolic word of eschatological expectation: resurrection from the 
dead.50 
This metaphorical understanding is found in Judeo-Christian hope and not in 
G reek speculat ion. Pannenberg discusses the two concepts of life beyond 
death in our western culture: the Greek idea of the immortality of the soul and 
the Jewish-Christian hope of a resurrection of the dead. He finds problems, 
however, with the Greek concept. 
Here a person cannot talk about hope in the genuine sense. The 
person who believes in the immortality of the soul docs not look for 
something new in the future, but thinks he is able lo preserve a kernel 
of his present human existence as something that cannot pcrish.51 
The Greek idea of immortality is based on a distinction between body and 
soul. Pannenberg maintains that modern anthropology has abolished this 
distinction between body and soul as two completely different realms of 
reality.52 
Although grounded in Jewish apocalyptic hope,53 the resurrection of Jesus 
opens the future in a radically new way. His rising from the dead has universal 
implications. 
J esus' new reality, which appeared to the disciples at Easter, remains 
incomprehensible for us, as it was for them. We also are able to 
describe it only by the metaphor with which Jesus' disciples spoke 
about it: it is like rising from sleep, but now to a new life. Yet, by 
knowing ourselves lo be bound lo Jesus, we can already be certain 
that someday we will also participate in this new reality, which has 
appeared in him.54 
Pannenbcrg is quick lo recognize the fact, however, that the universal 
implications of J esus' resurrection are subject t o certain historical 
presuppositions: 
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If one assumes that the dead cannot rise, that any event of this type 
can never happen, the result will be such a strong prejudice against 
the truth of the early Christian message of Jesus' resurrection, that 
the more precise quality of the particular testimonies will not be 
taken into consideration in forming a general judgment. Only if the 
expectation of the future general resurrection of all men from death, 
whether for life or for judgment, makes sense in itself, only if it also 
expresses the truth for us, will it then be meaningful to put the 
question of J esus' resurrection as a question of histor ical 
importance.55 
The historical resurrection of Jesus is foundational to Pannenberg's 
Christology. "Jesus' resurrection is the basis for the perception of his 
divinity."56 This stands in contrast to much Christology from below, in that it 
presumes the historicity of the resurrection, leading to Easter fai th. 
The possibility of the historicity of Jesus' resurrection has been 
opposed o n th e grounds tha t the resurrection of a dead 
person ... violates the laws of nature. Therefore, resurrection as a 
historical event is impossible.57 
Who is to say that the only things that can happen are the things 
which are by nature already fully and completely comprehensible? Is 
not even our everyday reality more complex than a picture of reality 
so empty of mystery would like to admit? One often hears the 
objection that a historian who reckoned with possibilities of this kind 
would come into conflict with natural sciences. Curiously enough this 
objection is seldom raised by scientists nowadays, and least of all by 
physicists; it is most often heard on the lips of theologians, or even 
historians. In these quarters a dogmatic view of the natural sciences 
is evidently still widespread which is no longer held by the sciences 
themselves. 58 
Why does Pannenberg take such a strong stance for the historical resurrection 
of Jesus? A major impetus comes from his desire to safeguard the objective 
basis of Christian faith. 
If no arguments could be marshalled in its favor which would allow it 
to seem credible, then the assertion that Jesus is risen would be the 
expression of irresponsible subjectivism or blind faith in authority. 
But the cause of the Christian faith does not rest on such shaky 
ground. On the contrary, the historical claim, which is already 
contained in the assertion that Jesus is risen, is a tenable one on 
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objective examination, even in the context of our present experience 
of reality. The distance of the present world from the eschatological 
future of God does not exclude the real appearance of that future in 
our present world. And it is on this that the Christian faith has always 
insisted throughout history.59 
For Pannenberg, it is inappropriate to find a fact/value dichotomy in the 
resurrection of Jesus. Meaning inheres in the historical facticity of the Easter 
event. 
Only when the original unity of event and meaning is grasped may the 
question of the historicity of Jesus resurrection be properly raised 
again. For the event here in question can only be expressed in the 
language of apocalyptic expectation by the metaphorical phrase, 
resurrection from the dead, but nevertheless it was experienced as a 
concrete occurrence from without, not simply as a subjective 
experience. Therefore, even modern historians must at least examine 
it as eternal occurrence .... The early Christian proclamation only 
unfolded the inherent meaning of Jesus' history in the language and 
the conceptualization of the time and the particular hearer. 
Sometimes it succeeded very welJ in expressing it, sometimes not. 
But it did not invent a meaning that was not already there.60 
In addition to his critique of the distinction between Geschicltte and Historie, 
Pannenberg calls into question the basic historiographical distinction between 
fact and value, event and meaning. God, as Lord of history, cannot be 
restricted lo some special sphere of history (i.e., Heilsgeschichte). This 
critique is most evident in his handling of the resurrection of Jesus. 
Pannenberg insists that certainty about the resurrection does not come from 
the decision of faith. Faith is based on the certainty, which must come from 
outside faith. Just because first-hand proof is no longer attainable, at least 
eyewitness historical proof is available to us. Thus, the resurrection of Jesus 
does not emerge in a historical vacuum. Three elements make the 
resurrection of Jesus an historical event: 
1. A context in Jewish apocalypticism, 
2. An ontological analysis of natural human.Jonging, and 
3. An adequate metaphorical expression of the reality of the 
resurrection.61 
The historicity of the resurrection is not affected by its metaphorical 
character. 
Please understand me correctly: Only the name we give lo this event 
is symbolic, metaphorical, but not the reality of the event itself. The 
latter is so absolutely unique that we have no other name for this than 
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the metaphorical expression of the apocalyptical expectation. In this 
sense, the resurrection of Jesus is an historical event, an event that 
really happened at that time.62 
In fact, the Easter event provides the hermeneutical key for Pannenberg's 
Christology. "Thus, Jesus is the final revelation of God and, therefore, he 
himself is God. This doctrine adds nothing essential to the events of the 
resurrection of Jesus; it only makes clear the inner meaning of that event.63 
In refutation of positivism,64 with its closed system of natural causes and 
effects, Pannenberg argues for the historicity of J es us' resurrection. The 
evidence points beyond reasonable doubt to the historical reality of the Easter 
event. Pannenberg believes that the rise of historical criticism and modern 
canons of historicity have been innuential in displacing the resurrection of 
Jesus from its central position in Christian teaching and proclamation. The 
Easter event cannot be torn from the fabric of Christian history without 
destroying that history itsclf.65 
There are many scholars today who think that the resurrection of 
J esus cannot be an historical fact. There are all too few analogies to 
an event of this kind; it is all too unusual for the historian to be able 
to assume it as a fact. Only faith, it is claimed, can venture to take 
such an unusual fact into consideration. But...f aith cannot guarantee 
the certainty of past events. These happenings must be assumed and 
in fact assumed as historically certain. Christian faith would be in a 
bad state if the resurrection of Jesus were not really an historical 
fact.. .. There is no sort of knowledge [e.g. "super-history" or salvation 
history] of past events which by-passes historical knowledge. Only 
because J esus' resurrection is an historical fact has faith in the God 
who raised him a stable foundation.66 
Fundamental to Pannenberg's understanding of the historical significance 
of J esus' resurrection is the concept of proleptic eschatology. " With the 
resurrection of Jesus, what for all other men is still to come has been 
realized.67 Viewing the resurrection as proleptic event, Pannenberg 
underscores the ontological priority of the future. The future does not stand 
in opposition to the past and present. There is continuity between past, 
present and future, in that through the release of past events by the future, the 
future can be anticipated. History has purpose, and continuity is given to past 
and present by the future. The coming Kingdom is that future reality that 
interprets the past and present proleptically.68 The proclamation of the 
Kingdom and its confirmation in Jesus' resurrection are events of the past that 
proleptically point to the future. Thus, the resurrection of Jesus from the 
dead is the paradigmatic proleptic event of the past that serves as a promise of 
the future.69 
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Pannenberg perceives Jesus' proclamation of the imminent Kingdom of 
God as the key to Christian theology. In stressing the present impact of the 
imminent future, Pannenberg differs with Bultmann, Dodd and others, who 
exaggerate the difference to the degree of dismissing the futurity of the 
Kingdom of God in Jesus' message. "Jesus indeed spoke of the presence of 
the Kingdom of God, but always in terms of the presence of God's coming 
Kingdom. Futurity is fundamental for Jesus' message." The "now" of the 
Kingdom is informed by the "not yet." Thus, the present is viewed as an effect 
of the future, rather than viewing the past and present as the cause of the 
future.70 
Key lo this view of proleptic eschatology is Jesus' role as the proclaimer of 
the Kingdom. 
Jesus summoned his hearers to turn, heart and soul, toward God's 
near future, toward his near reign. He made the final salvation of 
each man depend upon accepting or refusing that appeaL .. Jesus did 
not make this appeal for decision unveiledly for himself, but only 
indirectly. He made it primarily for his eschatological message of 
God's near reign.71 
The message of Jesus announces the "proleptic reality" of God's future 
Kingdom, partially realized in the present. 
Thus the future and the presence of the reign are intertwined in the 
ministry of Jesus. But the future remains future. There is no 
"realized eschatology," as if the future had faded out. The presence 
of God's reign in Jesus was founded ... only in the exclusiveness in 
Jesus' pointing to the future of God .... The present reality of the reign 
of God, thus mediated by the exclusiveness of Jesus' eschatological 
message, is to be considered a proleptic reality.72 
Thus, in the resurrection of Jesus, the end of history has been realized in 
the present. "The resurrection of Jesus was to be spoken of in close 
connection at least with the destiny of all mankind. The general human 
destiny has occurred in Jesus .... " The eschatological resurrection of the dead 
is previewed in the Easter event. The presence of this "ultimate reality" is 
evidence of the nearness of God's salvation, and the fulfillment of the "general 
eschatological hope." As the "final revelation of God," the resurrection of 
Jesus is decisive for all history, especially in its openness to the future.73 
Jesus of Nazareth is the final revelation of God because the End of 
history appeared in him. It did so both in his eschatological message 
and in his resurrection from the dead. However, he can be 
understood to be God's final revelation only in connection with the 
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whole of history as mediated by the history of Israel. He is God's 
revelation in the fact that all history receives its due light from him.74 
Pannenberg's conception of history is marked by " pure openness" to the 
future based on the "historical uniqueness of the saving event" in Jesus. 
Human beings are "caught up in that movement of concrete history ... [which] 
runs from the first Adam to the new Adam."75 Pannenberg's " biblical-
apocalyptic conception of history'' is grounded upon an anthropological 
assumption that belies his attempt to do Christology from below. 
Does not the biblical conception of uni\·ersal history ... presuppose the 
apocalyptic expectation of a general future resurrection of the dead? 
We have seen that this expectation forms the sole background against 
the resurrection of Jesus can be seen in its full significance as 
the irruption of the consummation of all history. But is not an 
expectation of this kind--which must be counted among the 
anthropological presuppositions of Christian faith--too much to 
demand of 20th century man? I think that modern research into 
human nature has made it easier to see how reasonable the truth of 
that expectation is. Man's openness to the world, can be understood 
today only in terms of the expectation of a resurrection of the 
dead .... Then the resurrection of Jesus ceases to appear as an 
unintelligible, although historically attested miracle. It then becomes 
intelligible again as the irruption of the consummation of history, 
which for us is still to come but in Jesus has already happened.76 
Thus, Pannenberg views the Easter event in the light of a general 
anthropological obse rvation th at human existence cannot be totally 
comprehended within finite dimensions. Man is a being who is open to 
the future and who hopes for a future fulfillment beyond death. Openness to 
an apocaiyptic view of reality is not only essential to an understanding of 
Christi an faith, 77 but shares in commo n with modern th ought a 
phenomenology of hope.78 Therefore, belief in the possibil ity of a future 
resurrection requires an openness to a view of reality that does not exclude 
such an event.79 
" Revelation is not completely comprehended in the beginning, but at the 
end of the revealing history."80 Only at the end of history is there a final self-
revelation of God. In the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, however, the 
eschatological consummation is already proleptically present. This claim is 
based on Pannenberg's reading of the teaching and fate of Jesus in their 
Jewish apocalyptic milieu. Jesus' resurrection, however, is ultimately decisive 
for Pannenberg, for in this event, the anticipated revelation of God is made 
manifest within the historical process. The resurrection of Jesus is the 
interpretive key to the meaning of history. 
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What it means that in the person of Jesus the end of history is already 
anticipated can itself be understood only within the apocalyptic 
concept of history. Thus the historical framework remains intact. 
History is by no means abolished. On the contrary, an understanding 
of history as a whole is made possible for the first time because the 
end of history is already present.81 
In line with the historical consciousness of Israel, Pannenberg maintains 
that history results from the dynamic tension between promise and fulfillment. 
Within the reality characterized by the constantly creative work of 
God, history arises because God makes promises and fulfills these 
promises. History is event so suspended in tension between promise 
and fulfillment that through the promise it is irreversibly pointed 
toward the goal of future fulfillment.82 
The Old and New Testaments are connected by the historical consciousness 
that binds the eschatological community of Jesus Christ to ancient Israel 
through the concept of promise and fulfillment. In fact, Panncnberg claims 
that "historical experience of reality is preserved only in the biblical 
understanding of history, in the biblical faith in the promise."83 
CONCLUSION 
Pannenberg's theology of history seeks to overcome the Christological 
fact /value dichotomy by emphasizing the historical Jesus as the basis for the 
Christ of faith. History and faith must be viewed as interpenetrating realities, 
for what is true theologically cannot, at the same time, be historically false. 
Pannenbcrg's conviction that it is reasonable to believe in the resurrection as a 
real, bodily event is grounded in the recognition of the importance of the late 
Jewish apocalyptic understanding of man as future oriented, and the primacy 
of history as the fundamental category for revelation. It is thus appropriate to 
sec his understanding of history as centering on a theology of the resurrection 
of Jesus Christ. 
Pannenbcrg takes seriously the historical character of the resurrection, 
and his views of faith, history and the theology of history all flow from his 
interpretation of the resurrection. He argues for historical foundations for 
Easter faith, calling for an openness to a provisional, yet reliable knowledge as 
the basis for faith in Jesus' resurrection. The essence of faith is not risk, but 
trust in historical probabilities. In the case of the Easter event, the historical 
proofs are not irrefutable; however, neither is the historical actuality of Jesus' 
resurrection without reliable evidence.84 
Pannenberg's Christology is based on a view of the retroactive power of 
the resurrection (riickwirkende Kraft).85 This means that Jesus is essentially 
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one with God on the basis of t!le resurrection event, and that his earthly 
existence is united to God by this event. The resurrection is both the 
ontological and epistemological basis for Pannenberg's Cbristology. God is in 
history, and historical method can make him known. Thus, revelation is 
reformulated to mean that God can be discovered in history if the right 
historical method is employed. In this regard, Pannenberg betrays a 
subjectivism that is not based on experience but on historical method.86 
The core of Pannenberg's theological method is found in his stress on the 
universal character of revelation. On this basis, be believes he has overcome 
the Historie-Geschichte distinction of the Bultmannian and post-Bultmannian 
positions. This has often been represc,nted as a shift from Kantian 
transcendentalism to a Hegelian objectivism based on a reflection on the 
whole of reality as history. Pannenberg, however, attempts to maintain the 
importance of particularity within the universality of God's revelation, as well 
as the ontological priority of the future.87 
In insisting, however, that historical knowledge of God's revelation in 
J esus must precede fa ith and therefore does not presuppose faith , 
Pannenbcrg's epistemology is suspect. Does not his appeal to man's openness 
to the future involve fai th in and knowledge of the God of the future? Is it not 
faith's hope that creates this openness? Perhaps one should ask whether 
Pannenberg's anthropological presupposition is as self-evident as he thinks it 
is. Even if we concede that it is, what is the basis for accepting the Jewish-
Christian apocalyptic construct as the appropriate paradigm for understanding 
such future hope?88 
T he Chr ist event in the historical J esus provides all of history with its 
interpretive key.89 All of reality must be viewed in relation to this one unique 
occurrence in history. The historical resurrection of Jesus Christ provides the 
anticipation of the end, in that the end of history has come into the midst of 
history. This emphasis on the significance of Jesus for universal history, 
however, fai ls to do justice to his works and teachings. Pannenberg's Hegelian 
idealism moves from the particular to the universal without examining the 
meaning of the particular. His proleptic eschatology leaves little room for 
dealing with the significance of the historical Jesus for the present. What is 
significant for Pannenberg's Christology from below is the historical 
resurrection of Jesus, viewed as proleptic reality.90 
Pannenberg is committed to a "theology of reason" defined as an 
"eschatologically oriented ontology."91 God has revealed the structure of all 
reality in his self-revelation through Jesus Christ. In him is the anticipated 
end by which all reality hangs together. Reality is found in Jesus. The value 
of Pannenberg's theology of history can be discerned in its development of the 
insights of two influential thinkers. First, he is indebted to Karl Barth for the 
perception that theology is a function of revelation, and that it must be 
Christocentric. He, however, disagrees with Barth's understanding that the 
cognitive aspect of revelation always remains with God. Pannenberg asserts 
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that the cognitive aspect of revelation lies with man. Second, he is indebted to 
Hegel (et al.) for the concept of universal history as the self-disclosure of God. 
History is the self-revelation of God. In history God makes himself known. In 
Hegel's thinking, however, it is not clear whether Jesus Christ is unique or 
final, or only one other event in the historical process. In contrast, 
Pannenberg insists on the centrality of the history of Jesus for universal 
history. 
Pannenberg emphasizes objective history over against the perceived 
devaluation of such in both the kerygmatic and Heilsgeschichte interpretations 
of history. Barth's emphasis on suprahistory or prehistory, and Bultmann's 
stress on the inwardness of existential historicity, both locate the event of 
revelation in the Word rather than in history. By contrast, Pannenberg seeks 
to verify the redemptive events by historical science, finding the locus of 
revelation in the works of God in history.92 What is crucial in Pannenberg's 
understanding of the end of history anticipated in the person of Jesus, is the 
dialectic between the apocalyptic expectation of resurrection and the proleptic 
occurrence of the finality of history in the resurrection of Jesus. Jewish 
apocalypticism should not be dehistoricized or demythologized, but must be 
viewed as essential to an understanding of the eschatological significance of 
the Christ event.93 In emphasizing the coming Kingdom of God as the over-
arching truth about reality, Pannenberg rightly seeks to reckon with the role of 
apocalyptic in Jesus' teaching. Christology, therefore, must be viewed in the 
context of the coming Kingdom of God.94 
Notes 
1. The idea that Christology must take its starting point from the Christ of faith has 
become very influential since Martin Kahler and his book, The So-called Historical 
Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ (1892). Pannenberg agrees with Kahler insofar as 
the latter protests against setting the figure and message of Jesus in opposition to the 
apostolic preaching in such a way that no sort of continuity between the two would 
exist any longer. Although positing continuity, however, Kahler held that knowledge of 
Jesus is necessarily conditioned by what the community of faith believed. See Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, trans. by L. Wilkins and D. Priebe (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1977), pp. 22-23. 
2. Wolfhart Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," Theology as 
History , vol. 3, New Frontiers in Theology, ed. J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb, Jr. (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 126-27. Cf. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), pp. 132-133. 
3. Pannenberg, "Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," p. 127. 
4. Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, p. 149; cf. Fred H. Klooster, "Historical Method 
70 Rightmire 
and the Resurrection in Pannenberg's Theology," Calvin Theological Journal 11, no. 1 
(1976): 28ff. 
5. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions In Theology, vol. 1, trans. by George Kehm 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press: 1970) p. 86. Cf. Iain G. Nicol, "Facts and Meanings: 
Wolfhart Pannenberg's Theology as History and the Role of the Historical-Critical 
Method," Religious Studies 12, no. 2 (1976): 130. 
6. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 1, p. 16; cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, 
"Redemptive Event and History," Essays on Old Testament Henneneutics, ed. by Claus 
Westermann (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1963), p. 314. 
7. Klooster, "Historical Method and the Resurrection," pp. 14, 18-19. 
8. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 1, p. 15. 
9. "Prolepsis" is a technical term in Pannenberg's theology to refer to the anticipatory 
nature of reality. Ultimate truth is only knowable at the end of the historical process. 
Along the way, knowledge of the truth is only provisional, to be verified at the end of 
history. Thus, Pannenberg's notion of truth presupposes a proleptic view of reality. 
10. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 1, p. 135. 
11. Carl Braaten, "The Current Controversy On Revelation: Pannenberg and H is 
Critics," Journal of Religion , 45, no. 3 (1965): 227-228. 
12. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 1, p. 69. 
13. Ibid., p. 94. 
14. Ibid., p. 158. 
15. Wollbart Pannenberg, ed., Revelation as History, trans. by D. Granskou (London: 
Macmillan, 1968), p. 155. Cf. Clark H. Pinnock, "Pannenberg's Theology: Reasonable 
Happenings in History," Christianity Today, Nov. 5, 1976, p. 21. 
16. Wollbart Pannenberg, The Apostle's Creed: In The Light of Today's Questions, 
trans. by M. Kohl (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972), p. 46. 
17. Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
18. Pannenberg distinguishes between historical certainty and the certainty of fai th. 
"Historical research can never achieve definitive certainty in its results, but only 
greater or less probability .... But certainty of faith, on the other hand, depends on the 
peculiarity of a particular historical event, namely, the history of Jesus .... The certainty 
of faith consists in the completeness of trust, which in turn is grounded in the 
eschatological meaning of the history of Jesus." Wollbart Pannenberg, " Response to 
the Discussion" in Robinson and Cobb, eds., Theology as History, p.273. 
Pannenberg's Quest for the Proleptic Jesus 71 
19. "Theology has to deal with presupposition of faith, with the truth and reliability 
(already presupposed in the act of faith) of the 'object' on which faith depends. Of 
course it can do this only in a provisional way" (Ibid., p. 271). 
W. R. J. Neuhaus, "Wolfhart Pannenberg: Profile of a Theologian" in Wolfuart 
Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1969), pp. 19-W. 
21. See Pannenberg, "Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," pp. 128-130; Jesus--
God and Man, pp. 12ff.; cf. Don Olive, Wolfhart Pannenberg (Waco, TX: Word Books, 
1973),pp.38-39,45-46, 96. 
22. Pannenberg, "Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," pp. 128-129. 
23. See William Hamilton, "The Character of Pannenberg's Theology," Theology as 
History, vol. 3, New Frontiers in Theology, ed by J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb, Jr. 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 195-196. 
24. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 1, p. 36. 
25. Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus," pp. 130-131. 
26. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Faith and Reality, trans by John Maxwell (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1977), p. 69. 
27. Sec Braaten, "Current Controversy on Revelation," pp. 234-235; Pinnock, 
"Pannenberg's Theology," p. 19-20. 
28. Pannenberg, Apostle's Creed, p. 131; cf. Stanley Grenz, "Reasonable Christianity: 
Wolfhart Pannenberg Turns Sixty," Christianity Today, September, 1988, pp. 22-23. 
29. See Braaten, "Current Controversy on Revelation," pp. 228-229. 
30. Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth:" pp. 128-130; Theology 
and the Kingdom of God, pp. 46-47; What Is Man? Contemporary Anthropology in 
Theological Perspective, trans by Duane Priebe, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), 
pp. 29, 32. Cf. Hamilton, "Character of Pannenberg's Theology," pp. 188-189. 
31. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Faith and Reality, p. 65. 
32. See Braaten, "Current Controversy on Revelation," p. 231. 
33. Pannenberg, Faith and Reality, p. 66. 
34. Christology "from above" starts with the divinity of Christ. Christology "from 
below" starts with the humanity of Christ, and derives knowledge of his divinity 
through his humanity. 
72 Rightmire 
35. Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man , p. 36. Cf. Pannenberg, ''The Revelation of God 
in Jesus of Nazareth," p. 124. 
36. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 1, p. 26; cf. Clark Pinnock, "No-
Nonsense Theology: Pinnock Reviews Pannenberg," Christianity Today 21, p. 219. 
37. Pannenberg's Christology from below assumes some a priori truth. Not all would 
agree with what he allows as part of the historical Jesus. E.g. "He says 'Jesus of 
Nazareth' inadvisedly .. .for he shows no disposition to limit the discussion to the 
historical man of Nazareth but means the whole of what most of us would call 'Jesus 
Christ"' (William Hamilton, ''The Character of Pannenberg's Theology," p. 166). 
38. See Pannenberg: Jesus--God and Man, pp. 33-37. 
39. Kenneth Heinitz, "Pannenberg: Theology 'From Below' and the Virgin Birth," 
Lutheran Qua11erly 28, no. 2 (1976): 173-174. 
40. Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, p. 69; cf. Heinitz, "Theology 'from Below,"' pp. 
176 ff. 
41. Pannenberg, "Jesus' Resurrection as the Ground of his Unity With God" in Jesus-
God and Man , pp. 53 ff. 
42. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, pp. 142-143. 
43. Wolfhart Pannenberg, What is Man ?, p. 39. 
44. Pannenberg, "Revelat ion of God in Jesus of Nazareth," p. 131. 
45. Ibid., p. 123. 
46. Ibid., pp. 109, 125. 
47. Pannenberg,Jesus--God and Man, pp. 66-73. 
48. Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Did Jesus Really Rise From the Dead?" Dialog 4 (Spring 
1965): 128. 
49. Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, p. 74. Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology 
in Theological Perspective, trans by M . J. O'Connell (Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 
1985), pp. 129-130. 
50. Pannenberg, "Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth, " p. 115. 
51. Pannenberg, What is Man ?, p. 45. 
52. Ibid., p. 47. 
Pannenberg's Quest for the Proleptic Jesus 73 
53. "The concept of the resurrection of the dead was probably adopted from the 
Persians. However, that could only happen because this concept converged with the 
requirements of the history of traditions in Israel itselr' (Ibid., p. 52). Pannenberg 
identifies this hope with Jewish apocalyptic expectation in Anthropology in Theological 
Perspective, pp. 130- 131. 
54. Pannenberg, What is Man ?, p. 53. 
55. Pannenberg, " Did Jesus Really Rise From the Dead?" p. 131. 
56. Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, p. 108. 
57. Ibid., p. 98. 
58. Pannenberg, Apostles' Creed , p. 110. Cf. Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological 
Perspective, p. 135: "General laws do not make possible an absolutely certain 
prediction about the possibility or impossibility of single events, except in the case 
where all possible conditions can be taken into account. This might be possible in an 
experiment, but not in the process of the world as a whole." 
59. Pannenberg, Apostles' Creed, pp. 114-115. 
60. Pannenberg, " Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," pp. 127-128. 
61. Cf. Hamilton, "Character of Pannenberg's Theology," pp. 181-183. Hamilton 
concurs with Pannenberg's judgment on the separation of the resurrection event from 
its meaning: "Historical method has three main elements: context, ontology, and 
language. It is brought to a particular event, it tests that event, tests its level of 
probability, examines the witnesses if any, and in the encounter between method and 
event, the label 'historical' is conferred. Historical means event and meaning, and the 
two cannot be sundered. Historical method finds the resurrection event to be 
historical and revelatory, together, in the same process and at the same time" (p. 184). 
62. Pannenberg, Alllhropology in Theological Perspective, p. 135. 
63. Ibid. 
64. See R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), pp. 
132-33, for critical discussion of positivistic interpretation of history which Pannenberg 
affirms in Theology as History, p . 127, n. 24. 
65. See Richard R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason: a Study of Theological 
Method (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 1, 3. " In isolation, the 
resurrection stands before our minds as the most questionable of all events. But when 
we see it in its relationship to the rest of our history, when we see its effectiveness in 
molding and interpreting that history, then we must acknowledge it to be the most 
concrete of the events in the New Testament" (pp. 103-104). Pannenberg affirms 
Niebuhr's view of the Easter event in Theology as History, p. 114, n. 8. 
74 Rightmire 
66. Pannenberg, Faith and Reality, pp. 71-73. 
67. Pannenberg, "Did Jesus Really Rise From the Dead?" p. 135. 
68. The future is that which gives meaning to all reality, and takes precedence over 
present reality. For Pannenberg, the Kingdom of God is the future of present reality. 
The end of history is present in every moment of history, and every moment of history 
is an anticipation of the future. Thus, the end of history gives meaning to the historical 
process, because the end has decisive meaning in itself and is proleptically present at 
every stage of development. See Ronald D. Pasquariello, "Pannenberg's Philosophical 
Foundations," Journal of Religion 56, no. 4, (1976): 338-347. 
69. Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, pp. 22, 25, 30. 
70. Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
71. Pannenberg, "Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," p. 110. For further 
discussion of functional Christology see Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man , pp. 212, 
217. 
72. Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," p. 113. 
73. Ibid., pp. 114, 116-117, 124, 131. 
74. Ibid., p.125. 
75. Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, pp. 498-500. 
76. Pannenberg, Faith and Reality, pp. 76-77. 
77. Pannenberg insists that apocalyptic history is essential to Christianity: " If the 
apocalyptic expectation should be totally excluded from the realm of possibil ity for us, 
then the early Christian faith in Christ is also excluded" (Pannenberg, Jesus-- God and 
Man, p. 82. 
78. Cf, Nicol, "Facts and Meanings," pp. 129-139. "Openness to the futu re, and the 
hopeful expectation of life's unlimited fulfillment beyond death are thus elements 
which belong to the essential structure of human existence .... It is only in the light of 
this anthropological fact , that the question of the resurrection of Jesus as a historical 
fact may be sensibly posed and treated with the historical seriousness which it 
deserves .... The late-Jewish and early Christian framework of apocalyptic, with its hope 
of the resurrection from death of all men, is now seen to have its permanent and 
enduring validity precisely in relation to this general anthropological fact of man's 
openness to the future and his hope of unlimited fulfillment" (pp. 134-135). 
79. Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man , pp. 83-88; cf. Frank Tupper, The Theology of 
Wolfhart Pannenberg (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), p. 150. 
Pannenberg's Quest for the Proleptic Jesus 15 
80. Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 131. 
81. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 1, p. 36. 
82. Ibid., p. 18. 
83. Ibid., pp. 25, 33. 
84. Cf. Tupper, Theology of Pannenberg, pp. 159-160. 
85. Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man , p. 135. 
86. Cf. William Hamilton, "The Character of Pannenberg's Theology," pp. 177-178, 
188. 
87. In this regard he prefers the "Platonist" label to that of the " Hegelian." Wolfhart 
Pannenberg's verbal response to the panel on "The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg: 
American Appraisals," (a seminar in Chicago, American Academy of Religion Annual 
Meeting, November 19, 1988). 
88. Cf. Nicol, "Facts and Meanings," pp. 134-136. 
89. In stressing the resurrection of Jesus as pivotal for the theology of history, 
Panncnberg implicitly undermines the significance of the cross. He does not view the 
death of Christ as an atoning sacrifice, but rather, as a conflict with Law and an 
identification with humankind in the death experience through vicarious 
representation. See Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man , pp. 246-251, 260-266, 268-269; 
Apostles ' Creed, pp. 83-86, 88-89, 114-115. Cf. Tupper, Theology of Woljhart 
Pannenberg, pp. 160 ff. 
90. Cf. Kendrick Grobe!, "Revelation and Resurrection," in Robinson and Cobb, 
Theology as History, p. 166. 
91. Pa nnenberg, Jesus--God and Man . p. 12. 
92. Pannenbcrg views C hrist, as the Word, to be the locus of God's revelation in 
history, as well as the content and unifying factor of Scripture. Although treating the 
Bible as a historical source, he denies its divine inspiration and authority. Pannenberg 
repudiates biblical infallibility because of critical difficulties with the text of Scripture. 
See Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 1, pp. 1-14, 194, 198. 
93. Braaten, "Current Controversy on Revelation," pp. 226, 228. 
94. Cf. Pinnock, "No-Nonsense Theology: Pinnock Reviews Pannenberg," pp. 218-220. 

Calvin's Contribution to 
Universal Education 
IV AN L. ZABILKA 
John Calvin's contribution to the development of common schools and 
universal education has been neglected by secular historians of education. He 
used religious motivations to bring about the civil promotion of education, yet 
scholars have been distracted from his significance. His theological system, 
role in promoting French literary style, and contribution to the relation of 
church and state have drawn attention away from his educational system. 
Another cause of neglect is that Luther was a more prolific writer upon 
educational topics, implying to some investigators a greater concern than 
Calvin's, but such is not the case. Luther was active in defending education 
against radical reformers who wanted to destroy all education to rid 
themselves of the supposed blight of Catholic education, while Calvin invested 
himself in developing a functioning educational system in Geneva. This 
concern was carried forward in the emerging educational centers of the 
Reformed Church in Germany, particularly al Heidelberg and Herborn, 
where educational programs were fashioned with reference to the irenic, 
evangelical rubrics provided by the Heidelberg Catechism (1563) .1 Finally, the 
achievements in education of the French, Dutch, Scottish and English 
reformers caused attention to be directed away from Calvin and the Genevan 
schools, even though the leaders of these movements were often trained in 
Geneva. Thus, at every point Calvin's contribution has been eclipsed. 
Calvin's attitudes toward education are not presented in philosophical 
essays like those of Luther, but in working civil documents. I will survey these 
Genevan records, describe the schools founded under Calvin's guidance and 
evaluate his influence upon education in other countries, especially during his 
own era. 
EDUCATION FOR LEADERSHIP 
Calvin's educational intentions are discerned in the first edition of the 
Institutes of the Christian Religion, the catechisms, the formal organization of 
schools, and were influenced by Johann Sturm and Calvin's own education. 
The first edition of the Institutes, consisting of six brief chapters, appeared 
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in 1536. Calvin's intent for the first edition was a simple introduction to the 
Christian faith that could serve to instruct anyone who wished to learn.2 In 
subsequent editions the work gradually lost its teaching intent and became the 
comprehensive summary of his theology that resulted by 1560. The final form 
of the Institutes did contain his discussion of the teaching attitude of the 
minister .3 Teachers, in Calvin's opinion, should exhibit kindness, prudence 
and skill in giving advice. Advice-giving imparted information and supported 
the authority of church and state. He indicated that arrogance could not be a 
part of instruction, and harshness reduced its value.4 Calvin emphasized that 
teachers must be honest, sincere and an example to their students, both as 
scholar and spiritual leader. Wit and reason were presumed helpful. False 
teachers were a curse from God upon the authorities who failed to select 
well.5 Even though these characteristics marked the minister as teacher, one 
may assume that such attitudes did apply to those who were directly involved 
in teaching activity. The emphasis upon kindness, while in contrast with 
Calvin's popular image, was consistently present in his attitudes toward 
children as learners. 
While the Institutes provides some understanding of his view of teachers, 
the catechisms are more helpful with his methodology. The people of Geneva 
requested guidance in correct theology through the formation of a catechism, 
having seen the effectiveness of Luther's use of it. In February 1537, prior to 
his and Guillaume Farel's expulsion in April 1538 following their first efforts 
al reform, Calvin presented a long and tedious catechism to the city officials 
for use in the instruction of children and citizens. This initial effort serves 
primarily to illustrate Calvin's misapprehension of the amount that children or 
adults could masler.6 During his exile from Geneva, Calvin came under the 
influence of Johann Sturm in Strassbourg, who had begun the most effective 
gymnasium of the day. He invited Calvin to deliver theological lectures. 
While engaged, Calvin apparently learned from Sturm's example and from the 
limitations of his students. When he later presented a revised catechism in 
1541, it was simplified and shortened. It still ran to more than fifty modern 
book sized pages, but the questions and answers were short, and the student 
had fifty-five weeks in which to master it.7 Clearly, the child or citizen had to 
be able to read the vernacular in order to master the expected theology, thus, 
elementary schools were necessary. 
Calvin's progress in producing better catechisms points to the importance 
of brevity, clarity and simplicity in educational methods, a perspective that 
appeared in his other writings as well. In a letter lo Simon Grynaeus he stated 
that the successful interpreter of the Scriptures, a major objective of 
education, must be clear and brief.8 The interest in brevity and simplicity 
extended to any teaching tool, including writing, and consequently Calvin 
accused other commentators upon the Scriptures of being " much too clever."9 
Calvin's intent is refreshing, although his standard of brevity and simplicity is 
removed from that of the current century. 
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Several histories of education assume that Calvin was the originator of the 
Genevan schools, since he formed the "College" and the "Academy." The 
honor of founding the vernacular schools, however, must go to the reformers 
and city fathers responsible for leading Geneva from Catholicism prior to 
Calvin's arrival. The Registres du Consei/ indicate that by unanimous action on 
May 21, 1536, provision was made for the education of all children, with the 
girls in separate schools, under the leadership of Antoine Saunier.10 All 
parents were obligated to send their children, with instruction provided free to 
the poor. Calvin did not alter the plan of the vernacular schools and sought to 
aid in the selection of teachers. He was able late in life to aid in reorganizing 
them more efficiently, as will be seen. 
An even more pressing concern to Calvin was the instruction of the 
people of Geneva in "correct" theology. The content of such "correct" 
theology was defined by Calvin in terms of a pious, reverential "knowledge of 
God and man," that had been disrupted by the fall into sin. Hence, the 
didactic character of theology was integral to all genuine Christian faith. 11 In 
Calvin's Geneva, education was subordinated to and motivated by this spiritual 
concern, a concern which appeared in the "Articles concerning the 
Organization of the Church and of Worship," presented on January 16, 1537.u 
In these Calvin claimed that preservation of pure doctrine necessitated that 
" .. .infants of tender age be so instructed that they be able to give reason for 
the faith .... " Such instruction was to be from "hand to hand" and "father to 
son," based upon a prepared catechism. At this time Calvin was emphasizing 
individual learning and the role of the family in instruction, but it was not 
working, for he also criticized parents who failed to do it, and recommended 
that a catechism be adopted and regular teaching instituted, events which 
transpired by 1541. 
The Ecclesiastical Ordinances of September and October of 1541 provide 
direct evidence of Calvin's influence.13 In the "four orders of office" for the 
government of the church, the second listed is "doctors" or teachers. The 
salary of these officials was to be provided by the state. Their role was clearly 
defined, so that they did not replace the teaching function of the "ministers" 
entirely, for the latter were responsible for the mid-Sunday instruction of 
young children in the catechism. Parents were required to bring their children 
to the classes. 
The principal function of the teachers was the instruction of the faithful in 
true doctrine, not for citizenship or the Renaissance man. For this purpose 
lecturers in theology were appointed, one for each testament. Since profit 
from the lectures would result only from proper instruction in the languages 
and the humanities, a "college" for the preparation of ministers and civil 
officials was necessary. The form this took was a middle school, above the 
vernacular schools and eventually preparatory to the "academy" or University 
of Geneva. Calvin further recommended the payment of the vernacular 
school teachers from civil funds again, and the continued separations of girls 
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from boys. The teachers were to be subject to the same discipline as the 
ministers.14 
This brief presentation of the schools in 1541 does not give a full picture 
of their nature and development, but it does demonstrate that Calvin was 
active in promoting them at an early date. While all children attended the 
vernacular schools, it is apparent that a more select group was educated in the 
College for the ministry and leadership of state. There is no mention of girls, 
which is expected since they could not hold the positions for which the schools 
prepared. Even at this early date the potential developed for training more 
than just local leadership. 
In 1547 Calvin returned to the problem of instruction in the catechism, 
when adjustments had to be made for the differing situation in the country 
churches around Geneva. The "Ordinances of the Supervision of Churches in 
the Country," which appeared on February 3, 1547, made provision for 
instruction in the catechism every other week in each church since the 
ministers had two churches.15 Additionally, fathers were liable for their 
children's penalties for failure to appear at catechism. 
As noted, the College was authorized in 1541, and opened shortly after. 
The next notice of activities related to the College appeared on the fifth of 
June, 1559, in the "Ordre du College de Geneva," a document which made 
formal the methods developed over the years. The final paragraphs discussed 
education beyond the seven levels of the college, and gave formal date to the 
founding of the University of Geneva. Combination of the schools in this 
document has caused some confusion of the two among educational 
historians. 
A summary of the contents of this document does much to clarif)' the 
nature of Calvin's educational theory for the middle and upper levels. The 
basic classicism of the content of the instruction will be apparent. 
The Ordre stipulated that the teachers would elect the rector who would 
then be approved by the ministers and the Council. (Geneva had three 
councils: The Little Council, The Sixty and The Two Hundred. Which was 
intended is not clear.) The teachers were also approved by the ministers and 
the Council. Students were to be present unless properly excused, 
circumspect in behavior, and diligent in the pursuit of learning. 
Rebelliousness and indifference led to punishment. Disputes were ref erred to 
the ministers and the Bible. Jn the treatment of students, teachers were 
expected to avoid crassness, rudeness, abruptness, and were alternatively to 
set a good example. They were to listen attentively to their students, and to 
remonstrate with their errors without losing control of the class. 
Scholars were divided into four groups according to the section of the city 
in which they lived. They were also separated into seven graded levels. 
Lessons began at six in the morning in Summer and seven in Winter. 
Placements in the classes were determined by skill and not age. The hours for 
study, recitation, meals and psalm singing were prescribed, including a 4:00 
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p.m. public session for the chastisement of those who failed assignments or 
broke rules. While the public reprimanding of disciplinary problems is poor 
from a modern perspective, the moderation of such methods from the usual 
corporal punishment of the day is apparent. Following this, the students 
recited the Lord's Prayer (in French), the Confession of Faith and the Ten 
Commandments. On Wednesday they attended morning sermon and followed 
it with a question and answer session over the content. The Saturday schedule 
also varied with a special hour for student declamations, and a three-hour 
study of the catechism in the afternoon. 
The curriculum was broadly defined for each year, with the seventh or 
lowest class expected to know the French and Latin alphabets and to be able 
to pronounce Latin and read French fluently. If the students were old enough 
at this level they also began to write. 
The first half of the sixth class was spent on Latin declensions and 
conjugations. During the second half of the year they studied oratory and 
declamation, comparing French with Latin forms. Students were expected to 
begin speaking Latin among themselves. 
The fifth class studied declamation and syntax using Virgil's Bucolics. 
Exercises in writing continued with simple original compositions expected by 
the end of the year. 
The fourth class was expected to continue the study of syntax until it was 
mastered, using Cicero's L etters and various writings of Ovid. The study of 
Greek declensions and conjugations was begun. 
On the third level emphasis was placed upon Greek grammar in a 
comparative approach to Latin, with attention to style. Materials used were 
Cicero's Letters, Virgil's Aeneid, Caesar's Commentaries, the Parenthetic 
Orations of Isocrates and other less-known works. 
The second class studied history through the Latin works of Livy and the 
Greek works of Xenophon, Polybius and Herodian. Propositional 
argumentation was studied through the Paradoxes and Smaller Orations of 
Cicero. The biblical book of Luke was read in the Greek. 
The first class studied dialectics and rhetoric using Cicero's Orations and 
Demosthenes' Olynthiacs and Philippics. Special attention was paid to style 
and the Pauline Epistles were read in Greek. The objective of this curriculum 
was the thorough preparation of ministers to proclaim the "Word," in the best 
classical tradition. 
The headmaster was responsible for maintaining the diligence of the 
faculty, and resolving minor quarrels. He was responsible for obedience to 
civil law, and the adherence to the articles of faith by the teachers. His term 
of office was for two years, and although not stated, it was renewable. 
Further regulations governing students included an annual vacation of 
three weeks at the wine harvest, in addition to the first Friday of every month. 
The procedures for the promotion of students to the next level began three 
weeks before the first of May, when one of the academy professors proposed a 
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theme in French for all students. The students had five hours to write upon 
the theme in Latin without the aid of books. The professors on the next level 
of the college evaluated the themes, and submitted them to the rector who 
made final judgments on the basis of the professor's recommendations. Prior 
to the ftrst day of May, a conference was held with each student at which a 
vote was taken among the professors as to advancement. On May first, all the 
students and professors assembled at the Church of Saint Pierre, along with a 
councilman, the ministers and the regents of the school. The rector gave a 
lecture, after which the councilm an congratulated those being advanced. The 
rector then offered words of encouragement to the students and they were 
dismissed for the day. 
The next level upward was the " public lectures," which were the 
beginning of the academy. The ones giving these lectures were professors of 
G reek, Hebrew and theology, whose obligations were discussed in the Ordre. 
They were expected to use Aristotle, Plato, Plutarch and Christean 
philosophers. Students at this level were exposed to oratory, history, physics 
and rhetoric. They had to register with the rector and confess their faith.16 
From this summ ary, the importance of classical Greek and Latin authors 
is readily apparent. The role of declamation, debate and rhetoric in the 
preparation of Calvin's ministers is also difficult to miss. The curriculum is 
similar to Sturm's at Strassbourg, for he also emphasized classical languages 
and literature, rhetoric, grammar, logic and history. Sturm had less place for 
the sciences, and seems to have influenced Calvin, although Calvin did include 
the " physics of space." 17 
Calvin's own experience may have promoted the moderate discipline in 
the Genevan schools. He left his home in Noyon, France, in 1523 to enter the 
College de la Marche, at the age of fourteen. Classes began at live in the 
morning and continued with intermissions until eight in the evening. Calvin 
moderated these hours in Geneva. School started later and ended earl ier with 
fewer intermissions. In addition to the more humane hours for young bodies, 
Calvin also worked in a more compact community where children lived with 
their parents, rather than in boarding schools, leaving the evening hours to the 
family. Albert Hyma indicated that "Corporal punishments were frequently 
inflicted [at the College de la Marche], even when the students were not guilty 
of serious offenses .... " 18 The exception to this pattern was Mathurin Cordier, 
or Corderius, who was a priest, humanist and educator who taught Latin to 
the lowest level. He had originally taught at the upper levels, but he was so 
disappointed with the skills of those coming to him that he chose to inspire the 
beginners. He combined kindness with good teaching, avoiding corporal 
punishment. Cordier's educational principles involved grouping by age, 
gradual development and emphasis upon the fundamentals.19 All of these 
marked Cordier as a bit different from others, and although Calvin studied 
with him for perhaps no more that three months,2° Cordier made such an 
impression that Calvin later secured him for Geneva, a further evidence of 
Calvin's Contribution to Universal Education 83 
Calvin's satisfaction with moderation in the treatment of children. The only 
apparent difference is that Calvin grouped by skill where Cordier preferred 
age. 
Following his brief time at the College de la Marche, Calvin moved on to 
the College de Montaigu, where he successfully studied the liberal arts and 
logic. He remained there approximately four years until 1527. He nominally 
studied for the priesthood by taking scholastic theology from Noel Beda. He 
also came under the influence of the reformers Nicholas Cop and Pierre 
Robert Olivetan, a distant relative.21 Meanwhile, Calvin's father developed 
trouble with the Bishop of Noyon, to whom he was secretary. After 
completion of his initial studies his father told him to withdraw from Paris and 
study law, which Calvin obediently did. He moved to Orleans, where he 
studied law under Peter de l'Etoile, a successful case lawyer and logician, and 
under Melchoir Wolmar, another reformer. Upon completion of his studies, 
the university conferred upon him the doctor's degree. From Orleans, Calvin 
went to Bourges where he studied with Andrew Alciati, a well known 
Milanese lawyer.22 He returned then to Paris for further humanistic studies at 
the Royal College.23 The humanism of his early and late education appeared 
in his love of the classics. The legal aspect of his education undoubtedly 
appeared in his love of order, completeness of organization and in the 
Institutes in many indirect ways that are beyond the scope of this study. 
Throughout this discussion of Calvin's writings upon education, they have 
been presented as his alone. In actuality he always presented them to the city 
fathers as the work of the ministers, but Calvin was clearly the moving spirit. 
He may well have held first place in Geneva as far as influence goes, but he 
never sought public office, nor did he hold positions of superiority to the other 
ministers. Even in the schools, he placed others as rector and never held 
position save as professor of theology. He may have been the leader in 
forming opinion, but he seldom left the others completely behind. He 
emphasized the dangers of wealth and office, especially the generation of 
pride, which he associated with false teaching.24 
This survey of Calvin's educational writing demonstrates that he wrote 
little upon the philosophy of education, save as it related to the formation of 
specific schools in Geneva. He was an organizer, with theory present only 
when the purpose of the schools was considered. He was primarily concerned 
with a method of organizing schools to accomplish the goal of training a Bible 
reading laity and an effective clergy. 
THE SCHOOLS IN GENEVA 
Having considered Calvin's perspective upon the education of children for 
leadership, it is appropriate to turn to the actual schools developed in Geneva 
and what they were able to accomplish. After a survey of the schools formed 
and the students who came to study, consideration will be given to the crucial 
issue for modern educators, that of ideological control. This issue will provide 
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furlher insight concerning why Calvin has been neglected. 
The development of the schools cannot be clearly understood without at 
least a preliminary glance at the relationship between the churches and the 
government in Geneva. Some difficulties in interpreting the significance of 
the schools are the result of a misunderstanding of the government of Geneva 
and Calvin's role in it. The ministers and a large segment of the population 
came to view Geneva as a theocracy where both the church and the state were 
responsible lo God. Even though a majority view, the interpretation of the 
implications remained a chronic ground for differences of opinion that were 
often expressed actively and even violently. The ruling church body was the 
"Consistory," which included the company ;)f the ministers and a dozen lay 
members selected from The Little Council or The Two Hundred.25 The 
Consistory was the primary source of contact with the civil government, and 
there is no denying the influence that Calvin was able lo wield in this body. 
However, political control always resided in the civil councils, that of The 
Little Council, The Sixty or Senate, and The Two Hundred, elected 
representatives of the people. The dominance of the ministers and Calvin 
among the members of these groups fluctuated with every election. Early 
efforts by the ministers met with stiff resistance, and Calvin was expelled for 
three years. After returning he was only once in that specific danger, but he 
did not always achieve his objectives. An example is the modification of who 
had final control over the selection of teachers. The Council of the Sixty 
changed the proposal of 1541 so that they had the final determination.26 
Other proposals were similarly revised and occasionally defeated. Calvin has 
been called the " undisputed" dictator of Geneva.27 Any consideration of the 
activities of the Councils is sufficient to show that this is certainly an 
exaggeration, for Calvin was even reprimanded upon occasion. While he did 
seek to eliminate opposition, usually through persuasion, the effort was 
directed toward accomplishing what the most learned citizens of the city 
deemed best. While the number of citizens burned and expelled is appalling, 
it is necessary to keep in view that the civil authorities tried and executed such 
acts. 
Similarly, Calvin did not exercise exclusive control over the schools, but 
responsibility was divided between church and state.28 The state's 
responsibility was control and provision of support, while the education was 
definitely for the benefit of the church and only indirectly for the slate. 
As a result of this system of relations, the first schools established were 
the vernacular schools which were scattered about the city under the direction 
of Saunier, as previously noted. In these schools the children were taught to 
read and write French, and the rudiments of arithmetic necessary for daily 
transactions. After Calvin clearly understood that family teaching of the 
catechism was not effective, the schools also taught it.29 The pastors 
recognized that success in developing a strong church was difficult with an 
uneducated laity.30 This was the core of the contribution of Calvin and 
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Geneva to education: the responsibility of the state to promote literacy by 
providing schools. 
Calvin soon recognized the advantages of more advanced instruction for 
the pastors. He circulated a prospectus in 1537 for a higher school.31 
Following his expulsion and stay in Strassbourg, the proposal was revised in 
the light of his experiences with Sturm and presented in 1541, as previously 
noted. Under this regulation Sebastian Castellio revived the College de la 
Rive between 1542 and 1544.32 The document of 1559 was a formalization or 
revision of the school system, including the reduction of the vernacular schools 
to four, and the founding of the Academy. 
William Boyd indicated that the early progress of the College did not 
satisfy Calvin, so in 1556 he returned to Strassbourg to evaluate Sturm's school 
again with an eye to improving his own.33 Calvin did not slavishly follow 
Sturm, for there were only seven classes instead of ten, and Calvin used the 
vernacular in the four lower classes, where Sturm had pressed for the 
exclusive use of Latin. The difference in number of classes may be explained 
by the fact that Sturm had no antecedent vernacular schools as Calvin did. 
While Cicero was still prominent at Geneva, Calvin placed less emphasis upon 
his works than did Sturm. During Sturm's lifetime his school overshadowed 
Calvin's efforts, but Calvin was able to achieve more lasting results.34 
In 1558, the Council approved a plot of ground for a permanent location 
for the college and academy. Calvin solicited gifts and effectively encouraged 
the inclusion of the schools in wills. The partially completed building was 
dedicated and put into use under the forms of the 1559 Ordres, although it was 
not finished until 1563.35 The academy was not divided into classes as the 
college was. There were no promotions and no degrees. Students were given 
attendance certificates and character references. Gifts and government funds 
allowed the instruction to be free. Arts and theology faculties existed in 
Calvin's day, and law and medicine were added after his death.36 Before he 
died, Calvin was able to place the academy upon firm foundations. 
The three levels of schools, the three separate fou nding dates, and 
different leaders such as Saunier, Castellio and Theodore de Beza have caused 
confusion among educational historians. Other problems appear as well, for 
example, Frederick Mayer, in a standard history of education, listed the 
courses taught in the academy and included mathematics, although this was 
not mentioned in the Ordre, as was the rest of his list.37 This may have 
resulted from Calvin's having a well-known mathematician on the faculty, even 
though he was teaching philosophy. Similarly, Calvin has often been gently 
chided for being deductive, even though Francis Bacon was four years old 
when Calvin died. Cordier has often been cited as rector of Geneva's schools, 
although there is no evidence that he ever had the position of leadership.38 
Discipline has been called severe in the schools, and it was, compared to the 
permissive classroom, but compared to the sixteenth century, it was mild.39 
One of the most significant contributions that Calvin made to the schools 
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was the recruiting of good teachers. Since the essential purpose of education 
in Geneva was the religious preparation of the people for service to the church 
and the city, the Ordinances of 1541 included the teachers under the same 
discipline as the ministers. They had not only to be adequate pedagogues, but 
theologically learned and orthodox as well. While this seems restrictive to the 
present age, it was not unusual then. In addition to Saunier and Cordier, 
another significant addition was Castellio, who served as headmaster of the 
college, but whose quarrelsomeness led to difficulties. He resigned because of 
an inadequate salary, and sought a pastorate. He was found to have a mildly 
heretical view of the Song of Solomon and the creed, and was denied the 
pastorate.40 He developed a deep resentment toward Calvin, whom he felt 
was responsible for his problems, and in May 1544 he accused the ministers of 
being guzzlers and licentious, charges he could not prove. For this he was 
expelled form Geneva and his resentment turned to hate, leading to attacks 
from distance over the following years.41 Calvin exercised some moderation 
here, for the usual result of heresy was death. Fewer problems resulted from 
Calvin's efforts to staff the academy in the late 1550s. After fai ling to secure 
some outstanding French scholars he wished, growing problems at Lausanne 
led Beza to move to Geneva. A short time later Calvin gained several faculty 
from the academy at Lausanne who had resigned over Bern's assumption of 
secular authority over spiritual discipline.42 These men were Calvinists and 
gave the academy an instant faculty of repute. 
Opinion varies widely among historians regarding the number of students 
enrolled in the College and Academy in 1559. The uniformly agreed upon 
number from the rector's book is 162, but whether this is both schools or the 
academy alone is not clear. Four years later there were 300 enrolled in the 
academy and 1200 in the college. From these figures, some scholars have 
assumed extremely rapid growth. Alternatively, Paul T. Fuhrman claims that 
the 162 refers to the academy, and that there were approximately 800 enrolled 
in the combined schools.43 William Monter supports this, indicating that there 
were 280 in the first class of the college, and Emanuel Stickelberger said there 
were 900 in the combined schools.44 If these figures are correct, it would 
present a more realistic view of growth, doubling over a four year period, and 
would also make provision for the fact that the college was functioning prior 
to 1559. 
Prior to the reorganization, students were primarily from Geneva and 
France.45 Following 1559, students began to come from all over Europe. 
Many of them were excellent scholars who contributed to the intellectual 
ferment in Geneva, and then returned to influence their native lands. Among 
the most illustrious were John Knox, the reformer from Scotland; the tutor of 
King H enry IV of France; Thomas Bodley, later of Oxford University; Caspar 
Olivianus, co-author of the Heidelberg Catechism (with Zacharius Ursinus); 
and Marnix of Saint-Aldegonde, a leader of the Dutch revolt against Spain.46 
Indirect evidence of the penetration of Calvinistic thought through Geneva's 
schools appeared in a 1625 list of eminent men of Louvain, Belgium, one-
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fourth of whom studied in Geneva.47 
The value of the schools has been variously assessed. J. G. Compayre has 
suggested that the CoUege was little more than a school for the study of 
Latin.48 Another has suggested that the primary function was to " ... safeguard 
and advance the interest of his particular church .... '"'9 This last statement 
distorts the breadth of Calvin's views, but is at least technically correct. Such 
expressions, and the claim that Calvin's standards of doctrine " ... naturaUy 
limited and crippled the education given ... ,"50 raise the question of the 
significance of Calvin's progress toward free and useful education, and the 
issue of freedom of thought. John T. McNeill, one of the most prolific 
modern writers about Calvin, made a fine distinction, suggesting that while 
Calvin was not egalitarian he was not necessarily thereby anti-democratic. As 
a consequence, at the lower levels, the young had equal educational 
opportunity regardless of birth or wealth.51 At the upper levels, since the 
education was for church and community leadership, women were not 
admitted, and the wealthy or distinguished had an advantage. 
Another aspect of the freedom of thought is the assumed Protestant 
emphasis upon the right of the individual to interpret the Bible without the 
intermediation of the church. Such a manner of stating the problem is not 
quite accurate from Calvin's perspective. He emphasized the right of 
"understanding" more that the right of " interpretation," and the necessity of 
correct belief more than freedom of belief. Subordination did not disappear 
from Calvin's system; it was directed to correct belief and true spiritual 
teachers rather than to Rome. In the light of this, Calvin wrote little about 
education to "interpret the Bible," but he did emphasize the necessity of 
education so that the Bible could be studied and true interpretation 
recognized and understood. 
The use of the catechism made clear that, for the majority of citizens, the 
learning of specific answers to specific questions was thought the most 
effective method of teaching the material needed for the defense of the faith. 
Luther had so ably demonstrated the effectiveness of the catechism, that both 
Calvinists and Catholics adopted the method with little comment.52 The 
catechism, the Institutes, expulsions and persecution make clear that there 
were definite bounds to freedom of thought in Geneva. 
Still another element in the limitation of freedom resulted from Calvin's 
view of man. From classical sources the Humanists had adopted the view that 
man could raise his estate through education. While Calvin had Humanist 
influences in his own educational background, he apparently reacted against 
them in a considerable measure, moving beyond the Catholic view that man 
could be raised by grace administered through the Church, to a position where 
grace administered solely by the will of God was the only hope. For Calvin, 
education was not a panacea for solving the ills of the race, but it was still 
necessary to educate children concerning their evil state and their obligations 
to God. Since Calvin did not regard children as partakers of grace until able 
to comorehend it. thev could be esoeciallv evi l. 
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Because of Calvin's "failure" to understand education in a modern secular 
light, some have claimed that he did comparatively little to further education, 
and that he produced no "new education" independent of the clergy and its 
authority.53 This supposedly resulted from a failure to fully grasp the meaning 
of private judgment, and thus Calvin failed to apply Protestant principles and 
was not fully Protestant.54 This is one of the most glaringly anti-historical 
perspectives in modern educational writing, completely missing the theological 
consistency of Calvin, and implying that one is not Protestant if the concept of 
freedom does not coincide with that based upon four hundred years of 
additional thought about the problem. 
Nicholas Hans made an apparent error on the opposite extreme; that is, 
too favorable to Calvin. He claimed that, while the Calvinist tradition was 
"essentially progressive," the appearance of rote use of catechisms in Scotland 
was evidence of degeneration " ... into narrow and intolerant dogmatism."55 
This view ignored Calvin's and Luther's use and promotion of catechisms. 
A final aspect of the issue of freedom of thought is the different 
interpretations of Calvin's willingness to allow the study of science. As 
previously noted, physics was present in the curriculum of the college, but 
science in the form of medicine did not enter the curriculum of the academy 
until after Calvin's death. Calvin opposed astrology and palmistry as inimical 
to seeking God's will by more o rthodox means, but, while against some forms 
of superstition, he did not necessarily endorse science.56 Some scholars have 
asserted that there was implicit in Calvinism an impulse toward free inquiry, 
not necessarily obvious in Calvin, but that found fruition in his followers, 
leading to the dominance of science by Calvinists as suggested by Robert K. 
Merton.57 This is the natural result of the Calvinistic view of natural 
revelation combined with the right of the student to freely examine and prove 
all things, an idea that grew among Calvinists. Calvin did have the 
mathematician Tagaut as a faculty member shortly after the founding of the 
academy, although he taught philosophy. Copernicus was ignored and John 
H olywood (Sacro Bosco) was the thirteenth-century astronomical authority at 
Geneva.58 Calvin was more pre-Copernican than anti-Copernican in scientific 
matters. Science did not develop among the Calvinists until the sense of 
professionalism could be combined with the Calvinist sense of call in the 
following century. 
The rejection of Calvin's views on method and freedom contributed to the 
neglect of his more important contribution to the practical provision of the 
means to enlist civil support for education. 
A SPREADING INFLUENCE 
Whatever the limitations of Calvin and his thought, he firmly believed in 
spreading the gospel by educating learned and zealous pastors. This was the 
goal of Genevan education. The pastors were further taught, at least by 
example, that an educated laity was essential to the strong church. As the 
Calvinistic influence expanded, the growth of schools was not far behind. The 
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Genevan pattern of educating citizen and minister together until the university 
level became the normal pattern wherever Calvinistic thought permeated. 
While Calvinism is narrow by modern standards, it was based on the new 
learning of the time (save the sciences), and thus appeared dynamic and 
progressive. 
France was the first objective of the Calvinists. Calvin never forgot his 
homeland, becoming a Genevan citizen only late in life. His first love outside 
Geneva was the French Reformed Church. The majority of early enrollees in 
Geneva's schools were French. These students returned to France to 
strengthen the growing Huguenot movement. Between 1555 and 1566 a 
minimum of 161 pastors returned to France from Geneva. The flood reached 
the point that Charles IX asked the magistrates to stop the supply, which 
request was refused.59 By 1559, when Calvin wrote the Gallic Confession for 
the use of the French Church, the French protestants numbered over 
400,000.60 By 1561 there were 2,150 churches.61 When Calvin died in 1564, a 
religious war was in progress and persecution growing. Huguenots were 
numerous, powerful and in a position to dispute the kingdom with the 
Catholics. The Geneva-trained did not seem to advocate subversion, but 
persuasively argued the Reformed cause. 
The high point of the penetration of Calvinism came with the Edict of 
Nantes of 1598. The Huguenots had religious freedom and control of some 
two hundred towns where they were able to develop the schools on the lowest 
levcls.62 Later they developed thirty-two colleges and eventually eight 
Huguenot universities, including the best known at Nimes, Montauba, and 
Saumur. The Geneva standards were observed: the poor and the laity were 
educated, synods made liberal appropriations for the universities, supervision 
of both faculty and students was present, and use was made of the Bible and 
the vernacular.63 Following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the schools 
were suppressed and the Huguenots began to flee France. Education in 
France among the Protestants never became compulsory, as it had been in 
Geneva, on any basis other than a local one. Power was never concentrated 
enough for that. The impact upon France was great, but only temporary, and 
the longer lasting influences of Calvinistic education came from other 
countries. 
Calvinism entered to a limited extent into Italy, Austria, Poland, Hungary 
and Bohemia, but there is little available evidence that any lasting 
achievements were made in education. Slightly better results were obtained in 
the Palatinate, as has been noted, and some of the other German states. The 
Palatinate became significant primarily through the universities of Heidelberg 
and Marburg, the former the most significant Calvinist university other than 
Geneva. It excelled Geneva in law, medicine and philosophy.64 Frederick III, 
especially, promoted Calvinism at the university and was responsible for the 
authorizing of the Heidelberg Catechism in 1563,65 as well as establishing the 
lower schools in each village. In some of the western German states, schools 
were established under the German Reformed Church, especially in such 
90 Zabilka 
locations as Strassbourg, Nassau, Bremen, Hesse, Baden and Anhalt.66 These 
efforts were modest, and they were eventually absorbed into Lutheranism. An 
exception would be the academy at Herborn in Nassau, that attained the 
status of a university. Several precursors of modern "non-scholastic" 
educational theory taught there, including the Christian encyclopedist, Johann 
Alsted, and John Annos Comenius, the seventeenth-century intellectual leader 
of the Czech Brethren, who were the catalysts for igniting the national spirit of 
that land. Under the impact of Pietism, this school also became the center of 
the foreign missionary efforts of the German Reformed Church in the 
eighteenth century, especially through the ministry of Philip Wilhelm 
Otterbein.67 
The major development of school systems came in H olland and Scotland, 
where compulsory education was adopted on a nationwide scale. In Holland, 
where some schools were in existence before the Calvinists came to power, the 
Dutch merely adapted these schools to their needs and expanded them to 
make them universal.68 Freeman Butts, the educational historian, indicated: 
The Synod of the Hague in 1586 provided for the establishment of 
schools in the cities, and the Synod of Dort in 1618 provided for the 
establishment in all villages of schools under control of the civil 
magistrates, to give free instruction to the poor.69 
The salaries of schoolmasters were paid with civil funds. 
The middle class had assumed the leadership role in the struggle against 
Spain, and Calvinism was found to fit very well with their design on both 
political and religious freedom from Spain. As in Geneva, parents were called 
upon to read the Bible and teach the catechism to their ch ildren. The schools 
extended religious instruction as well as the more secular elements of 
education. Only Reformed Church members could instruct in the schools.70 
Pastors were made the superintendents of the schools and were required to 
inspect them regularly. Some of the provinces passed school taxes based on 
the number of eligible children, and not those actually attending. Eventually 
some pastors were designated as truant officers to make sure the children 
were in school.70 Such were some of the familiar innovations that are now 
regarded as commonplace. They were developed in response to the needs of 
accomplishing the typical Calvinist objectives of educating the citizenry to 
carry out their task. 
The Calvinist innuence naturally reached the U niversity, as Geneva 
became the example for the University of Leiden. Holland became the prime 
example of that wedding of Calvinism and middle class mercantilism that 
reached fruition in New England. Comenius's views on raising sunken 
humanity through education found especially fertile soil in Holland as well.71 
Leiden was founded in 1575 and was quickly followed by Franeker, 
Groningen, Utrecht and Harderwijk. All were Calvinistic centers and began 
to attract foreign students in the fashion of Geneva, especially as zeal declined 
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in Geneva and the center of Calvinism shifted northward. Holland became 
the major center for the exporting of Calvinism.73 
A national system of education also developed in Scotland. There the 
system was more under the influence of one man, John Knox, as had been the 
case in Geneva under Calvin. Consequently, education in Scotland seems 
more narrow then that in Holland, and more subject to the limitations of 
Knox's influence. The Scottish schools were not unnoticed or failing of 
influence, but Scotland never became as great a center as Holland in 
propagating the faith. Part of this may also be that they were less a sea-faring 
and trading people than the Dutch. 
As in Holland, the Scottish schools did not have to be started. In the 
fifteenth century James I decreed the maintenance of public schools, but little 
had been accomplished. The catalyst for Scotland was time John Knox spent 
with Calvin in Geneva around 1556.74 Knox observed the relation between 
Church and State and the power of the school system capped by the academy. 
Such a system, he believed, would promote the reformation in his homeland as 
well. Knox advocated educating girls in the same schools, and the right of 
every child of talent to any level in the system.75 In 1560 the General 
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church recommended to the Scottish 
Parliament that primary schools be established in connection with each 
church, and middle schools in every town of importance. Many years passed 
before this was realized, but in 1616, 1633 and 1646, laws were passed which 
provided for schools in each parish.76 Knox had hoped to finance the schools 
from the old church and monastic foundations, but the nobles also had designs 
upon that income, and Knox was unsuccessful. Some schools were begun on 
the local level during his lifetime; he died in 1572, but the fruition came after 
his death. In 1567, Parliament caused the Presbyterian Church to appoint 
visitors or superintendents for the existing schools, and when the church was 
established in 1592, these visitors became responsible for licensing teachers.n 
Presbyteries received the right to tax for the schools in 1640, but exercised the 
right in only a limited fashion. In 1646 the erection of schools became 
mandatory, a law that was poorly observed. 
The influence of Geneva was also apparent in the founding of the 
University of Edinburgh. Unlike the medieval autonomy of the faculty and 
nations of the medieval university, Edinburgh was placed under the civil 
administration and the ministers of the city. This meant much more control of 
the curriculum and faculty. The university was intended to serve the Church.78 
The success of the Scottish schools was much longer in coming than in 
Holland, and failed to have as much impact subsequently, but it is notable that 
the schools that were in existence were nearly as available to the poor as the 
rich. There was an egalitarianism that is not quite so apparent in any other 
European country. 
England was not without the Puritan influence stemming from the 
writings of Calvin. The academy was again the pattern for Emmanuel College 
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adoption of Calvinistic ideas by Thomas Cranmer, and the subsequent 
influencing of the Church of England by Calvinism, culminating in the mild 
Calvinism of the Thirty Nine Articles. The effects of Calvinism in England 
upon education of the very young were less spectacular than Holland and 
Scotland. England had much greater difficulty breaking away from the idea 
that education was for the wealthy. Religious strife also prevented the 
development of a comprehensive system at an early date. 
While a survey of the influence of Calvinism upon American schools is 
clearly beyond the scope of this paper, it is necessary to note that the founding 
of schools in every parish in New England is a direct influence of the 
Calvinism of the early settlers, as were schools in the Carolinas where 
Huguenots were settling, and the schools of the Scotch Presbyterians in the 
central colonies. These early American colonists were influenced by what they 
had seen in Switzerland, Holland and Scotland. The Dutch influenced the 
formation of the same kinds of schools in New Netherlands. The strongest 
schools, and those broadest based, tended to be in the colonies with the 
greatest Calvinist influence. The expansion of education clearly shows the 
remarkable influence of one man and the schools he promoted in Geneva. 
CONCLUSION 
Calvin was extremely influential in developing concepts of Church and 
State that provided the means of promoting universal elementary education. 
There is a correlation between the presence of Calvinism and the development 
of state-supported schools. Calvin wrote little on education, but provided an 
example of a working system that spread his theological ideas very effectively. 
His contribution appears to have been neglected or ignored because of the 
narrowness of his views and the unpopularity in more enlightened ages of the 
rigorous pursuit of theological and moral error in Geneva. 
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Kaiser, Walter C., Jr. 171e Uses of the Old Testament in the New. Chicago: 
Moody Press, 1985. xvi, 270 pp. $12.95, hardback. ISBN 0-8024-9085-9. 
Kaiser has written this book essentially in an attempt to demonstrate that 
the New Testament's use of the Old Testament is one of objective integrity, 
sound and reasonable exegesis, and revelation by the Holy Spirit. As such, his 
aim is clearly apologetic--a defense of the infallible and inerrant nature of 
Scripture, a position that cannot be maintained, in Kaiser's judgment, by an 
interpretation of the New Testament's use of the Old Testament other than by 
the one he offers. 
Two quotes from the preface illustrate the author's legitimate concerns. 
First, Kaiser asks (pp. x-xi): "In their attempt to show that the Messiah and 
many of the events in the first century had indeed been anticipated by the Old 
Testament writers, have the New Testament writers cited the Old Testament 
quotations according to their real truth-intention and original writer's 
meaning?" On p. xii, Kaiser presents the alternative: "Or did they so massage 
the Old Testament text that it suddenly printed out new meanings previously 
unattested, but in the contemporary tradition of rabbinic midrash or Qumran 
peslier?" Of course, by framing the options in such a black-and-white 
relationship, and by using such patently rhetorical questions, lo say nothing of 
emotive phrases like "massage" or "suddenly printed out," Kaiser clearly 
indicates his position. Kaiser attempts to buttress his position by identifying 
five different types of uses of the Old Testament in the New, including the 
apologetic, prophetic, typological, theological and practical uses. 
To be faithful lo his hypothesis, there are also certain terms which Kaiser 
eschews, some of which are "double meanings" or "multiple meanings" or 
se11sus plenior. Conversely, there are other terms with which Kaiser is 
enamored. I tried to keep count, but lost track of how many times he uses the 
word "single." 
While I am deeply appreciative of the author's work, his obvious 
homework, and his concern to preserve the integrity of Scripture, I have some 
reservations about his effort. In the first place, his handling of 1 Peter 1:10-12 
(pp. 18-21) is not convincing. Has not Peter attributed a greater "ceiling" to 
the prophet's knowledge about the future other than chronological ignorance? 
Second, it is not certain that all of Kaiser's illustrations are correctly 
categorized. Why, for example, is Matthew's use of Hosea 11:1 cited as an 
illustration of the "apologetic" use of the Old Testament, when it fits the 
" typological" category much better? Again, could not Old Testament " rest" 
themes be as much "typological" as " theological?" Finally, Kaiser could have 
engaged other pertinent matters, such as Paul's reading of the creation story 
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and the question of whether Paul added a dimension of interpretation to his 
reading of the creation narrative that is at best implicit, but certainly not 
explicit. Or again, consideration needs to be given to the three distinctive uses 
made by New Testament writers of the Abraham narrative (Paul, James, the 
author of Hebrews), and to the question of whether or not such matters were 
known to the author of Genesis. 
Some words have been left out of a quote on p. 26, and incorrect Hebrew 
words appear on p. 82. 
The main contribution of Kaiser's book will be to stimulate further 
discussion of the New Testament hermeneutic applied to the text of the Old 
Testament, and for that we need to thank hir.1. 
VICTOR P. HAMILTON 
Professor of Religion 
Asbury College 
Wilmore, Kentucky 
Theissen, Gerd. The Shadow of the Galilean: The Quest of the Historical Jesus 
in Nan-alive Fann Philadelphia: Forcress, 1987. 212 pp. $9.95, paper. 
ISBN 0-8006-2057-7. 
The Shadow of the Galilean is an intriguing conjunction of three significant 
currents in contemporary New Testament scholarship. First, it brings together 
and communicates, in an illuminating and readily accessible way, the fruit of 
the application of sociological analysis to the first-century world of Jesus. This 
kind of study has already helped us see what it was like to "walk and talk" in 
the first century, and this new book draws on those labors in very helpful ways. 
Second, it exploits the recent interest in, and itself contributes to, current 
efforts at "narrative exegesis." In the author's own words, " the basic structure 
of narrative exegesis consists of historical reconstructions of pallerns of 
behavior, connicts and tensions, and its superstructure consists of fictitious 
events in which historical source material is worked over in a poetic way" (p. 
19). Finally, this is a creative contribution to the quest of the historical Jesus. 
Methodological discussions related to this "narrative" approach to the quest 
appear regularly, though without disrupting the now of the narrative. 
What Theissen offers the reader is a story whose main character is an 
educated, relatively wealthy, Jewish merchant--one Andreas, son of John. 
Through misfortune, Andreas is arrested by the Romans in Jerusalem, then 
released on the condition that he serve as a spy for Pilate. As the narrative 
un folds, we sec ancient Palestine--its religious, economic, political and social 
realitics--through the eyes of a Jew struggling to make sense of his faith in the 
face of the ambiguities resulting from centuries of Hellenistic influence and, 
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more recently, from Roman occupation. Through his experiences, we are 
introduced to a gang of freedom fighters, Sadducees, Essenes, John the 
Baptist, and others, including Jesus, each with their options for faithful living 
in a strained world. 
As the title suggests, we never quite meet Jesus face-to-face in Theissen's 
story: our information is always second-hand. Nevertheless, we are enabled to 
see something of the way " real people" in the early part of the first century 
A.D. might have responded to Jesus. Thus, we are brought face-to-face with 
the promise of Jesus, and the problem of Jesus, for people of his own time. 
These windows into the impact of Jesus are fascinating, and themselves make 
this book well worth reading. 
In this context, it is notable how optimistic Theissen seems to be with what 
we can know of Jesus of Nazareth. He appears to believe that already during 
Jesus' own ministry people of many walks of life knew his message; they 
recited his parables and teachings and told stories of his miracles to one 
another. At the same time, however, Theissen is able to show how, even from 
early on, certain aspects of J esus' ministry were being interpreted differently 
or developed along surprising lines. 
It is true that at times the story suffers from the appearance of artificiality, 
with Theissen's characters too obviously being used to communicate 
Theissen's lecture notes. And we might wonder at some points whether 
Theissen has left us too much in the dark about the contours of Jesus' life and 
message. Nevertheless, this is an important book precisely for the way it 
paints the background of J esus' world and shows how ordinary people of 
ancient Palestine, whether poor or rich, would have received J esus' message. 
Thfa is a book that deserves a wide readership, including discussion by small 
groups. 
JOEL B. GREEN 
Acting Dean and Assistant Professor of New Testament 
New College for Advanced Christian Studies 
Berkeley, California 
Kugel, James L. and Rowan A. Greer. Early Biblical Interpretation. Library of 
E arly Christianity. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986. 214 pp. Select 
Bibliography (Kugel) and Notes (Greer). Scripture Index. 
ISBN 0-6642-1907-1. 
The third volume in the Library of Early Christianity series, edited by 
Wayne Meeks of Yale University, actually unites two self-contained 
monographic studies under one cover. James L. Kugel, who has written not 
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only as a biblical scholar but also as an historian of Jewish biblical 
inlerprelalion, analyzes J ewish biblical inlerprelalion from the exilic period lo 
the turn of the era, while Rowan Greer, a distinguished scholar of early 
Christianity, takes the measure of patristic exegesis. Though each essay could 
stand on its own, they nevertheless converge on so many points that they 
provide a coherent and concise account of early biblical interpretation which 
would be useful mainly to seminarians and ministers, though biblical scholars 
ignorant of how the Bible was read prior to the nineteenth century (and they 
are many!) will find here an excellent introduction. 
Kugel's essay argues for the essential continuity between early and late 
forms of Jewish interpretation, and rightly lo..:ates the birth of interpretation in 
the emergence of texts, as opposed lo events or oral t radition, as the locus of 
religious authority. A stable collection of sacred literature generates the 
necessity of interpretation out of its increasing distance from the reading 
community. Kugel outl ines how the need for interpretation arose and the 
forms il look, concluding with an insightful study of how selected J ewish 
exegetes approached certain texts. This last section is worth the entire study. 
Kugel demonstrates convincingly that, however strange early exegesis appears 
to moderns, it nevertheless constitutes a close hearing of the biblical text 
worthy of scru tiny. A selecl bibliography concludes Kugel's contribution. 
Greer's essay, like Kugel's, recognizes the consolidation of a stable, if nol 
absolutely closed, collection of sacred writings as the key to the birth of an 
exegetical tradition, and so offers a theological analysis of the appearance of 
the "Christian Bible," referring not merely to the New Testament canon, but 
to the peculiar shape of the Christian Scripture as a two-testament unity. This 
Bible, he argues, " is the product of the formative period of early Christianity" 
and is a "central feature of [early ecumenical] unity" (p. 111). The central 
question faced by early Christian theologians was how the Jewish Scriptures 
(OT) might serve as a witness to Christ. It was, therefore, an explicitly 
theological undertaking, as opposed to the primarily histo rical and/ or literary-
acsthetic concerns of modern interpretation. G reer then outlines how the 
predecessors of Irenaeus used the Hebrew Bible to art iculate the Christian 
message. It was in the writings of lrcnacus, though, that a clear fram ework of 
interpretation developed, namely, the " Rule of Faith." Greer is at his best 
here, demolishing the idea that the Rule of Faith was an ideological grid 
forced onto an unwill ing text, and demonstrat ing its positive fun ction of 
preserving, on the one hand, the particularity and pastness of the H ebrew 
Scriptures, while asserting, on the other hand, the Christian claim that the 
story of Israel (the OT) comes to completion in the sto ry of Jesus. Finally, 
Greer points out that the e ntire enterprise of interpretation arises precisely 
because the Rule of Faith only establishes a general theological framework 
without dictating the methods or conclusions on any given text. The Rule thus 
warrants, indeed demands, interpretation of the Bible for its own sake. 
Both of these essays arc well writlen, and despite their being intermediate 
introductory works, they advance distinctive lines of argum ent and offer fresh 
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readings of important primary texts. No person concerned about the role of 
biblical interpretation in Christian theology should overlook this important 
book. 
LAWSON G. STONE 
Assistant Professor of O ld Testament 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Stambaugh, John E., and Balch, David L. The New Testament in its Social 
Environment. Library of Earliest Christianity. Philadelphia: Westminster, 
1986. 194 pp., maps. ISBN 0-664-25012-2 
The Library of Earliest Christianity, of which this volume is a part, 
attempts to "take down fences" by allowing scholars from various academic 
disciplines to bring their distinctive expertise to bear upon the history of first-
century Christianity. Accordingly, the present work is co-authored by two 
men who come to the task from divergent backgrounds. David Balch is a New 
T estament scholar, who has written widely in the areas of New Testament 
ethics, and the philosophical and rhetorical background of the New 
Testament. John Stambaugh is a historian whose work has focused upon the 
ancient city and the Roman Empire. 
These two scholars direct their significant talents to the production of a 
"social history'' of primitive Christianity. They attempt to explore the New 
Testament Church from the perspective of sociological studies, along the lines 
of works produced by Gerd Thcissen, Wayne Meeks, and Abraham Malherbe. 
The aim of the present volume is descriptive, and ideologically neutral: the 
authors wish only to " understand" the early Christian communities, not to 
"explain them by supposedly universal laws of social behavior." Consequently, 
the writers present straightforward discussions of the historical background of 
the period, the relationship between first-century mobility and the Christ ian 
mission, economic history, society in Palestine, first-century city life, rounded 
off with a chapter that attempts to tie all of this together under the rubric of 
"Christianity in the Cities of the Roman Empire." 
There is much to commend this volume. The sociological study of first-
century Christianity holds great promise for enhancing our understanding of 
the New Testament and of the Christ ian faith in general. The present volume 
directs this study to the whole of primitive Christianity, not just to specific 
communities or particular dimensions of first-century Christian life (such a 
restricted focus characterizes most works on the sociological background of 
primitive Christianity). Moreover, the writers present technical information 
and complex issues in a remarkably clear and easy-to-read fashion. And the 
annotated "suggestions for further reading" at the back of the book are 
extremely helpful. 
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In spite of these positive considerations, the book is generally a 
disappointment. For one thing, there is a lack of integration and cohesiveness. 
The individual chapters stand virtually independent of one another; and the 
final chapter falls far short of providing the kind of synthesis the writers 
promise for it. One wonders if this is not a result of dual authorship (although 
certainly a result which could have been avoided). The reader can identify with 
virtual certainty those portions written by Balch and those by Stambaugh, but 
the reader will have difficulty discerning the connections between these 
portions. 
Furthermore, there is too much rehearsing of the well-known history of 
the period. Almost all of this information can be found in histories of the New 
T estament or works on New Testament background. Indeed, so much 
historical recounting is included that it r aises doubts regarding the need for 
this volume. Although there are certain sociological emphases in this book, 
there is little included here that does not appear in major works dealing with 
the history of the period. 
A more substantive criticism involves the issue of meaning. In their 
attempt lo remain "descriptive" and neutral, the authors fai l to explore the 
meaning of this background for the understanding of the first-century church 
or the interpretation of the New Testament. The reader must be satisfied with 
occasional indications as to the way in which a custom or social form illumines 
an iso lated New Testament passage. Unfortunately, in the process the writers 
tend lo engage in questionable exegesis in order to show relevance for New 
Testament passages. 
When all is considered, this volume can be recommended only with great 
reservations. 
DA VlD R. BAUER 
Associate Professor of English Bible 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Applebee, Denis. When I Tread the Verge of Jordan. Marion, Indiana: World 
Gospel Mission, 1988. 78 pp. ISBN 0-9620406-2-2. 
This book contains live lectures given in 1988 at Wesley Biblical Seminary 
for the Ray W. and Marianne E. Chamberlain Holiness Lectures. The author 
is a well known and highly respected pastor, evangelist and educator among 
the more conservative Wesleyan holiness churches in Great Britain and the 
U nited States. H e recently taught at Wesley Biblical Seminary as an adjunct 
professor and previously taught at Emmanuel College in England. He is 
presently the international pastor of the World Gospel Mission whose 
headquarters are in Marion, Indiana. 
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These lectures are a really fine devotional study of the Christian life. 
Their intent is to present the Wesleyan doctrine of entire sanctification as a 
crisis experience in a more intelligible and biblical way than has often been 
done by Wesleyan writers who allegedly often ignore the context of Scripture 
in treating the biblical texts on holiness. The author recognizes that his 
approach will be controversial because he departs from his holiness-Wesleyan 
tradition at some very crucial points, but he is willing to do this because it is 
obviously better lo be biblical than "orthodox." Consequently, he admits that 
his perceptions are not intended to be representative of the seminary where he 
delivered these lectures. 
This reviewer found these lectures to be warm, personal and inspiring. 
They fit into the category of literature which is now being called spiritual 
formation. The author's approach is to take both an Old Testament and a 
New Testament passage, to view them contextually within the history of 
salvation, and then to relate them to the believer's spiritual life in practical 
terms. The author's style of writing and emphases renect his pastoral 
concerns and experience. His grasp of the theological issues also renects his 
experience as an educator and teacher. 
I was especially impressed with the basic soundness of his approach which 
describes the New Testament understanding of sanctification in the light of 
the Old Testament language of Canaan Land. His reasoning and 
interpretation of key biblical passages were solid and insightful. 
However, I felt disappointed at some rather key points in his 
reinterpretation of the Wesleyan view of entire sanctification. First, I must 
confess that I felt a bit suspicious when he placed "orthodox" Wesleyan 
thinking against his new interpretation of the doctrine of holiness. Theology is 
an always-developing discipline because of the need to restate the message in 
terms understandable to every new generation; but the author is suggesting 
that not only is there a need for restating the doctrine of holiness for today, 
but also that there has been a serious deficiency in the way that it was 
traditionally understood. Being a teacher of Wesleyan theology myself, I 
naturally read with keen interest to see just how the Wesleyan tradition had 
been incorrect in one of its key doctrines. 
I believe the author failed to make his case at some very crucial points. 
First and foremost is his own misunderstanding of the doctrine of sin. He 
obviously once labored with a misconception which implied that sin was a 
physical-like thing which occupied one's personhood and which was eradicated 
when one was filled with the Holy Spirit. Seeing the difficulties of this 
interpretation which he erroneously allributes to the Wesleyan tradition, the 
author repudiates any such notion that sin is something which is " cleansed" 
during the crisis experience of entire sanctification. In fact, he reinterprets a 
Pauline passage which has reference to "the body of sin" as if Paul is talking 
about the physical body (pp. 44-45) . The tone of his arguments is to downplay 
the "cleansing" element and to stress instead the element of separation unto 
r.n<f. This is r.snr.ri;i llv nnlirr.:1hlr. in his <lisrnc;c;inn nf ri rrnmric:inn n f h P,.rt 
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He denies that the rite of circumcision was al all associated with the meaning 
of cleansing. This is a most remarkable position and clearly deviates from the 
universal consensus of biblical scholarship. And it clearly stands over against 
the theology of John Wesley in whose tradition the author supposedly stands. 
Clearly " uncleanness" and an uncircumcised heart are used interchangeably in 
Scripture. That is why the prophets called upon Israel " to circumcize the 
foreskins of your heart" (Jer 4:4). That is why Moses told the Israelites that 
not until the Lord had circumcised their hearts would they be enabled to love 
Him perfectly (Deut 30:6). The association of circumcision with cleanness is 
unmistakable (see Isa 52:1 and Lev 19:23). Just as the " flesh" which was 
excised in circumcision symbolized an inherited im purity, so the New 
Testament particularly uses the imagery of " flesh" to speak of sin. That is why 
Paul talks about the new circumcision as liberating the believer from the 
"flesh" (Col 2:11). The " flesh" does not refer to the physical body in these 
instances, but it is a metaphorical way of speaking of sin and is derived from 
the ancient practice of the physical circumcision of the inherited " flesh" which 
symbolized impurity. 
The author's misinterpretation of sin comes dangerously close to 
embracing a modernized form of Pelagianism on the one hand, whereas his 
emphasis upon "separation unto God" as constituting the essence of the 
sanctified li fe places him more within the Keswick movement than the 
Wesleyan tradit ion. Indeed the author gives the Baptist preacher and author, 
J . Sidlow Baxter, much credit for his way of reinterpretating the Wesleyan 
doctrine of holiness. I have pe rsonally read with great interest the writings of 
Baxter and have found them, in many ways, parallel to the Wesleyan 
perspective. This reviewer, however, finds Baxter's interpretation of the 
theology of John Wesley quite defective and inaccurate in many instances, 
even though Baxter's emphasis on holiness is otherwise helpful at many points. 
Wesley, like Augustine, Luther and Calvin, interpreted the essence of 
original sin to be pride. This is a real condition in which everyone is born and 
only by God's grace can it be remedied. When Wesley talked about a 
cleansing from the being of sin, he was sim ply using the pictorial and concrete 
language of Scripture which mctapborically describes original sin as a " root" 
(H eb 12:15) or a "dwelling-in-me" entity which Paul cried out to be liberated 
from (Rom 7:20). 
Classical theology described sin as " not-being" because "being" was 
ident ified with what is true, good and beautiful. So if one wished to speak 
qui te literally about sin, it is " not-being" in the sense that sin is distorted anc! 
depraved being, and not-true being. But the language of Scripture does not 
use such phi losophically precise categories; rather, it describes experience in 
concrete and fu nctional language, such as picturing sin as if it were a root or 
something that dwells in us which needs to be cleansed. 
The author is quite right in rejecting the view that sin is literally a thing 
which could be extracted like a decayed tooth, but he confuses the issue when 
he suggests that Wesleyan theology holds to such a view. It may be that many 
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have thought of it in these terms, but this is surely not the representative 
position of W esleyan theology. As a consequence of a serious 
misunderstanding of a Wesleyan view of sin, the author misinterprets the 
meaning of cleansing as it relates to Wesley's doctrine of entire sanctification. 
An ironic situation emerges as the author finds himself trying to steer a course 
between the Pelagian trap of downplaying the nature of original sin on the one 
hand, and embracing a Keswick emphasis on "separation" as opposed to 
cleansing from sin on the other hand. 
Inasmuch as the author opts for an emphasis on separation instead of 
cleansing, be has embraced Baxter's emphasis on entire sanctification as 
meaning separation to God. Baxter frequently uses the terms "entire 
sanctification," but he defines it as denoting primarily loving God with all the 
heart by living a separated and committed life, but he rejects Wesley's 
emphasis on cleaning from sin. How someone can love God with all their 
heart while retaining the original sin of pride in their heart at the same time is 
not explained by Baxter. 
This author's apparent acceptance of Baxter's view of sanctification is a 
rather surprising development considering the fact that the author is obviously 
representing the World Gospel Mission, an international missionary society, 
which is committed confessionally to " the spread of Scriptural holiness over 
the lands" in good Wesleyan fashion. I would imagine that the author does 
not really see himself as differing from the theological confession of the World 
Gospel Mission, but rather as trying to restate the doctrine of holiness in ways 
which will better communicate the message. If so, this is indeed 
commendable. But to do this effectively, a more adequate understanding of 
the meaning of cleansing from sin as understood from within the Wesleyan 
tradition needs to be forthcoming. 
Despite these critical remarks, I pe rsonally e njoyed reading this 
thoughtful and helpful devotional treatise on the meaning of the holy life. IL is 
an important contribution to the growing body of recent literature in spiritual 
formation. 
LAURENCE W. WOOD 
The Frank Paul Morris Professor of Christian Doctrine 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Butler, Trent, C. Word Biblical Commentary: Joshua. Waco, Texas: Word 
Books, 1983. xiii, 304 pp. $22.95. ISBN 0-8499-0206-1. 
Over a decade ago, Brevard C hilds complained that m odern 
commenta ri es of Joshua have concentrated o n the histo rical and 
archaeological issues of the book while largely ignoring its theological 
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dimension (Old Testament Books for Pastor and Teacher [Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1977], pp. 44-45). The appearance of Trent Butler's 
commentary represents a significant correction to that tendency. H e has 
written a scholarly work which, while alert to historical questions, primarily 
focuses upon the meaning of Joshua as God's word in its contemporary 
setting. He believes the book of Joshua to be a key toward unlocking a host of 
literary and theological problems in Old Testament studies. 
His attention to literary criticism and theology are doubtless the result of 
his educational background, which includes a Ph.D. from Vanderbilt 
University and post-doctoral study at the U niversities of Heidelberg and 
Zurich. 
Influenced by Martin Noth, Butler adopts the position that Joshua is part 
of the Deuteronomistic historical work comprising Deuteronomy, Joshua, 
Judges, Samuel and Kings. This work utilized earlier material and traditions, 
but reached its final shape during the exile. As such, it bears the theological 
stamp of that period. Methodologically, Butler employs the tools of literary 
criticism (form, tradition and redaction criticism) to recover both these earlier 
traditions and the various stages in their compilat ion. The result is an 
interpretation which endeavors to understand the traditions in their original 
setting and as the final product of Deuteronomistic redaction. In its canonical 
form Butler understands the book as a message to the exiles in Babylon. 
Published in the Word Biblical Commentary series, this book follows its 
distinctive format. The exegesis of each textual unit consists of an initial 
bibliography, original translation of the text, textual notes, form-critical and 
literary analysis, verse by verse commentary and, finally, an explanation of the 
overall significance of the unit. Though sometimes cumbersome and prone to 
produce repetition, this format allows the commentary to be read on several 
levels. The translation, comments and explanation will be accessible to the 
student or pastor, whereas scholars will appreciate the full range of material 
presented. The bibliographics arc especially comprehensive, including works 
in all scholarly languages. 
The introduction is concise, yet presents a useful review of recent 
scholarship on Joshua. Butler's survey of literary critical work sets the 
commentary in the context of the Alt-Noth school. Rather than the traditional 
rubric "Theology," another introductory section is entitled, "The Meaning of 
the Material." Here Butler outlines what he views as the four major 
theological concerns in Joshua: Land, Leadership, Law and Lord. These four 
themes, especially the first two, recur throughout the commentary, a nd arc 
understood as a message of hope to the landless exiles in Babylon looking for 
new leadership aft er the model of Joshua; someone who will reestablish them 
as the people of God's covenant. Other introductory essays include the 
form ation of the book, the concept of an Israelite amphictyony and the 
relation of archeology to the book. 
There is a legitimate question which should be asked of Butler's 
commentary: In what sense is it evangelical? According lo the editors of the 
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series, "The broad stance of our contributors can rightly be called evangelical, 
and this term is to be understood in its positive, historic sense of a 
commitment to scripture as divine revelation, and to the truth and power of 
the Christian gospel" (p. ix). Butler does adopt somewhat conservative 
positions on certain issues, but broadly speaking his commentary is much 
more in line with J . A. Soggin's commentary (Joshua. OTL. Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1972.) than the decidedly conservative volume of M. H. 
Woudstra (171e Book of Joshua. NICOT. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981.), 
who argues that Joshua was composed soon after the events by a single hand. 
Because there is no established tradition regarding the composition of Joshua, 
as is the case with the Pentateuch, Butler fe.els free to break out of the 
hermeneutical constraints imposed by some conservative circles. Yet at the 
same time, throughout the book he reveals explicitly and implicitly his 
commitment to the divine origin and authority of Scripture. He does not find 
literary criticism and its results incompatible with a high view of inspiration. 
He expresses this when discussing Deuteronomistic editing of the book: "The 
criteria for authority and canonicity in the OT is not that of having been an 
eyewitness of the events. Rather, it is that of having been inspired by God to 
use the traditions of the nation to interpret the identity of the nation for the 
fu ture" (p. 117). 
Although some within the circle of Evangelicalism may disagree with 
Butler's approach and methodology, there is no doubt that he has produced a 
commentary which reflects extensive research and reflection. It does not 
always break new ground, but what it may lack in originality is compensated 
for by its breadth of scholarship and depth of interpretation. It is a welcome 
addition to the literature and will serve a wide audience for many years as an 
example of thorough commentary writing and careful, theological exegesis of 
the book of Joshua. 
OWEN DICKENS 
Assistant Professor of Religion 
Asbury College 
Wilmore, Kentucky 
Croatto, J . Severino Biblical Henneneutics: Toward a Theory of Reading as 
the Production of Meaning. Translated by Robert R. Barr. Maryknoll, 
New York: Orbis, 1987. x+94 pp. ISBN 0-88344-583-2 (original), 
0-88344-582-4 (paper). 
The last two decades have marked a perceivable shift in the ways the 
hermeneutical task is conceived and pursued, with new literary-critical 
methods moving into the spotlight. In this process, older, more traditional 
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approaches (e.g., form and redaction criticism) have often been questioned, 
sometimes marginalized or even discarded. After briefly surveying the major 
phases of philosophical hermeneutics and outlining interpretive options 
championed among modern interpreters, Croatto develops a biblical 
hermeneutic clearly at home with these newer, reader-oriented approaches. 
The book's orientation to the pastor and student is manifest in its clearly 
elaborated use of " in-house" language and its helpful glossary. 
In the view of Croatto, the discipline of hermeneutics must embrace three 
related phenomena--the primacy of the text, the preunderstanding of the 
reader and the enlargement of the text through reading and re-reading. 
Hence, the interpreter is not so much concerned with the background of a 
text, or the intentions of the author, but, first, with the text as text. He argues 
that because we read a text, not an author, the text is open to a plurality of 
meanings. The real focal shift, however, is to the "forward" of the text--i.e., 
what it suggests as a pertinent message for the one who receives it. In this 
rereading, the plurality of possible meanings is narrowed; a closure of 
meaning occurs whereby the text speaks in the present as God's word. 
Crucial to this hermeneutical understanding, therefore, is the notion of 
process; both the process by which biblical texts have come to us in the canon 
(which provides its own closure of meaning), but also the process whereby the 
reader engages the text in a fertile rereading. The hermeneutical process 
itself, the production of meaning, is a part of the biblical message. The 
legitimacy of this approach is worked out with reference both to philosophical 
hermeneutics and to the ways in which the Bible interprets itself. Traditional 
ideas of inspiration and canon also come in for discussion, and in helpful ways. 
The one major proviso I would mention upon refl ection on Croatto's 
approach has to do with his constant emphasis on the plurality of meanings of 
a text. He himself is cognizant of the potential "anything-goes-ism" in his 
model, and, at one point, insists on the urgency of situating the text in its 
proper context by means of historical-critical methods. But this stands as little 
more than a footnote in the development of his model, and we are left 
wondering about the place of these traditional models (or even newer 
sociological approaches) in the hermeneutical process he envisages. 
Clearly, Croatto is interested in a more creative and relevant reading of 
the Bible. And this little book should be of help to those who share this 
interest. 
JOEL B. GREEN 
Acting Dean and Assistant Professor of New T estament 
New College for Advanced Christian Studies 
Berkeley, California 
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Salter, Darius L. Spirit and Intellect: Thomas Upham 's Holiness Theology, 
Studies in Evangelicalism, vol. 7, Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow, 1986. 
278 pp. $27.50. ISBN 0-8108-1899-X. 
Darius L. Salter's study of Thomas Cogswell Upham (1799-1872), 
refreshingly avoids hagiographic tendencies of religious biography and reveals 
a man thoroughly immersed in the thought-patterns of mid-nineteenth-century 
America. Salter, professor of pastoral theology al Western Theological 
Seminary and former executive director of the Christian Holiness Association, 
does not regard Upham's philosophy to be novel. He traces the background 
of Upham's ideas to Locke and to Scottish common-sense philosophers. 
U pharn's psychology, also eclectic, came about through temperamental quirks 
that led him to seek spir itual answers in mysticism a nd Wesleyan 
perfectionism. Not "ahead of his time," Upham was, like many of his 
contemporaries, a "systematizer" of ideas. Chronologically, he furnished a 
half-way house between Jonathan Edwards's speculative philosophy and 
William James's empirical investigations. 
Salter argues that Thomas Upham's unique contribution to Ame rican 
psychology and philosophy was his argument for freedom of the will which 
provided the theologica l turn whi ch helpe d him move fr om hi s 
Congregationalist training in New England theology to Phoebe Palmer's 
Wesleyan perfectionism. Yet it was not Upham so much as it was his era that 
created his thought patterns. U pham, who lived at the confluence of 
transcendentalism, romanticism and unitarianism, represents a spiritual 
proto type of his age. As well as anyone he merged holiness theology and 
transcendental romanticism. " Free will, impartation, accent on God's 
benevolence, the antebellum era's increasing romantic naivete" met in 
Upham's perfectionism. This era also produced ecclesiastical democratization 
as the laity took over the altar from the clergy. 
Salter is at his best as he sets the stage for Upham's intellectual-spiritual 
shift by presenting the historical background of the American idea of a 
benevolent God as the basis for a mid-nineteenth-century benevolent empire 
of social reform. Timothy Smith called this arrangement "a holy happiness, a 
happy holiness." According to Upham, "God's happiness is the contemplation 
of the holiness and happiness of his creatures." In Scottish common-sense 
philosophy, Upham found a philosophical machine: "Where there is perfect 
liberty ... there is perfect harmony, but there cannot be perfect harmony, nor 
harmony in any degree without law." Upham's God circumscribed himself by 
the moral laws of his own creation. 
Where Upham deviated from orthodox eighteenth-century Wesleyanism, 
Salter accredits the departure to a "naturalistic optimism that Wesley's more 
definite concept of depravity did not allow him to share." Or was it, to stay 
with Salter's earlier analysis, Wesley's less optimistic age that innuenced the 
found er of Methodism in the direction of depravity? Upham saw 
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sanctification more as a positive aspect of union with God than as a cleansing. 
In chapter five, on "Mysticism," Salter provides another discussion of 
Upham's deviance from orthodoxy, and in footnote no. 87 he quotes Timothy 
Smith's superb explanation that Upham joined Wesleyanism to mysticism in 
order to bridge the gap between Christian piety and transcendentalism in his 
own era. 
The effect of the Holiness Movement was to elevate nineteenth-century 
Christian social ethics. (Salter shares Donald Dayton's argument that early 
twentieth-century campmeeting proliferation reflected an escapist mentality 
among Wesleyans.) In both ethics and psychology, Upham was an optimist, a 
proponent of national and individual progress. Sanctification, a n 
instantaneous act of grace, freed man from conscious sin and, over time, could 
purge him of acquired habits. 
In his final chapter, Salter outlines Benjamin B. Warfield's (1851-1921) 
objections to Upham's dtysticism, Arminianism and perfectionism. The 
purpose is to contrast these two common-sense philosophers of adjoining eras. 
Also, Warfield wrote the longest critique of Upham, published in 1931. But 
this chapter detracts from Salter's emphasis on Upham as a product of his 
time. If Upham's theology was temporally based, then criticism by Warfield, 
who was hardly a contemporary, is only slightly useful. To keep from 
detracting from his thesis that Upham (and by association, Wesleyan 
perfectionism) was a product of mid-nineteenth-ce ntury inte llectua l 
movements, Salter should have placed this Warfield material in some other 
place than his concluding chapter. 
This first definitive monograph on Upham is part of the Studies in 
Evangelicalism series edited by Kenneth E. Rowe and Donald W. Dayton, a 
series which represents new confidence among Holiness Movement scholars. 
The book is the child of a 1983 Drew University dissertation on "Thomas 
Upham and Nineteenth Century Holiness Theology." If the book has stylistic 
weaknesses, they are the note-to-note dissertation mode and the assumption 
that its audience recognizes the name of Upham's Wesleyan mentor, Phoebe 
Palmer, without benefit of a biographical note. Its endnotes are a gift to 
Upham students and the diction is improved by an occasional sprightly phrase, 
such as: "Newtonian physics had taken some of the transcendence out of God, 
or at least, put the upstairs office within commuting distance." This is an 
important contribution to an understanding of the mid-ninetee nth-century 
evangelical mind. 
NORMAN M URDOCH 
Associate Professor of History 
University of Cincinnati 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
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Kittel, Gerhard and Gerhard Friedrich, eds. Theological Dictionary of the New 
Testament. Abridged ed. Bromiley, Geoffrey, tr. from German. Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1985. xxxvi, 1356 pp. 
Paper, ISBN 0-8028-2402-9; Hardback, ISBN 0-8028-2402-9. 
Geoffrey W. Bromiley has produced a long-awaited, one-volume edition 
of "Kittel." This abridgement is handier and more affordable and manageable 
than the original multi-volume set. The strength of Bromiley's desk-top copy, 
however, is that the serious scholar can use it as a handy reference work, or as 
an index to the voluminous unabridged set. For example, whereas the three-
paragraph treatment of eudia (fragrance) may lead scholars to the multi-
volume set, the eighteen-page treatment of /ego (to speak) would probably 
suffice. 
Fo r many academicians, denominational leaders and clergy this 
abridgement will supplant the popular unabridged "Vine's." Comparatively 
speaking, Bromiley's textual arrangement presents a less-congestive reference 
work which orchestrates spacious subheading, full-sentence explanations and 
tangential derivations. He wisely buttresses his theological etymologies with 
descriptions of classical prototypes and contemporary secular parallels. 
Nonetheless, the publisher's assertion that Bromiley presents "a convenient 
and portable reference tool" is perhaps a mild overstatement: convenient and 
resourceful, yes, put a portable "Liddell and Scott" it is not. 
The publication of Bromiley's abridgement could not have been more 
timely. A myriad of scholars from various types of institutions have shown a 
renewed interest in American southern religion, thereby magnifying the role 
of good reference works. The public exchange between Eugene D. Genovese 
and Southcrnists illustrates this point well (Miami University's Symposium on 
Southern History, 1988). The Marxist Southernist vividly and convincingly 
relayed the importance of proslavery antebellum sermons as primary 
resources (see The Mind of the Master Class. forthcoming, Norton). 
However, Genovese's use of doulos (slave), as used by nineteenth-century 
clergy, was hermeneutically in question. The doulos of the American South 
had a much bleaker existence than his Greco-Roman counterpart. Bromiley's 
succinct four-page representation of doulos clarifies the issue. Incidentally, 
"Vine's" does not even represent doulos, listing only soma under the rubric 
"slave"! The latter represents an unfortunate reliance on English translations, 
an error poignantly noted by Edwin Yamauchi ("Slaves of God," Bulletin of 
the Evangelical 111eological Society, 9.1 [1966):43). 
Whereas theological dictionaries are found primarily in the offices of 
theologians and clergy, the renewed interest in century-old sermons will 
necessitate their usage by a plethora of Southernists as well. A perusal of the 
footnotes in Anne C. Loveland's Southern Evangelicals and the Social Order, 
1800-1860 (LSU Press, 1980) will verify this assertion. 
Members of the religious orders and history departments alike will 
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benefit from Bromiley's well-organized abridgement. Recently, one of 
Bromiley's longtime colleagues told me that Bromiley was "omni-competent." 
Although this is a flallering overstatement, the new abridgement does 
represent a strong commitment to excellent scholarship. 
J. ALAN PATIENGALE 
Assistant Professor of History 
Azusa Pacific University 
Azusa, California 
Pelikan, Jaroslav. Jesus Through tlze Centuries: His Place in the History of 
Culture. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, xi + 270 pp. $22.50 
cloth, $8.95 paper. ISBN 0-06-097080-4 
Jaroslav Pelikan, Sterling Professor of History al Yale University, studies 
the images of Jesus preserved by successive ages, starting from the rabbi of 
the first century to the liberator of the twentieth century. Based on the 
William Clyde De Vane lectures, Jesus Through the Centuries discerns in each 
age an image of Jesus that has been celebrated and received, and reveals how 
these images have both shaped and been shaped by culture. Rather than 
examining the development of theological doctrine, which he has done in his 
771e Christian Tradition , Pelikan presents in rough chronological order, 
eighteen cultural " portraits" of Jesus from the history of humankind, both 
Christian and non-Christian. The author studies the poetry and prose, the 
painting and sculpture, the mosaic images and rhetorical pictures of Jesus by 
which people have expressed his meaning for them in their own time. 
Based on the premise that Jesus is the most influential figure in Western 
culture, Pelikan presents the images of Jesus as they have appeared 
historically. The author believes that the best conceptual fram ework for the 
range of images is the classical triad of the Good, the True and the Beautiful, 
although there is no consistent application of this framework through the 
book. Pelikan contends that in discussing the perception of J esus in the 
history of culture, "each successive epoch found its own thoughts in Jesus" 
(Schweitzer). 
The earliest Christian communities sought to understand Jesus in relation 
to his background in Judaism. From a treatment of Jesus as "Rabbi," the 
author turns to the significance of Christ for human history. As "The Turning 
Point of History," the Christ-event provided a new interpretation of history, as 
the early church adapted the Heilsgeschichte of the OT to the redemption of 
humanity accomplished through the death and resurrection of Jesus. Jesus 
Christ, as the "Light of the Gentiles," is presented as the common hope for 
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the world by second and third century apologists, who perceived him as 
anticipated in pagan thought. 
Jesus as Lord, in opposition to the lordship of Caesar in the second and 
third centuries, is the theme of the chapter entitled "King of Kings." Fourth-
century metaphysics identified the "Cosmic Christ" as the historical Jesus. 
Pelikan astutely notes that theological anthropology was a response to 
soteriological and Christological developments. Jesus, portrayed as the "Son 
of Man," is not only the image of divinity, but also the image of humanity as it 
was originally intended to be. 
Against the docetic tendencies of the iconoclasts, Byzantine art and 
architecture sought to take seriously the incarnation of Christ--the "True 
Image." The author views Medieval art and literature as centered on the 
theme of "Christ Crucified." The culture of the Middle Ages was impacted by 
the symbol of the Cross as both the "power" and "wisdom" of God. Pelikan 
interprets the Medieval monastic movement as maintaining the ideal of the 
conquest of the world by Christ through the denial of the world for Christ 
("The Monk Who Rules the World"). Jesus as the "Bridegroom of the Soul," 
becomes the object of mystical experience. Francis of Assisi is presented by 
the author as the figure who was the apex of the development of Christ-
mysticism and was at the same time the fountainhead for a new appreciation 
of the historical Jesus ("The Divine and Human Model"). 
Pelikan insists that the new concept of humanity that arose in the 
Renaissance was not in opposition to the Christian religion, but it was an 
understanding of Christian rebirth (renascentia) as .the restoration of human 
nature to the original goodness of its creation, and of Jesus as the " Universal 
Man." The Reformation is interpreted as an appeal to the authority of the 
historical Jesus, and a reaction to the authority of the institutional church. 
Jesus as the "Mirror of the Eternal," was the revelation of the True, the 
Beautiful and the Good. "Prince of Peace" is a chapter devoted to reflection 
on the three-fold typology of theories about Jesus and war in the sixteenth 
century: just war, crusade and pacifism. J ustification for each of these 
positions was sought in the person of Jesus. 
Jesus was viewed by Rationalists/Deists during the Enlightenment of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the "Teacher of Common Sense." 
The essence of the gospel was equated with reason and natural religion. 
Effort was made to penetrate beneath the Christ of faith to the Jes us of 
history and the ethic of his teaching. Pelikan interprets nineteenth-century 
R omanticism as an attempt to go beyond the quest for the historical Jesus to a 
Jesus who could be called the "Poet of the Spirit." 
Alongside the conventional portraits of Jesus as the pillar of the status 
quo in state and church, the author presents the tradition of those who 
perceived him as the "Liberator." Radical conformity to the life and death of 
Jesus, as well as revolutionary obedience to his imperatives, were trademarks 
of a tradition that interpreted the teaching of Jesus as a "Christology of 
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revolutionary praxis." The expansion of Christian missions in the last two 
centuries involved the communication of the person of Christ cross-culturally, 
as "The Man Who Belongs to the World." The stress on the universality of 
his person and message is seen by some as supplanting the particularity of 
Jesus and the absoluteness of his message. 
Jesus 111rough the Centuries attempts to acquaint the nonspecialist with 
the importance of Jesus in the general history of culture, by taking the reader 
on a "quest for the symbolic Jesus" as perceived by generations of the 
previous two mille nnia. Although Pelika n views culture in broadly 
anthropological terms, the images he selects are governed by his theological 
priorities. The generalizations and omission.; that are discernible in Pelikan's 
selective presentation are to be expected in the writing of such a work. Ample 
footnotes provide the reader with a wealth of bibliographic information for 
delving deeper into each subject. Pelikan's lucid and unpretentious style 
makes Jesus 171rough the Cenh1ries an invaluable resource for understanding 
the place of Jesus in the history of culture. A number of color plates add to 
the richness of this volume. Beyond the literary quality and esthetics of this 
work, however, the reader is challenged to come to grips with the religious 
images of Christ at work in culture. 
R. DAVID RIGHTMIRE 
Assistant Professor of Religion 
Asbury College 
Wilmore, Kentucky 
Peck, M. Scott, M.D. 17ze Different Dn1111. New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1987. 334 pp. ISBN 0-671-60192-X. 
In this heavily anecdotal record of Dr. Peck's own pilgrimage, we arc 
helplessly drawn into examining our own relationships. Peck divides the book 
into three canons: The Foundation, The Bridge and The Solution. 
Definitions of community are illustrated generously throughout the first 
section. Many are compelling and convicting, since few of us have taken our 
past " communities" as seriously as Peck does, at least in reflection. High 
conviction catches all of us as we examine the probabilities that we often settle 
for "pseudocommunity" instead of integrity in relationships. 
Excellent development work appears in The Bridge segment of the book, 
and helpful reflective patterns are offered and modeled for examining 
experiences of emptiness, vulnerability, integration and integrity. 
Peck's "Solution" is focused almost entirely on the necessity of nuclear 
disarmament. He offers a pattern for examining the American church and the 
r ' c ThP h" "li- ic: rlr.::i rlv "cn11ntf'.r c-11lt11 rt>." in tnnf'. ::incl Vf'.t it is 
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compassionate and not strident. 
This is the second Peck book I have used as a catalyst for an annual 
marathon meeting of a continuing support group. We worked through People 
of the Lie two years earlier. Both books served us well by providing mirrors 
into which to gaze to examine our own integrity in the face of enormous 
pressures to conform to compromising values and behaviors. 
Those of us who know that our survival with sanity and wholeness is 
directly contingent on maintaining a support community of significant peers 
will likely profit most from The Different Drum . Most clergy live in splendid 
isolation, as do most theological academics. These are likely to find the book 
mildly discomforting and might be better served to read something else unless 
their loneliness is getting them down. 
DONALD M. JOY, Professor of Human Development 
Ray and Mary Jo West Professor of Christian Education 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Wangerin, Walter, Jr. As for Me and My House. Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 
1987. 252pp. ISBN 0-8407-5475-2. 
Walter Wangerin, story-teller laureate of contemporary Christendom, has 
given us the "Thanne and Walter Love Story." Everyone, I suspect, regardless 
of marital state, will see their own story here, revisit their own failures and be 
edified. 
"Early Marriage Work," heavily laced with Thanne and Walter anecdotal 
material, traces love, dat ing, motivation, marriage and the adaptation of two 
very different people to each other. 
"Forgiveness," part two, works through a theology of marriage and of the 
sin of manipulation for selfish purposes which plagues a marriage. But 
Wangerin's eloquence in enveloping us in patterns and strategies of 
forgiveness, and covenant making and keeping is easily the peak of the whole 
book. 
A final segment, " Marriage Work--The Continuing Tasks," plays a set of 
strings on the keyboard of continuing the lifelong marital work. The section is 
open enough to range from how to nurture effective communication to 
spotting early signals of potential adultery, as well as how to deal with abuse in 
a marriage. 
I have assigned the book now twice in classes dealing with "discipleship 
development in the family." This means that I have also read critiques and 
responses to As For Me and My House, perhaps a hundred times. In my 
eighteen years of leaching, students have not been more positive in their 
ratings of a book, especially in terms of its transforming impact on their 
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willingness to be vulnerable and to make changes in their own relationships 
and marriages. 
Appearing as the book did, virtually at the same moment as our Lovers: 
What Ever Happened to Eden? (Dallas: Word Books, 1987), which is in many 
ways parallel in scope and equally anecdotal, Robbie and I had the feeling that 
we were "twins" to Walter and Thanne Wangerin. Our story, tracing our 
"three marriages, all to each other" examines biblical foundations for 
husband-wife and male-female relationships in a different but highly 
congruent way. 
Theological and pastoral libraries will, of course, likely regard As For Me 
and My House as a necessary resource. I predict that it will extend Wangerin's 
fame into a new circle. The book easily vies with The Orphean Passages for 
the spot at the top among those of us who rank-order Wangerin's proliferating 
and helpful works. 
DONALD M. JOY, Professor of Human Development 
Ray and Mary Jo West Professor of Christian Education 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Marrow, Stanley B. Paul, His Letters and His 171eology: An Introduction to 
Paul's Epistles. New York: Paulist Press, 1986. iii-viii, 1-278 pp. $9.95, 
paper . ISBN 0-8091-2744-X. 
Stanley B. Marrow, S.J., is professor of New Testament at Weston School 
of Theology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he has taught since 1971. He 
obtained his licentiate in Scripture from the Pontifical Biblical Institute in 
Rome in 1964 and his doctorate in theology from The Gregorian U niversity in 
1966. Before coming to Weston he taught at the Biblical Institute in Rome. 
He serves as associate editor of New Testament Abstracts and the Catholic 
Biblical Quarterly . His previous books include: Basic Tools of Biblical 
Exegesis (1976), The Words of Jesus in Our Gospels (1979) and Speaking the 
Word Fearlessly (1982). 
Marrow is aware that a vast amount of literature on Paul already exists, 
but, in his perception, the literature tends to be one of two types. On the one 
hand, numerous treatments of Paul's writings are rather sim plistic devotional 
studies, concerned to further personal piety and edification. On the other 
hand, the fascination with the apostle has also given rise to no small amount of 
forbidding works of scholarship which are much too technical for the average 
reader. A further factor which complicates access to the apost le is that his 
thought has often been distorted by self-appointed reformers and outright 
heretics. The result has been that the Pauline corpus in the New Testament 
has continued to be a closed book to many Christians down to the present. 
This book is directed toward the perceived literary void which exists 
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between the uncritical devotional and the arcane scholarly treatments of Paul. 
The intended audience is those "educated laity who, in today's vortex of ideas, 
find their knowledge of Paul inadequate, and that inadequacy no longer 
tolerable" (p. 3). 
The sheer bulk of material relevant to Paul in the New Testament has 
also given rise to books which are either historical-biographical or exegetical-
theological. Marrow feels that this bifurcation has the potential of further 
distorting Paul's thought by producing histories which do not do justice to the 
theological basis of Paul's mission and travels, or theologies which treat Paul's 
thought in abstraction and in isolation from the historical circumstances out of 
which it arose. His concern is to "take up Paul's life in conjunction with his 
theology, attempting to illumine and interpret one by the other" (p. 2). 
This in turn determines the organization and content of the book. The 
first three chapters are largely historical and biographical in character, 
introducing the reader to the basic facts of Paul's background, his life both 
before and after his Christian conversion, the historical sequence of his 
epistles and the chronology of his missionary career (pp. 5-58). A chronology 
of Paul's life and letters (p. 18), as well as maps of the Roman world (p. 6) 
and the missionary journeys (pp. 46, 60, 113, 208), aid the reader in placing 
Paul in time and space. 
The greater part of the book is then given to a discussion of the major 
theological themes found in Paul's epistles (pp. 59-256) . The author regards 
only six of the thirteen books which claim Paul as their author in the body of 
the text as being authentically written by Paul (pp. 51 ff.). These include, in 
historical order, 1 Thessalonians, Galatians, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, 
Philippians and Romans. This historical ordering provides the sequence for 
chapters four through nine. 
The primary sources for the first three chapters are scattered historical 
and biographical references in the Pauline epistles, supplemented by the Book 
of Acts. Marrow attempts a via media between a complete rejection of the 
historical reliability of Acts and an uncritical acceptance of its historical 
content at face value. Throughout this section he relies heavily on Ernst 
Haenchen's study of the Book of Acts and reflects much of the same 
skepticism about the historical reliability of the book that Haenchen does, as 
well as a like skepticism which is found in the mid-twentieth century 
Bultmannian school of New Testament Theology. 
Haenchen's treatment of the Book of Acts spawned a generation of New 
Testament scholars who, among other things, have spent no little amount of 
time, space and energy ferreting out alleged discrepancies and contradictions 
between the theological premises and historical record found in the (late first 
century) author of the Book of Acts and that found in the Pauline writings. 
Marrow has followed Haenchen's precedents at numerous points here, most 
notably in connection with his lengthy (pp. 20-44) discussion of the meaning of 
Paul's conversion, which he regards as a primary datum for understanding 
Paul's thought (p. 2). 
118 Book Reviews 
The usual method for orgamzmg the discussion of Paul's theology 
proceeds on a thematic basis. A rather standard set of themes is selected and 
then the separate epistles are drawn upon to develop that theme. This 
procedure always runs the risk of obscuring the historical development of 
Paul's thought and blurring nuances which arose out of different historical 
settings. It also most often gives special prominence to Romans and 1 
Corinthians, leaving the content of the remaining epistles standing in their 
shadows. Marrow's historical organization--treating the epistles in their 
historical sequence--has the advantage of bringing some of the shorter epistles 
to the foreground and preserving the various slants of emphasis which the 
apostle gave these themes. 
The author gives one chapter to each of the six epistles which he regards 
as being authentically Pauline. He then isolates the major theme or themes 
resident in each book and carries out a contextual interpretation. Since, 
however, several of these are not exclusive lo one epistle, but often recur in 
subsequent epistles, the discussion of a given theme in one book is then 
supplemented by insights on the same theme from other books. T his 
preserves a unity for the author while it permits him to avoid repetitiveness as 
he moves from book to book. 
The major themes isolated for discussion include Paul's sense of mission 
and the uniqueness of his gospel (1 Thessalonians), eschatology (1 
Thessalonians, 1 Corinthians), law and freedom (Galatians, 1 Corinthians), 
sexual and marital ethics, the eucharist, spiritual gifts (1 Corinthians), 
apostolic authority (2 Corinthians), christology, pneumatology (Philippians, 
Romans), soteriology, anthropology and ecclesiology (Romans) . 
The book closes with a helpful bibliography of scholarly works for further 
reading, an index of terms and names found in the book, and an index of 
Scripture references. 
Marrow is obviously well read and informed in contem porary New 
Testament history and criticism, as well as in Pauline theology. He does quite 
well with what he sets out to do. The book was not intended to be exhaustive 
in its treatment of Paul's thought, but to serve as an introduction to the 
apostle and his writings (pp. 1 ff.). Neither the graduate student in theological 
studies nor readers who are more informed in the Pauline literature will find 
anything new or innovative here. The book represents a distillation of mid-
twentieth century Pauline scholarship for the interested lay person. Readers 
shaped by a more conservative scholarship will find his assignment of all of the 
New Testament books except six epistles of Paul to pseudonymous authorship 
discomforting, and his insistence that this makes no difference so far as the 
divine inspiration and canonical authority of those scriptures is concerned (pp. 
53 ff.) unconvincing. 
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